GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

2016

MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM
Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

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This is the fourth edition of the Global Terrorism Index which provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 16 years, covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2015.

Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The Global Terrorism Database is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has now codified over 150,000 terrorist incidents.

The research presented in this report highlights a complex and rapidly changing set of dynamics in global terrorism. While on the one hand the top-line statistics highlight an improvement in the levels of global terrorism, the continued intensification of terrorism in some countries is a cause for serious concern, and highlights the fluid nature of modern terrorist activity. The complexity of this year’s GTI is underscored by the fact that although 76 countries improved their GTI scores compared to 53 countries that worsened, the overall global GTI score deteriorated by six per cent since last year as many moderately affected countries experienced record levels of terrorism.

The 2016 GTI finds there has been a change from the pattern of the previous four years. 2015 saw the total number of deaths decrease by ten per cent, the first decline since 2010. The number of countries recording a death from terrorism also decreased by one. This decline in terrorism deaths is mainly attributed to a weakened Boko Haram and ISIL in both Nigeria and Iraq due to the military operations against them. However, expanded activities by both of these groups in other countries is posing new threats in other parts of the world. Boko Haram has expanded into Niger, Cameroon and Chad, increasing the number of people they have killed through terrorism in these three countries by 157 per cent. Meanwhile ISIL and its affiliates were active in 15 new countries, bringing the total number of countries they were active in to 28. This is largely why a record number of countries recorded their highest levels of terrorism in any year in the past 16 years.

There was a ten per cent decline from 2014 in the number of terrorism deaths in 2015 resulting in 3,389 fewer people being killed. Iraq and Nigeria together recorded 5,556 fewer deaths and 1,030 fewer attacks than in 2014. However, with a global total of 29,376 deaths, 2015 was still the second deadliest year on record.

While the weakening of ISIL and Boko Haram in their central areas of operations in Iraq and Nigeria is positive, this change has coincided with two key negative trends which have driven up terrorism in the rest of the world. The first is ISIL’s shift in tactics to transnational terrorism, not just to other parts of the Middle East but to Europe as well. The second key negative trend is Boko Haram’s extension into neighbouring West African countries which has led to Cameroon and Niger rising to 13th and 16th in the GTI.

Accompanied with these two key negative trends was an increase in the number of ISIL-affiliated groups that undertook attacks. The research found that the number of countries with greater than 25 deaths rose to 34, an increase of seven to the highest numbers ever recorded. At least six countries saw very significant deteriorations in their GTI scores in 2015 leading to large rank changes from the previous year. This accounted for the overall deterioration in the global GTI score of six per cent as these falls outweighed the substantial gains in Nigeria and Iraq. These countries include; France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia and Burundi.

In Europe, ISIL’s transnational tactics in combination with lone actor attacks inspired by the group drove an increase in terrorism to its highest levels ever. This increase was seen in many OECD countries resulting in a 650 per cent increase in executions.
deaths to 577 from 77 in 2014. ISIL's role in this increase was significant as more than half of the 577 deaths were in connection to the group. The attacks by ISIL in Paris, Brussels and in Turkey's capital Ankara, were amongst the most devastating in the history of these countries and reflect a disturbing return of the transnational group-based terrorism more associated with al-Qa‘ida before and immediately after September 11.

It is important to note that while the international community's focus has intensified on ISIL and its activities in Iraq and Syria, last year recorded the deadliest year for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both terrorist deaths and battlefield deaths committed by the Taliban significantly increased in 2015. Terrorism increased 29 per cent to 4,502 deaths and battlefield deaths increased 34 per cent to over 15,000.

This complex global picture was rounded out by pockets of more positive news whereby many other countries saw improvements in their levels of terrorist activity. One less country recorded a terrorist attack in 2015 than 2014, which halted the prior four-year trend of yearly increases in the number of countries experiencing terrorist activity. There was also progress in countering terrorist groups through international coalitions which led to reductions in deaths in the Central African Republic, Somalia and Sudan. Pakistan continued to see declines in its levels of terrorism due to infighting within the largest active group, the Tehrik I Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as to the operations of the Pakistan Army in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Improvements continued to be recorded in India which historically has had high levels of terrorist activity. Similarly, Thailand had the lowest number of deaths from terrorism since 2005, despite the 2015 Bangkok bombing which killed 20.

The global economic impact of terrorism in 2015 was broadly comparable to the previous year, costing the global economy US$89.6 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence which reached $13.6 trillion in 2015 (PPP). Only in situations of intense terrorist activity like Iraq are the costs of terrorism very significant. The cost of terrorism to the Iraqi economy were equivalent to 17 per cent of its GDP in 2015.

Statistical analysis of the drivers of terrorist activity show there are two distinct sets of factors associated with terrorism, depending on whether the country is developed or developing. The first set of factors which are closely linked to terrorist activity are political violence committed by the state and the presence of a conflict. The research finds that 93 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state sponsored terror, involving extra-judicial killing, torture, and imprisonment without trial. Similarly, over 90 per cent of all terrorist deaths occurred in countries already engaged in some form of conflict whether internal or international. This means only 0.5 per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that did not suffer from conflict or political terror. This underlines the close link between existing conflicts, grievances and political violence with terrorist activity.

When analysing the correlates of terrorism there are different factors that are statistically significant depending on the level of development. In the OECD countries, socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, militarisation, levels of criminality, access to weapons and distrust in the electoral process are the most statistically significant factors correlating with terrorism. This reinforces some of the well-known drivers of radicalisation and extremism. In developing countries, the history of conflict, levels of corruption, acceptance of the rights of others and group based inequalities are more significantly related to terrorist activity.

Individual terrorist acts are unpredictable but the report highlights some common statistical patterns. These patterns help inform the future deadliness of terrorist organisations, the trends in their tactics and the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations.

The 2016 GTI report reinforces the fact terrorism is a highly concentrated form of violence, mostly committed in a small number of countries and by a small number of groups. The five countries suffering the highest impact from terrorism as measured by the GTI; Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria, accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. Similarly, only four groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all these deaths; ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa‘ida.

This report also includes commentary on various aspects of terrorism. This includes efforts to understand terrorism such as Maggioni and Varvelli from ISPI who explore why there are hotbeds of radicalisation, and Schori Liang from GCSP who looks at the connection between criminal networks and terrorism. There are also explanations of what is being done to discourage and prevent the spread of terrorism. The Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Command’s Specialist Intelligence Team describe their experiences with community driven prevention, Cunningham and Koser from GCERF outline the role the private sector can play in preventing violent extremism, and von Einsiedel from the United Nations University Center for Policy Research describes the history of the UN’s work to resolve conflicts is stemming terrorism.

While terrorism as a form of violence has a major psychological impact on the societies it touches, there are other forms of violence which are more devastating. Major armed conflicts resulted in more deaths in 2015 as well as the wholesale destruction of economies. The global homicide rate is 15 times the death rate from terrorism.
2016 GTI Results

- Seventy-six countries improved their scores in the 2016 GTI while 53 countries deteriorated. However, the overall GTI score deteriorated by six percent since last year due to many countries experiencing record levels of terrorism.
- The five countries with the highest impact from terrorism as measured by the GTI are Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. These five countries accounted for 72 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015.
- Deaths from terrorism decreased by ten percent in 2015 to 29,376. This is the first decrease in number of deaths recorded since 2010.
- Iraq and Nigeria had the biggest decreases with 5,556 fewer deaths. This constitutes a 32 percent reduction in these two countries since 2014.
- In OECD member countries, deaths from terrorism dramatically increased in 2015, rising by 650 percent when compared to 2014. Twenty-one of the 34 OECD countries experienced at least one terrorist attack with the majority of deaths occurring in Turkey and France.
- ISIL-affiliated groups undertook attacks in 28 countries in 2015, up from 13 countries in 2014.
- There were 274 known terrorist groups that carried out an attack in 2015, of these 103 groups did not kill anyone.
- Twenty-three countries recorded their highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2015. This is six more than the previous high of 17 countries in 2014.

Trends

- Of the last 16 years, the worst year for terrorism was 2014 with 93 countries experiencing an attack and 32,765 people killed.
- Since 2006, 98 percent of all deaths from terrorism in the US have resulted from attacks carried out by lone actors, resulting in 156 deaths.
- ISIL foreign fighters who have gone to Syria generally have high levels of education but low incomes, with many fighters joining in part due to a feeling of exclusion in their home countries.
- There were 18 deaths caused by ISIL-affiliated attacks in the OECD in 2014. This number increased significantly in 2015, to 313 deaths from 67 attacks.
- Half of all plots with an ISIL connection have been conducted by people who have had no direct contact with ISIL.

Terrorist Groups

- In 2015 four groups were responsible for 74 percent of all deaths from terrorism: ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
- ISIL surpassed Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 2015 and was responsible for 6,141 deaths in the year.
- Boko Haram had an 18 percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 5,478 deaths during the year.
- Al-Qaeda had a 17 percent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 1,620 deaths in the year.
- The Taliban in Afghanistan had a 29 percent increase in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 4,502 deaths from terrorism during the year.
Correlates and Drivers of Terrorism

- Ninety-three per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state sponsored terror – extra-judicial deaths, torture and imprisonment without trial.

- Over 90 per cent of all terrorism attacks occurred in countries engaged in violent conflicts.

- Only 0.5 per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that did not suffer from conflict or political terror.

- Terrorism is more likely to occur in OECD member countries with poorer performance on socio-economic factors such as opportunities for youth, belief in the electoral system, levels of criminality and access to weapons.

- In both OECD and non-OECD countries terrorism is statistically related to the acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with neighbours, likelihood of violent demonstrations and political terror.

- Individual terrorist acts are unpredictable but follow common statistical patterns. This aids in understanding similarities between terrorist organisations, their tactics and the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations.

Economic Impact of Terrorism

- The global economic impact of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion in 2015, decreasing by 15 per cent from its 2014 level.

- Iraq is the country suffering the highest economic impact from terrorism, reaching 17 per cent of its GDP in 2015.

- Tourism’s contribution to GDP is twice as large in countries with no terrorist attacks compared to countries with attacks.

- The economic resources devoted to peacekeeping and peacebuilding represent two per cent of the economic impact of armed conflict and terrorism.
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries, covering 99.7 per cent of the world’s population.

Given the resources committed to counter-terrorism, it is particularly important to analyse and aggregate the available data to better understand its various properties. Examples of the information contained in this report are:

- The differing socio-economic conditions under which terrorism occurs.
- The longer term trends and how terrorism changes over time.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorists groups.
- The types of strategies deployed by terrorists, their tactical targets and how these have evolved over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends and to help inform a positive and practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.

The GTI is based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the most authoritative data source on terrorism today. The GTI produces a composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The GTD is unique in that it consists of systematically and comprehensively coded data on 150,000 terrorist incidents.

The GTI was developed in consultation with the GPI Expert Panel, and in particular with the advice of Expert Panel member and terrorism expert Dr Ekaterina Stepanova, Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit at the Institute of World Economy & International Relations. The GTI scores each country on a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable impact of terrorism. Countries are ranked in descending order with the worst scores at the top of the index.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions agreed to by the authors of the GTD, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) researchers and its advisory panel. The GTI therefore defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. This definition recognises that terrorism it not only the physical act of an attack, but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many years after.

In order to be included as an incident in the GTD the act has to be: “an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor”. This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

1. The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence — including property damage, as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the START database from 1997:

- The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience other than to the immediate victims.
- The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law. In cases where there is insufficient information to make a definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist incident within the confines of the definition, the database codes these incidents as ‘doubt terrorism proper.’ In order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism this study does not include doubted incidents.

It is important to understand how incidents are counted. According to the GTD codebook, “incidents occurring in both the same geographic and temporal point will be regarded as a
single incident, but if either the time of the occurrence of the incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate incidents.” Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook are as follows:

- Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city. This represents four incidents.
- A bomb goes off, and while police are working on the scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with automatic weapons. These are two separate incidents, as they were not continuous, given the time lag between the two events.
- A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery. This is one incident since it occurred in a single location (the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
- A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and, while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese policemen. This is one incident, since the hijacking was still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence the two events occurred at the same time and in the same place.

ABOUT THE REPORT

The 2016 GTI report comprises of six sections:

1. **RESULTS SECTION** analyses the changes in terrorism over the last year.
2. **TRENDS SECTION** explores the overall trends in terrorism over the past 16 years.
3. **TERRORIST GROUPS SECTION** analyses the major terrorist groups, including their relationships.
4. **ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM SECTION** summarises the economic costs of terrorism.
5. **CORRELATES AND DRIVERS OF TERRORISM SECTION** explores the link between political terror, human rights and terrorism, as well as the statistical properties of terrorist organisations.
6. **EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS SECTION** features research from leading academics and practitioners on approaches to understanding and countering terrorism.

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RESULTS

KEY FINDINGS

- Seventy-six countries improved their scores in the 2016 GTI while 53 countries deteriorated. However, the overall GTI score deteriorated by six per cent since last year due to many countries experiencing record levels of terrorism.

- The five countries with the highest impact from terrorism as measured by the GTI are Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. These five countries accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015.

- Deaths from terrorism decreased by ten per cent in 2015 to 29,376. This is the first decrease in number of deaths recorded since 2010.

- Iraq and Nigeria had the biggest decreases with 5,556 fewer deaths. This constitutes a 32 per cent reduction in these two countries since 2014.

- In OECD member countries, deaths from terrorism dramatically increased in 2015, rising by 650 per cent when compared to 2014. Twenty-one of the 34 OECD countries experienced at least one terrorist attack with the majority of deaths occurring in Turkey and France.

- ISIL-affiliated groups undertook attacks in 28 countries in 2015, up from 13 countries in 2014.

- There were 274 known terrorist groups that carried out an attack in 2015, of these 103 groups did not kill anyone.

- Twenty-three countries recorded their highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2015. This is six more than the previous high of 17 countries in 2014.
The Impact of Terrorism

Highest impact of terrorism

Lowest impact of terrorism

No impact of terrorism

Not included*

Global Terrorism Index 2016

Measuring the Impact of Terrorism

RANK | COUNTRY | SCORE
--- | --- | ---
1 | Iraq | 9.96
2 | Afghanistan | 9.444
3 | Nigeria | 9.314
4 | Pakistan | 8.613
5 | Syria | 8.587
6 | Yemen | 8.076
7 | Somalia | 7.548
8 | India | 7.484
9 | Egypt | 7.328
10 | Libya | 7.283
11 | Ukraine | 7.132
12 | Philippines | 7.098
13 | Cameroon | 7.002
14 | Turkey | 6.738
15 | Thailand | 6.706
16 | Niger | 6.682
17 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 6.633
18 | Sudan | 6.6
19 | Kenya | 6.578
20 | Central African Republic | 6.518
21 | South Sudan | 6.497
22 | Bangladesh | 6.479
23 | China | 6.408
24 | Lebanon | 6.068
25 | Mali | 6.03
26 | Colombia | 5.954
27 | Chad | 5.83
28 | Palestine | 5.659
29 | France | 5.603
30 | Russia | 5.43
31 | Burundi | 5.417
32 | Saudi Arabia | 5.404
33 | Israel | 5.248
34 | United Kingdom | 5.08
35 | Tunisia | 4.963
36 | United States | 4.877

RANK | COUNTRY | SCORE
--- | --- | ---
37 | Venezuela | 1.998
38 | Macedonia | 1.86
39 | Djibouti | 1.78
40 | Brazil | 1.74
41 | Madagascar | 1.671
42 | Bulgaria | 1.631
43 | Dominican Republic | 1.562
44 | Kyrgyzstan | 1.445
45 | Guinea | 1.403
46 | Belarus | 1.357
47 | Georgia | 1.257
48 | Belgium | 1.245
49 | Spain | 1.203
50 | Guatemala | 1.144
51 | Honduras | 1.144
52 | Albania | 1.103
53 | Estonia | 1.103
54 | Kazakhstan | 0.934
55 | Morocco | 0.892
56 | Lesotho | 0.892
57 | Netherlands | 0.864
58 | Switzerland | 0.864
59 | Armenia | 0.828
60 | Laos | 0.695
61 | Eritrea | 0.534
62 | Argentina | 0.499
63 | Trinidad and Tobago | 0.499
64 | United Arab Emirates | 0.422
65 | Zimbabwe | 0.413
66 | Congo | 0.365
67 | Azerbaijan | 0.346
68 | Ghana | 0.346
69 | Armenia | 0.288
70 | Iceland | 0.25
71 | Liberia | 0.25
72 | Hungary | 0.23
73 | New Zealand | 0.23
74 | Qatar | 0.23
75 | Austria | 0.182
76 | Montenegro | 0.154
77 | Uzbekistan | 0.154
78 | Bhutan | 0.115
79 | Jamaica | 0.115
80 | Czech Republic | 0.115
81 | Estonia | 0.115
82 | Latvia | 0.115
83 | Liechtenstein | 0.115
84 | Moldova | 0.115
85 | San Marino | 0.115
86 | Andorra | 0.115
87 | Monaco | 0.115
88 | Switzerland | 0.115
89 | Austria | 0.115
90 | Germany | 0.115
91 | Norway | 0.115
92 | France | 0.115
93 | Sweden | 0.115
94 | Belgium | 0.115
95 | Netherlands | 0.115
96 | Denmark | 0.115
97 | Finland | 0.115
98 | Ireland | 0.115
99 | Luxembourg | 0.115
100 | Iceland | 0.115
101 | Libya | 0.115
102 | United States | 0.115
103 | Turkey | 0.115
104 | Russia | 0.115
105 | Portugal | 0.115
106 | Spain | 0.115
107 | Italy | 0.115
108 | United Kingdom | 0.115
109 | Greece | 0.115
110 | China | 0.115
111 | Russia | 0.115
112 | United Kingdom | 0.115
113 | France | 0.115
114 | Germany | 0.115
115 | United States | 0.115
116 | United Kingdom | 0.115
117 | France | 0.115
118 | Germany | 0.115
119 | United States | 0.115
120 | United States | 0.115
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2016 | Results

* refer to the GTI methodology in Appendix C
TERRORIST INCIDENTS

THE TWENTY MOST FATAL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>INJURIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/4/2015</td>
<td>QAIM</td>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/5/2015</td>
<td>PALMYRA</td>
<td>SYRIA</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/9/2015</td>
<td>KUNDUZ</td>
<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>TALIBAN</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/4/2015</td>
<td>KARAMGA</td>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>BOKO HARAM</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/10/2015</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>SINAI PROVINCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/4/2015</td>
<td>ISHTABRAQ</td>
<td>SYRIA</td>
<td>ANSAR AL-DIN FRONT</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/8/2015</td>
<td>KUKUWA-GARI</td>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>BOKO HARAM</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/6/15</td>
<td>KOBANI</td>
<td>SYRIA</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4/2015</td>
<td>GARISSA</td>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>AL-SHABAAB</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/4/2015</td>
<td>FOTOKOL</td>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>BOKO HARAM</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DESCRIPTION

Assailants executed 300 civilians in Qaim, in the Al Anbar governorate.
Assailants executed at least 280 people, including civilians, government employees and Syrian Armed Forces soldiers.
Assailants raided Kunduz, storming the prison and releasing more than 500 inmates. At least 240 people were killed in this attack.
Assailants attacked a military base and residential areas which killed at least 46 soldiers, 28 civilians and 156 assailants.
An explosive device detonated on a Kogalymavia passenger flight which caused it to crash in North Sinai killing all 224 on board.
Assailants killed at least 200 civilians, and abducted at least 100 government soldiers, militia fighters, and their families.
Assailants opened fire on residents in Kukuwa-Gari village. Villagers were killed by gunfire or drowning in a nearby river, killing at least 174 people.
Assailants detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near the Syrian Border Police, then stormed the town and detonated two more explosives-laden vehicles, resulting in 74 deaths.
Assailants armed with grenades and firearms attacked students at Garissa University College, executing non-Muslim students, killing at least 154.
Assailants attacked residents, soldiers and buildings including mosques in Fotokol town, killing 144.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>INJURIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>10/8/2015</td>
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<td>143</td>
<td>UKRAINE</td>
<td>DONETSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>17/7/2015</td>
<td>BANI SAAD</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
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<td>13/1/2015</td>
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<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>BOKO HARAM</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10/2015</td>
<td>ANKARA</td>
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<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/10/2015</td>
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<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>TALIBAN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7/2015</td>
<td>KUKAWA</td>
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<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>BOKO HARAM</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/3/2015</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>FULANI MILITANTS</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/11/2015</td>
<td>PARIS</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/5/2015</td>
<td>ADEN</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>YEMEN</td>
<td>HOUTHI EXTREMISTS</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/8/2015</td>
<td>AQABA THARAA</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>YEMEN</td>
<td>HOUTHI EXTREMISTS</td>
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**DESCRIPTION**

Assailants attacked Ukrainian soldiers with artillery and tanks near Starohtivka. The Donetsk People's Republic claimed responsibility for the incident, which killed 143.

A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle detonated at a market, killing 121. ISIL claimed the attack as revenge for the deaths of members of the Sunni Muslim community in Hawija.

Assailants opened fire on a meeting of vigilantes in Zamfara state. At least 107 people were killed and an unknown number of others were injured in the assault.

Two suicide bombers detonated at a peace rally near the train station in Ankara. The assailants were identified as members of ISIL. The attack killed 105.

Assailants attacked security forces on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident which killed 100.

Assailants attacked residents in mosques and in their homes in Kukawa village, killing at least 97 people.

Assailants attacked residents and buildings in Egba village, killing at least 95 people.

Three suicide bombers opened fire on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris. This was one of several attacks in Paris on this evening, which resulted in a total of 136 deaths.

Assailants fired projectiles that struck a boat carrying fleeing civilians which killed 86 people.

Assailants attacked pro-government forces near Aqaba Tharaa killing at least 80 people.
The 2016 Global Terrorism Index finds that in 2015 the total number of attacks and deaths from terrorism both decreased by ten per cent.

This is notable after the 84 per cent increase in deaths in the prior year and indicates a possible turning point in the fight against terrorism. The change has mainly come about because of decreased activity of Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIL in Iraq following their respective military setbacks. It is the first time since 2010 that deaths caused by terrorism have fallen. Although the decline is encouraging, 2015 was still the second deadliest year for terrorism out of the last 16 years, with nearly a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths when compared to 2000. Terrorist attacks decreased ten per cent to 12,089, compared to 13,486 in 2014.

The large fall in the total number of deaths can mainly be attributed to declines in Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan.

Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria remain the five countries most affected by terrorism as measured by the GTI. The GTI scores the impact of terrorism based on the number of terrorist incidents in the past five years, fatalities from these attacks, injuries and damage to property. These five countries have been at the top of the index for the last three years. However, there have been substantial improvements in Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan.

In contrast, the average country score for the GTI, a measure of the impact of terrorism, deteriorated by six per cent. However, 76 countries improved their scores, while only 53 deteriorated. This highlights the complexity of the distribution and impact of terrorism with the most affected countries improving, as well as many others, but a significant group of countries recording their worst year for terrorism since 2000. There were 27 countries which experienced a deterioration in their GTI score of more than ten per cent in 2015. These include: Burundi, France, Belgium, Kuwait, Niger, Saudi Arabia and Niger.

Iraq and Nigeria had 5,556 fewer deaths from terrorism in 2015 than in the previous year. This constitutes a 32 per cent reduction for these two countries. Iraq and Nigeria, along with Afghanistan, were the countries with the highest number of deaths in both 2014 and 2015.

The decline in Nigeria was due to sustained military action by the Nigerian government and neighbouring countries against Boko Haram, forcing them to abandon territory they had previously controlled. However, they have expanded their terrorist activities in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon and Niger. Both countries have seen a significant rise and are now amongst the ten countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism and are in the top 20 on the GTI.

The declines in Iraq were driven by the military interventions against ISIL. This has forced the group to reallocate its declining resources away from terrorist planning and tactics in Iraq towards activities related to conventional combat to defend their sources.
The number of deaths from terrorism declined in many of the most affected countries. Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan together had 6,233 fewer deaths in 2015.

Except for Iraq and Nigeria, deaths from terrorism in the rest of the world increased by 14 per cent from 15,309 in 2014 to 17,476 in 2015. This highlights the contradictory trends in this year’s report, with more countries than ever reporting the highest number of incidents since 2000. This is mainly attributed to the expanded reach of ISIL and its affiliates. ISIL and groups that support it or are affiliated with it were active in 28 countries in 2015, compared to 13 in 2014.

The largest increases in deaths from terrorism occurred in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan, which all had over 800 more deaths in 2015 from 2014. The increases in Afghanistan highlight the resurgence of the Taliban in a war that has now lasted 15 years.

A number of countries experienced their highest death tolls since 2000, including France, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.

The number of countries experiencing a terrorist attack in 2015 was one less than in 2014, with 92 countries recording an attack in 2015. This makes 2015 the first year to see a decrease in the number of countries attacked since 2010 and could highlight a changing trend.

Although the number of countries affected was nearly the same, there were marked differences within these countries. Fifty-one countries had a decrease in attacks while 55 countries had more attacks. There are still many countries in the world which are untouched by terrorist activity; 71 countries did not experience an incident of terrorism in 2015, up from the low of 70 countries in 2014.

2015 appears to be a plateau year for terrorism, reversing the steep increasing trend of the three prior years. As well as the number of deaths decreasing by ten per cent, after the 80 per cent increase in 2014, the number of countries suffering more than 230 deaths has decreased by one, down to 16 countries. However, this has been partially offset by an increase in territory. However, terrorism deaths by ISIL have increased by over 800 in Syria.

FIGURE 1.2 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY COUNTRY, 2014 VS 2015
The number of deaths from terrorism declined in many of the most affected countries. Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan together had 6,233 fewer deaths in 2015.

Source: START GTD, IEP calculations
the number of countries suffering from greater than 25 deaths, jumping by seven countries to 34.

The five countries at the top of the GTI; Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria, accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. This is despite the fact that Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan all had at least a 30 per cent decline from 2014. Afghanistan, on the other hand, had an increase in deaths of 18 per cent, rising from 4,507 to 5,312. This highlights the ascendency that the Taliban is currently having in its battle with the Afghan Government and NATO allies under operation Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

Except for Pakistan, in each of these countries there is a prominent group which is responsible for the majority of deaths. These same groups make up the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Boko Haram and the Taliban were responsible for 55 per cent of all the deaths from terrorism in 2015.

ISIL, also known as ISIS, Daesh or the Islamic State, was the deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL killed 6,141 people with an average of 6.4 deaths per attack. ISIL was responsible for 62 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in Iraq, but this is likely a conservative estimate as 37 per cent of deaths in Iraq were by unknown actors.

The second deadliest group in 2015 was Boko Haram, which killed 5,478 people. Three quarters of these deaths were in Nigeria, but the group was also responsible for over 500 deaths in both Cameroon and Niger. Boko Haram is an extremely deadly group, killing on average 11 people per attack.

The Taliban averaged four deaths per attack in Afghanistan, killing 4,502 people. This was their deadliest year, surpassing the previous deadliest year of 2014 by 18 per cent.

The rest of the world, aside from Iraq and Nigeria, recorded an increase in total deaths in 2015, increasing by 14 per cent. The largest increase in deaths occurred in Syria, which recorded its highest levels of terrorism on record with 2,761 deaths, maintaining its fifth place on the GTI and experiencing a six per cent deterioration in its score. Most of the increase is attributable to ISIL.

Overall, 51 countries had fewer incidents and 37 countries had fewer deaths in 2015. In contrast, there were 55 countries with more incidents and 38 countries with more deaths when compared to the prior year. Many of the countries with more terrorism in 2015 also faced their highest recorded levels. In 2015, 34 countries had the most incidents since 2000 and 23 countries had the most deaths.

In 2015 two of the countries with the most serious deteriorations, Niger and Cameroon, suffered from the spill-over effects of Boko Haram. These countries went from very low levels of terrorism to be amongst the ten countries at the top of the GTI. Niger had eight times more deaths in 2015 than in the preceding 15 years as a result of Boko Haram’s expansion. In Cameroon, the number of deaths increased by four percent compared to the prior year. Of the 1,081 deaths recorded in Cameroon in 2014 and 2015, all but 34 were caused by Boko Haram. The rest were mostly attributed to affiliates of al Qaeda.

Outside of the ten countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism, there were 4,277 deaths. The deaths in these countries represented 14.6 per cent of the total in 2015. This
was mainly driven by the spread of ISIL and its supporters into other countries. ISIL-affiliated groups undertook attacks in 29 countries in 2015, up from 13 countries in 2014. The other group which accounted for most of the increase was Boko Haram, which expanded from three to five countries.

Although the total number of deaths from terrorism decreased in 2015, many countries experienced an intensification of terrorism while in others the impacts of terrorism subsided:

- In 2015, 75 countries had either no attacks or their lowest number of attacks in a decade.
- The number of countries with greater than 25 deaths rose to 34, an increase of seven. This includes Burundi, Chad and France, which all had less than ten deaths in 2014.

OECD countries also experienced substantial increases in terrorism, with Turkey and France being particularly affected. In 2015 Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and Turkey recorded the most deaths from terrorism in a single year since 2000. The largest increase occurred in Turkey, where both ISIL and the PKK became more active, resulting in the number of deaths rising from 20 in 2014 to 337 in 2015. France also experienced a dramatic increase in 2015 due to the Paris attacks in November, which killed 136 and the Île-de-France attacks which killed 20. This compares to the average of one person a year being killed for the prior 15 years in France. Germany, Sweden and Denmark were also affected, recording six, four and two deaths respectively. This was the first year since 2010 that any of these countries had recorded a death.

High levels of terrorism in the OECD countries have continued in 2016, with prominent attacks at Atatürk Airport in June killing at least 45 people and the Ankara bombing in March which killed 37. At the time of writing, the deadliest incident in 2016 was in Nice, when Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a truck through a Bastille Day celebration, killing at least 85 people and injuring over 300.

Military operations coincided with a decline in terrorism in Pakistan. The Pakistan Army began Operation Zarb-e-Azb in mid-2014 focused on the North Waziristan district of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, an area known as a safe haven for militants. This has had a significant impact on the Tehrik-i-Taliban, with military officials reporting that over 3,000 members were killed and that members had fled into Afghanistan to join the conflict there. The organisation is also experiencing infighting over succession since the death of its leader Hakimullah Mehsud by a drone strike in November 2013.

2015 was also a difficult year for Bangladesh, resulting in the most attacks and deaths since at least 2000, although the lethality rate per attack was low. There were 459 attacks which resulted in 75 deaths. Historically, terrorism in Bangladesh has been carried out by local groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, a group which was allegedly involved in the July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka that resulted in 29 deaths. However, for the first time al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent and a local ISIL affiliate engaged in attacks, resulting in 11 deaths in 2015.

Libya, a country that has been in crisis since the Arab Spring and the ousting of its leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, has seen a significant increase over the last five years. In 2010 it was ranked

![Figure 1.4: Countries with the highest number of deaths by terrorism, 2015](source: START GTD, IEP calculations)
90th in the GTI; by 2015 it had risen to be tenth. There were 454 people killed in 2015, compared to none in 2010 and 2011. The most active group is ISIL who were responsible for at least 42 per cent of these incidents and 69 per cent of deaths.

The discrepancy between the countries with the most deaths and those with the most attacks shows that terrorism has different levels of lethality around the world. Lethality can be measured by the average number of deaths per attack. Niger had the highest lethality rate in 2015, with an average of 19.7 people killed per attack, resulting in a total of 649 deaths. The second highest rate was in Chad, with 9.4 people killed per attack. Boko Haram, which is responsible for the attacks in Niger and Chad, has caused the second highest rate of deaths per attack in 2015, with an average of 11.2. Al-Nusrah Front had the highest rate of lethality, at 11.8.

OECD countries experienced substantial increases in terrorism in 2015, with Turkey and France being particularly affected.

The global average death rate per attack was 1.8 in 2015. However, this does mask the wide variations between groups, with some recording no deaths. In 2015 there were 103 groups that had attacks which resulted in no deaths. The groups that have the most attacks with no or few deaths are nationalist or separatist groups. This includes the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, a separatist group in Thailand that had 15 attacks with no deaths, as well as other separatist groups such as the People’s Liberation Army in India which had ten attacks with no deaths and the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Chand) which had eight attacks with no deaths. These separatist movements are generally seeking to remind both the government and local populations of their presence to further their negotiation positions.
France has a very high level of lethality due to a series of large attacks, including the November Paris attacks and the Île-de-France attacks. Of the 35 attacks in France in 2015 there were 161 deaths, averaging 4.6 deaths per attack.

Kuwait had one terrorist attack which resulted in 28 deaths.

The distribution of deaths per attack varies widely between countries due to the differing tactics of the terrorist groups and the messages that they wish to send. In 2015 India had the highest number of attacks since 2000, whilst paradoxically it had the second lowest number of deaths for a single year since 2000. Terrorism in India often has very local goals, with separatists and Marxist groups engaging in terrorism as a signalling exercise. As such, 75 per cent of attacks in India had no fatalities, compared to 44 per cent globally. This suggests that groups are seeking to remind governments of their presence without provoking significant military reactions. This may signal the opportunity for mediation or future peace accords that could be negotiated. The country had 797 attacks that resulted in 289 deaths, compared to 764 attacks with 418 deaths the previous year.

The Philippines similarly had many attacks that did not result in deaths. Of the 487 attacks in 2015, 300 of these attacks or 62 per cent did not cause any fatalities. However, terrorist activity is at historically high levels. 2015 was the second deadliest year with the second most attacks since 2000. The worst year for terrorism in the Philippines was in 2013, with over 100 people killed in assassinations coinciding with the general election. Violence has continued in the Philippines in Mindanao, with one in five deaths occurring in either the provinces of Cotabato or Maguindanao in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This is despite the peace plan signed in 2014 which created a new autonomous government in Mindanao, a region which has been in conflict for 40 years.

Although many countries experience terrorism, it is also highly concentrated. Over 80 per cent of all deaths in 2015 occurred in eight countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia.

The greatest changes in deaths from terrorism in 2015 occurred in countries involved in armed conflict. The two largest decreases were in Iraq and Nigeria and the three largest increases were in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. Terrorism is strongly associated with armed conflict, with conflict dynamics influencing the levels of terrorist activity. Effective military interventions appear to have reduced the impact of terrorism in Iraq, however the increasing intensity of violent conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan have led to rises in the number of terror-related fatalities.
The three countries with the largest reductions in deaths in 2015 were Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan. All three countries have seen substantial reductions coinciding with major military operations targeting terrorist groups.

In Iraq, ISIL has been the target of an international military campaign. As a result, ISIL lost control of 14 per cent of its territory which led to fewer attacks in 2015. There were nearly 3,000 less deaths in Iraq in 2015 than the previous year, representing a reduction of 30 per cent. ISIL has concentrated on Syria and has committed more attacks, resulting in 800 more deaths than the previous year.

Nigeria recorded a drop of 34 per cent in deaths from terrorism, due to the success against Boko Haram of the Nigerian army and the Multinational Joint Task Force, which included Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger. Although Boko Haram experienced a decline in its activity in Nigeria, this was offset by increased activity in Niger and Cameroon. Nigeria also had a reduction in deaths by Fulani militias. There were 630 fewer deaths by these militias in 2015, a decrease of 50 per cent.

Pakistan had the third largest decline in deaths. There were 677 fewer deaths in Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan had the lowest number of deaths from terrorism since 2008.

The Central African Republic, a country in civil war since 2012, had the fourth largest decline in deaths, from nearly 600 in 2014 to 166 in 2015. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has been active against the militia group Séléka and the Anti-Balaka Militia in the lead up to the elections in December 2015.

South Sudan had the fifth largest improvement, with 430 fewer deaths in 2015. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan likely contributed to this reduction. Fluctuations in terrorist activity in South Sudan appear to be related to conflict dynamics. The number of deaths rose dramatically in 2014, from 123 in 2013 to nearly 570 in 2014, before falling again down to 141 in 2015. 2014 was a tense year as multiple ceasefire agreements broke down. But peacebuilding efforts are ongoing, despite continued challenges in 2015 and into 2016.

Ukraine had the sixth largest reduction in deaths. Ukraine had 109 fewer terrorist incidents in 2015 and 307 fewer deaths, amounting to a 46 per cent reduction. Prior to the onset of the armed conflict in the Donbas region in 2014, the country had low levels of terrorism and had never more than eight attacks in any year since 2000. There were a total of three terrorism deaths between 2000 and 2013. The majority of deaths, roughly 90 per cent, are attributed to the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. These two groups represent the two states between Ukraine and Russia that declared independence in April 2014.

China, where the Xinjiang conflict continued with low intensity, had a reduction in deaths from terrorism in 2015 of 62 per cent, down to 123. In 2015 there were fewer attacks by Uighur Separatists and no attacks by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement.

The largest increases in terrorism occurred in countries engaged in armed conflict. Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan all had increases of more than 800 deaths in 2015. Niger’s increase is striking, rising from 11 deaths in 2014 to 649 in 2015. Chad’s increase was just as striking, experiencing a 34-fold increase to 206. In both countries the increase in deaths was driven by greater activity by Boko Haram. Similarly, the spread of large terrorist groups into nearby countries was behind the increases in deaths in France, Kuwait.
and Saudi Arabia. ISIL and its affiliates carried out major attacks in all three countries.

There were at least five countries that had a notable increase in their GTI scores in 2015. Kuwait had the biggest change moving 87 places on the GTI from 124 to 37, from a score close to zero in 2014 to a score of 4.449 out of 10 in 2015. Other countries to move more than 10 places were: France, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Burundi. Except for Burundi, ISIL and affiliated groups were responsible for the increases in all of these countries.

The country with the largest relative difference was France, which had one death from terrorism in 2014 increasing to 161 in 2015. The deterioration in France was due to two significant events: the Île-de-France attacks which killed 20 and the November Paris attacks which killed 136. These attacks were planned and undertaken by ISIL members.

Saudi Arabia experienced a six-fold increase in deaths compared to the prior year, with 48 attacks resulting in 107 deaths in 2015. This is the highest level of terrorism Saudi Arabia has experienced since at least 2000. There were more people killed from terrorism in 2015 in Saudi Arabia than in the previous 11 years combined. ISIL and affiliated groups were responsible for 88 per cent of the attacks that were attributed to a group. The rest were attributed to attacks by Houthi militants. Saudi Arabia had previously launched air strikes against Houthi insurgents in Yemen in 2015.

The ISIL affiliates in Saudi Arabia include the Najd Province of the Islamic State which killed 30, the Hijaz Province of the Islamic State which killed 18 and the Bahrain Province of the Islamic State which killed six.

The Najd Province of the Islamic State was also responsible for the attack in Kuwait that killed 28 people, by the bombing of a Shiite mosque. This was the first terrorist attack in Kuwait since 2011, the first death since 2005, and one of only seven attacks since 2000.

Niger recorded a devastating year with 11 terrorism deaths in 2014 rising to 649 in 2015. This is the largest proportional increase of any country and is due to the expansion of Boko Haram.
Although overall deaths were down, terrorism continued to spread to more countries in 2015, with more countries experiencing higher levels of terrorism. This was mainly due to the spread of ISIL on the back of groups swearing allegiance to it or becoming branches of ISIL.

This spread is evidenced by the increase in the number of countries that experienced more than 25 deaths, increasing by seven to 34. Thailand was the only country to reduce its death rate from terrorism to under 100 in 2015. Six new countries recorded over 100 deaths, increasing the number of countries to 25. These countries were: Burundi, Chad, France, Niger, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Their collective total breached 1,500 deaths in 2015. Each of these countries had fewer than 20 deaths in the prior year, demonstrating that significant changes can occur in a short period of time.

**REGIONS**

Terrorism is largely centralised in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa regions, which together account for 84 per cent of attacks and 95 per cent of deaths.

MENA is the region most affected by terrorism with five countries in the bottom performing ten countries on the GTI. It also had the highest numbers of both terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism in 2015. Forty-four per cent of all deaths in 2015 occurred in MENA. Over 70 per cent of attacks in MENA were by bombings and explosives. However, the number of bombings decreased by 16 per cent in 2015, but were more lethal resulting in a 20 per cent increase in deaths. This reflects that groups have become more efficient and lethal in their use of explosives and may engage in tactics to maximise fatalities. The next largest categories of attack type in MENA in 2015 were armed assaults and hostage taking or kidnapping, which together accounted for nearly 3,000 deaths or 22 per cent of the total.

South Asia is the second most affected region with three countries among the ten worst countries on the GTI: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The region also had the second highest number of attacks and the third highest number of deaths from terrorism. Attacks decreased by seven per cent, whilst deaths went up by one per cent since 2014. In South Asia bombings and explosives account for 51 per cent of attacks and firearms for 32 per cent. The Taliban increased their use of firearms, with the majority of attacks targeting the police, which in part explains the increase in deaths in the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa had the largest decrease in deaths in 2015, with 2,817 fewer deaths compared to 2014. This was due to fewer deaths in the Central African Republic, Nigeria and South Sudan. Most of the attacks were by firearms with bombings and explosives making up a smaller percentage of terrorist attacks.

Asia-Pacific accounted for seven per cent of all attacks and two per cent of deaths. Many of the terrorist attacks in this region are related to local political goals and the violence often does not result in any deaths. There have been roughly 200 active terrorist organizations in the Asia Pacific since 2000, but 76 per cent of groups have launched attacks that did not result in any deaths. This type of non-deadly terrorism is most prevalent in the Asia-Pacific region.

Both Central America and the Caribbean and the North America regions had small increases in terrorism and from a low base, with two and five per cent more deaths respectively in 2015. North America (the United States and Canada) had 12 attacks and 40 deaths in 2015. Europe had a substantial increase in terrorism, where 487 more people were killed.

**TARGETS**

Figure 1.14 highlights the fact that private citizens is the group targeted the most. There were roughly 2,800 fewer private citizens killed in 2015 than in 2014, amounting to
a 19 per cent reduction. This is mainly because of the reduced level of activity of Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, the number of deaths was still high at 12,576.

The number of attacks did not fall at the same pace as deaths, highlighting that the attacks on private citizens were less lethal. The percentage of attacks on private citizens fell by four per cent to 43 per cent of attacks in 2015. Figure 1.15 shows the breakdown of target types for 2015, the most recent full year of data.

Attacks on police, the second highest category, also declined, with 500 fewer attacks in 2015 resulting in 23 per cent fewer deaths. This decline is explained by the reduction in ISIL activity in Iraq. In contrast, the Taliban continued to increase their attacks on police, although the increase was not enough to offset the declines by ISIL. In 2014 the Taliban had 35 per cent more attacks against police targets than in 2015, which resulted in 22 per cent more deaths than the previous year, a change of 411 people.

While there was an overall decline in attacks on civilians, there was an increase in attacks on the military and government.

Military targets are the third largest category of deaths, after private citizens and police. Deaths of military personnel increased by 54 per cent, up from 2,520 people in 2014 to 3,885 in 2015. This increase in military attacks is largely attributable to the Taliban. Three quarters of attacks on military targets in 2015 were suicide attacks, while over half of the deaths were caused by bombings and explosions. The classification of military attacks as terrorism can be blurred but there are certain instances where attacks on military targets are clearly regarded as terrorism, particularly when it is an act of violence outside the precepts of international humanitarian law. An attack on a military hospital or a military checkpoint would be an example of this.

Governments, the third largest category, recorded 400 fewer attacks than in 2014. However, there was an eight per cent increase in deaths from these attacks, highlighting the increased lethality of these attacks. They increased from 1,804 in 2014 to just over 1,950 in 2015. Attacks on government include attacks on government buildings, events by political parties, government employees such as judges, politicians and public servants. The majority of attacks on government occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, Pakistan and India.

The number of deaths in attacks on business and religious figures or institutions was similar to the prior year, with approximately 2,000 and 1,100 deaths respectively. In 2015, attacks on businesses accounted for seven percent of deaths and attacks on religious figures or institutions accounted for three per cent of all attacks and four per cent of all deaths. Suicide bombings were responsible for 60 per cent of these deaths. In 2015 there were at least 39 suicide bombings of mosques in nine countries which resulted in 493 deaths.
Private citizens and property is the group facing the highest number of deaths from terrorist attacks, although deaths from attacks on civilians and other nongovernmental targets declined in 2015.

The majority of attacks were against private citizens and property, accounting for 43 per cent of all deaths.

MENA is the region most affected by terrorism with five countries in the ten bottom performing countries on the GTI. It also had the highest numbers of both terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism in 2015.
Iraq has ranked as the country most impacted by terrorism every year since 2004. The catalyst for the increase in terrorism in Iraq was the US-led invasion in 2003. The increase was so dramatic that in the year of the invasion, 2003, fatalities from terrorism were nearly five times higher than the total from the years 1998 to 2002.

Since 2003, there have been two distinct periods where high levels of terrorism were recorded in Iraq. The first was from 2003 to 2007. The peak coincided with the US troop surge and then decreased by 71 per cent over the following four years. The second period started in 2011 and has continued to today. The terrorist activities in the second period are mainly dominated by ISIL, a group which grew in part due to the Syrian civil war.

Over 40 different terrorist groups have undertaken deadly attacks in Iraq since the US-led invasion. However, nearly 90 per cent of deaths where a group has claimed responsibility were conducted by just three groups: 59 per cent by ISIL, 21 per cent by al-Qa’ida in Iraq and nine per cent by ISIL precursor Islamic State of Iraq. None of these groups were active in Iraq prior to 2003.

ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group in Iraq’s history with over 11,000 deaths. The next deadliest group in Iraq is al-Qa’ida. However, the number of deaths attributed to these groups is underestimated as nearly two thirds of the 50,000 deaths in Iraq from terrorism in the last 13 years have not been claimed by any group. Other groups active in Iraq include the al-Naqshabandiya Army, a Sufi group that has been active since 2006, and the Mukhtar Army, a Shi’ite militia group.

In 2015 there was a 30 per cent yearly reduction in deaths from terrorism in Iraq. This is related to the reduced influence of ISIL in the country. According to US Central Command, two thirds of the US-led coalition airstrikes occurred in Iraq with the effect of driving ISIL from Iraq to Syria. This reduction in deaths by ISIL in Iraq has been partly offset by an increase in Syria.
Afghanistan suffered the worst year so far in its war with the Taliban, resulting in nearly 18,000 deaths from the conflict in 2015. Deaths from terrorism also increased to the highest recorded levels, with 5,312 deaths recorded in 2015, up by 18 per cent from the previous year.

Deaths from terrorism and conflict in Afghanistan have increased every year for the past five years. The Taliban was responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks and in 2015 they were responsible for 85 per cent of all deaths from terrorism carrying out 1,094 attacks that killed 4,502 people.

Police remain the main target of attacks by the Taliban and accounted for half of all attacks and deaths. There were 543 attacks on police resulting in 2,259 deaths. The majority of these attacks are armed assaults that target checkpoints, outposts, patrols and other regular policing activities. There were also 30 suicide bombings targeting police that resulted in 193 deaths. Suicide bombings in Afghanistan are on average more deadly than other forms of attacks.

The majority of attacks are along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. However, there has been a 20 per cent increase in attacks in the northern provinces which highlights the growing ascendence of the Taliban. In 2015 there were nearly 1,000 deaths in the provinces of Faryab, Baghlan, Jawzjan and Kunduz, an increase of 60 per cent from the previous year. The capture of Kunduz in September 2015 marked the first time a major city was under Taliban control since 2001. At the time of writing the Afghan government has taken back control but clashes between Taliban and Afghan government forces were ongoing in and around the city.

There is also a risk that terrorism in Afghanistan may continue to spread north into Central Asia, particularly along the border with Tajikistan, a country that had its worst year for terrorism since at least 2000.

As well as the Taliban, there are four other groups that conducted attacks in 2015. The most active of these groups was an ISIL affiliate, the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, which undertook 47 attacks that killed 120 people. They also claimed responsibility for the July 2016 Kabul bombing at a protest which killed at least 80. This branch of ISIL is active in the Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan and is reported to be comprised of Pakistani migrants who were former members of Tehrik-i-Taliban.
Nigeria experienced a 34 per cent decline in the number of deaths from terrorism in 2015. This was largely due to a decline in the number of attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria. A coalition of the Nigerian military and forces from neighbouring countries Cameroon, Chad and Niger forced Boko Haram out of areas in northeast Nigeria in 2015, driving the 33 per cent decline in deaths. In 2015 Boko Haram killed 4,095 people in terrorist attacks in Nigeria, down from 6,136 deaths in 2014. However, there was an increase in attacks by Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, which resulted in 1,382 deaths, a 163 per cent increase from the previous year.

Despite the decrease in deaths from terrorism, Nigeria still experienced a high rate of violent deaths. In addition to terrorism victims, there were at least 4,422 battle-related deaths from the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Government in 2015, down from 8,233 in 2014.

Boko Haram has been one of the deadliest terrorist groups in history. Even though the first recorded terrorist death by Boko Haram was only in 2009, the group has the second highest death toll out of all terrorist groups since 2000. Only the Taliban has killed more people than Boko Haram. Nearly 90 per cent of the 15,600 deaths by Boko Haram since 2009 have been in Nigeria. On average, Boko Haram killed 11 people per attack in Nigeria.

Four out of five deaths from terrorism in Nigeria are civilians. This is one of the highest targeting of civilians anywhere in the world; by contrast civilians are targeted in half of all attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst the majority of fatalities were caused by armed assaults with firearms and knives, there has been an increase in the use of bombings and explosions, a tactic Boko Haram has been increasingly using after receiving explosives training from al-Shabaab. In 2013, Boko Haram conducted 35 bombings which killed 107 people. In 2015 there were 156 bombings that killed 1,638. Nearly two thirds of the bombings in 2015 were suicide bombings, which on average killed ten people per attack. The majority of attacks in Nigeria were in the north-eastern states and particularly Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State where Boko Haram is based.

Attacks by Fulani ethnic militants — groups of semi-nomadic, ethnic-based pastoralists engaged in conflict with farming communities — were recorded in the Middle Belt. There were 630 fewer deaths by these militia in 2015, a decrease of 50 per cent since the previous year.
In 2015, Pakistan recorded a substantial drop in terrorist activity with 45 per cent less attacks and 38 per cent fewer deaths than in the previous year. This is the second consecutive year in which Pakistan has seen a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism in the country is now at its lowest levels since 2006. However, with 1,086 deaths, Pakistan is still the sixth deadliest country.

Although the number of attacks has fallen, terrorism in Pakistan is spreading. It has moved from the border region and is now in many other parts of the country. The reduction in deaths from terrorism is in part explained by Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the Pakistan Army which started in mid-2014. This focused on removing militant safe havens in the North Waziristan district of the federally administered tribal areas. As a result of this operation, the military estimates that over 3,000 Tehrik-i-Taliban members have been killed and that members have fled into Afghanistan, thereby bolstering the number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Although the Tehrik-i-Taliban has reduced the number of attacks in Pakistan, it is still responsible for the most attacks. In 2015 the group was responsible for 36 per cent of deaths, totalling 240 people. This is down from 59 per cent of deaths, totalling 544, in 2014 representing a sharp year-on-year reduction. The Tehrik-i-Taliban faced succession challenges following the death of its leader Hakimullah Mehsud by a drone strike in November 2013.

Although the number of attacks has fallen, terrorism in Pakistan is spreading. It has moved from the border region and is now in many other parts of the country. A total of 429 different cities experienced a terrorist attack in 2015, up from 17 in 2000. This may create a much more difficult situation for the Pakistani government in the coming years.

The increase in the spread of terrorism is reflected in the diversity of active groups. As well as the Tehrik-i-Taliban, 23 other groups committed an attack in 2015. This includes eight different Baloch nationalist groups in the southwest which together were responsible for 112 deaths.

Half of all attacks in Pakistan are perpetrated with the use of bombs or explosives. Of this, four per cent are suicide bombings. However, suicide bombings were extremely deadly: the 22 suicide bombings in 2015 averaged ten deaths per attack. In contrast, all other attacks in Pakistan averaged less than one death per attack.

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The Syrian civil war continues to drive the increase in terrorism in Syria. In 2015 there was a 63 per cent increase in the number of deaths from terrorism over the previous year, rising to 2,761, the highest yet recorded in Syria. It is likely that the number of deaths is actually much higher, but due to the intensity of the civil war and ISIL’s territorial control, the information is incomplete. Although there were 17 groups that committed terrorist attacks in 2015, just two groups were responsible for three quarters of all deaths: ISIL and the al-Nusra Front. The present-day civil war in Syria began in 2011. Since then over 320,000 people have been killed in the civil war according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The majority of these deaths are classified as a result of warfare rather than acts of terrorism. However, terrorism has been deployed as a tactic by some of the rebel forces.

Whilst terrorism in Syria is very extreme, representing 9.4 per cent of global deaths in 2015, there were significantly more deaths from violent conflict. In 2015 there were 53,000 battle related deaths from the conflict. These deaths include the Assad regime, various rebel groups and civilians.

ISIL was the deadliest group in Syria in 2015, killing at least 1,442 through terrorism with an average of ten deaths per attack. Sixty-five per cent of these attacks were suicide bombings and 18 per cent kidnappings. Kidnappings were particularly deadly, with 419 deaths from 26 attacks. Three quarters of the suicide attacks in Syria were committed by ISIL and a quarter by the al-Nusra Front. Over half of the attacks by ISIL targeted private citizens. However, there were also a series of deadly attacks targeting government employees, including in May 2015 in Palmyra when at least 280 people were killed.

The second deadliest group in Syria is the al-Nusra Front which killed at least 600 in 2015. The al-Nusra Front has been the al-Qa'ida affiliate in Syria, although the group claimed independence in August 2016. The al-Nusra Front is more active in targeting forces loyal to the Assad regime than ISIL. Accordingly, half of their terrorist attacks were military targets, particularly checkpoints. The al-Nusra Front conducted eight suicide bombings on military targets, which resulted in at least 172 deaths.
In 2015 Yemen experienced the highest levels of terrorism ever recorded with an increase in deaths of 132 per cent from 2014. There were 1,519 people killed, which is 866 more deaths than the previous year. Prior to 2015, the worst year for terrorism in Yemen was 2012, the year that President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted, when 372 people were killed.

There were eight different groups that committed terrorist attacks in Yemen in 2015. However, three groups committed over 90 per cent of the attacks. These groups are the Houthis, ISIL affiliates and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The most deadly group in 2015 were the Houthis who claimed responsibility for 63 per cent of deaths and 62 per cent of incidents. This represents as increase of seven and a half times from the previous year. The Houthis are a militant Islamist insurgency made up of followers of a Shi’a sect known as Zaydi. The Houthis are a socio-political movement that emerged from Sa’dah, northern Yemen in the 1990s. They have fought against the central government on and off since 2004. The movement initially sought an end to economic under-development, political marginalisation and perceived discrimination in Zaydi areas, and sought greater autonomy in areas where they are predominant. The Houthis are in conflict with the Sunni-majority government. The Houthis are also opposed to AQAP and the ISIL affiliated groups.

The biggest change in Yemen in 2015 was the involvement of supporters of ISIL. There are three groups that have claimed to be affiliates with ISIL, none of which were active in 2014. The Lahij Province of the Islamic State killed 20 people from two attacks and the Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State killed 34 people from four attacks. The most deadly of the affiliates was the Sana’a Province of the Islamic State that killed 271 people from 27 attacks. Combined, these three groups were responsible for 21 per cent of deaths in Yemen in 2015.

The other major group active in Yemen is AQAP, an al-Qa’ida affiliate which was led by Nasir al-Wuhayshi who was Usama bin Ladin’s former secretary. AQAP were responsible for 16 per cent of attacks and nine per cent of deaths in 2015. In 2014 they were the most active group in Yemen, but in 2015 they had a 64 per cent reduction in deaths. This is most likely related to al-Wuhayshi’s death by a drone strike in June 2015, following which Qasim al-Raymi took over the organisation. AQAP have continued to declare allegiance to al-Qa’ida over ISIL, with an AQAP spokesman, Khalid Batarfi, reiterating this in November 2015. AQAP has mainly operated in the south of Yemen and has been the target of US drone attacks since 2002.
This discrepancy between the number of attacks and deaths reflects that the nature of terrorism in India is different than in other countries. Many of the groups are seeking political recognition, with attacks not aimed at killing people. As a consequence, the majority of terrorist attacks in India have low casualties.

In 2015 deaths from terrorism in India decreased to the second lowest level since 2000. There were 289 deaths in 2015, a reduction of 45 per cent from the previous year. However, there were four per cent more attacks, totalling 800 and representing the highest number since 2000.

In 2015 around 80 per cent of attacks were non-lethal. Reflecting this, there were many groups which committed terrorist acts that didn’t kill anyone at all. Of the 49 different terrorist groups that engaged in a terrorist act in 2015, 31 groups did not kill anyone. There were 18 groups that had a fatal attack, down from 27 groups in 2014. Four groups that accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths in 2015. In contrast, in 2014 these same groups accounted for only 60 per cent of all deaths.

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Terrorism in India is characterised by communist, Islamists and separatist groups. Communist terrorist groups are by far the most frequent perpetrators and the main cause of terrorism deaths in India. Two Maoist communist groups claimed responsibility for 176 deaths in 2015, which constitutes 61 per cent of all deaths. Police are overwhelmingly the largest target group of Maoists, accounting for a third of deaths, followed by private citizens who are targeted in around 20 per cent of deaths with other categories including the government and businesses. The majority of Maoist attacks occurred in the provinces of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha.

The dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is the main source of Islamist terrorism. The two deadliest Islamist terrorist groups in 2015 in India were Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen, which are also operating in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Lashkar-e-Taiba mainly operates in Pakistan and was responsible for 22 deaths in 2015. Hizbul Mujahideen, an Islamist group allegedly based in Pakistan, has been responsible for fewer deaths since its peak in 2013. The group was responsible for 30 deaths in 2013, which fell to 11 the following year and to seven deaths in 2015.

India’s north east region has for the last three decades seen continual ethno-political unrest from ethnic secessionist movements. The deadliest of these groups in 2015 were the Garo National Liberation Army which killed ten people and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which killed five.
Whilst deaths from terrorism in Somalia decreased by 18 per cent since the previous year, 2015 was still the second deadliest year in Somalia. It also marks the first time since 2009 that there were attacks by more than two groups. Four groups claimed attacks in Somalia in 2015, two of which had never before carried out an attack in the country. These groups are the Awdal Regional Administration Army and ISIL. However, over 90 per cent of deaths from terrorism in Somalia in 2015 were from al-Shabaab, a group which has recorded an attack every year since 2007.

Al-Shabaab has controlled several areas of Somalia including the capital Mogadishu in 2010. A joint military mission called Operation Indian Ocean began on 16 August 2014 to challenge al-Shabaab. The military mission involves the Somali military, the African Union and the US military. This military mission has led to the death of many of the leaders of al-Shabaab. The overall leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr, was killed by a US drone strike in September 2014. He was replaced by Ahmad Umar who reinforced al-Shabaab’s allegiance to al-Qa’ida.

Government employees were the biggest targets of attacks in Somalia in 2015 representing 44 per cent of deaths, up from 17 per cent in the prior year. The majority of these deaths were due to explosions and suicide bombings. Other targets included private citizens, which resulted in 16 per cent of fatalities or 105 people. A reduction from the 202 people killed in 2014. The military was also targeted less, with a 65 per cent reduction in deaths in 2015.

Suicide bombings were much more deadly than other types of attacks. On average, suicide attacks killed 14.6 people per attack, whereas other types of attacks killed 1.7 people.

The largest attack in Somalia in 2015 was by al-Shabaab when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle after which the militants stormed a base of the African Union Mission, killing at least 70 people.

Southern Somalia continues to experience the majority of attacks. The largest city and capital Mogadishu recorded 32 per cent of attacks, followed by five per cent in Bosaso in Puntland, four per cent in Afgoye in the Lower Shebelle region and three per cent in Beledweyne in the Hiran province. Three quarters of deaths in 2015 occurred in four provinces: Banaadir, Bay, Gedo and Lower Shebelle.
Terrorism in Egypt has increased to the highest levels since 2000. In 2015 there were 662 deaths, an increase of 260 per cent, from 2014. In contrast, from 2000 to 2012 the most deaths recorded in one year was 92, which was in 2005. Since 2000 there have been seven years in which Egypt recorded no deaths from terrorism.

Egypt also faces deaths from armed conflict. The government of Egypt is actively engaged in armed conflict with ISIL and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, an ISIL affiliate in Egypt. These two conflicts resulted in an additional 750 deaths in 2015.

The Sinai Province of the Islamic State was responsible for 78 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2015. However, it is likely that this group is responsible for even more deaths as the perpetrators of 19 per cent of deaths are unknown. The group first conducted an attack in 2014 when 11 people were killed in 11 separate attacks. In 2015 this increased over tenfold to 517 deaths in 111 attacks.

Two thirds of the 493 terrorist attacks in 2015 did not result in any deaths. These were mainly bombing attempts by unknown actors. However, there were also some very deadly attacks. The deadliest attack in 2015 killed 224 when an explosive device on a passenger plane flying from Egypt to Russia caused the flight to crash in North Sinai. This attack was claimed by the Sinai Province of the Islamic State.

The biggest target of attacks in 2015 were the police, who were targeted in a third of all attacks, followed by the military who were targeted 25 per cent of the time. Private citizens were targeted in 15 per cent of the attacks and government in eight per cent.

The Sinai Province of the Islamic State was responsible for 78 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2015.

However, it is likely that this group is responsible for even more deaths as the perpetrators of 19 per cent of deaths are unknown.
Libya recorded a four per cent increase in terrorist fatalities in 2015 compared to the previous year. Terrorism in Libya is linked to the crisis that began in 2011 after the overthrow of Prime Minister Muammar Gaddafi. The levels of terrorism in the country have increased steadily since then, rising to 454 deaths in 2015.

There were no deaths from terrorism in Libya until 2012 when there were 51 attacks in which 28 people were killed. In 2013, terrorism more than quadrupled to 121 deaths. This trend continued in 2014 when there were 435 deaths, a 256 per cent increase.

The largest and most active ISIL affiliates are in Libya and have now become the most active terrorist organisations in the country. Their rise is concerning as the deaths attributed to them increased 16 fold to 314 in 2015.

Seventy-three cities had a terrorist attack in 2015, up from 55 cities in the previous year. Sixty per cent of attacks and 57 per cent of deaths were in four cities: Benghazi, Sirte, Tripoli and Derna. Benghazi recorded the most deaths with 136 deaths from 112 attacks.

Over half of all attacks in Libya were bombings, with armed assaults accounting for 15 per cent of deaths. The targets of most bombings were private citizens, with 122 from 108 attacks. There was an increase in the frequency of suicide bombings in 2015. In 2014 there were six suicide bombings resulting in 93 deaths in 2015.

Of the three ISIL affiliates in Libya, the Barqa Province of the Islamic State was the deadliest in 2015 killing 146 people. This group is allegedly made up of many Libyan jihadists who have returned from Syria and Iraq, as well as fighters who fled Tunisia in 2013. The second deadliest affiliate was the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State which killed 143. The third affiliate, known as the Fezzan Province of the Islamic State, was responsible for killing 25 people.

Previously, the deadliest group in Libya was Ansar al-Sharia, a jihadi group which was responsible for the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi. Ansar al-Sharia was responsible for 15 deaths in 2015, down from 67 deaths in 2014.

The three affiliates of ISIL in Libya are named after the provinces they have a presence in, and they have all separately pledged allegiance to ISIL.

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Two thirds of attacks did not result in any deaths. However, there were 11 attacks which had at least ten deaths. The deadliest attack was in August when the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State set fire to a hospital in Sirte killing at least 22 people.
TRENDS

KEY FINDINGS

➤ Of the last 16 years, the worst year for terrorism was 2014 with 93 countries experiencing an attack and 32,765 people killed.

➤ Since 2006, 98 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the US have resulted from attacks carried out by lone actors, resulting in 156 deaths.

➤ ISIL foreign fighters who have gone to Syria generally have high levels of education but low incomes, with many fighters joining in part due to a feeling of exclusion in their home countries.

➤ There were 18 deaths caused by ISIL-affiliated attacks in the OECD in 2014. This number increased significantly in 2015, to 313 deaths from 67 attacks.

➤ Half of all plots with an ISIL connection have been conducted by people who have had no direct contact with ISIL.
TRENDS IN TERRORISM
2000-2015

Terrorism is highly concentrated, with 57 per cent of all deaths since 2000 occurring in four countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan.

Iraq is the most affected country and accounts for 30 per cent of the deaths over this period. Half of the roughly 50,500 deaths in Iraq have occurred between 2012 and 2015. The other three countries most impacted by terrorism according to the GTI; Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan, each had between nine and 13 per cent of the total deaths.

Other countries that recorded substantial numbers of people killed include India with five per cent of all deaths, Syria with four per cent, and four other countries with two per cent each, as shown in figure 2.1.

The high level of deaths in the United States is the result of the September 11, 2001 attacks, which account for 97 per cent of terrorism deaths in the US since 2000.

The number of countries experiencing an attack has varied substantially since the year 2000. In 2000 there were 85 countries that experienced at least one terrorist attack, this number fell to 51 in 2004 before peaking at 93 in 2014. Since 2010 there has been a steady rise in the number of countries experiencing at least one terrorist attack each year. However, the trend appears to have plateaued, with one less country experiencing an attack in 2015, down from 93 to 92 countries.

There are divergent trends in 2015 for countries that experienced terrorist activity. There were improvements in countries with very low levels of terrorism and in those with high levels of terrorism.

In contrast, many of the countries previously suffering from moderate levels of terrorist activity experienced an increase in deaths in 2015.

There were 16 countries that had more than 250 deaths from terrorism in 2015, one less than in the prior year. Together, these 16 countries recorded over 27,000 deaths constituting a nine per cent decline from 2014. The largest decreases occurred in Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan, which together had 6,233 fewer deaths in 2015. Iraq alone recorded nearly 3,000 fewer fatalities. Among the highly affected countries, Syria had the largest increase in the number of deaths in 2015, increasing by over 1,000 followed by 865 more deaths in Yemen.

Despite the fall in the total number of deaths, 2015 was a record year for the number of countries suffering from their highest number of fatalities in any one year. This was mainly the result of ISIL and their affiliates who expanded their operations and were responsible for attacks in 15 of the 23 countries on the list.

Denmark and Sweden, counties which do not have a history of terrorism, both experienced attacks in 2015. The Copenhagen shooting at the Krudttonden café in
Denmark killed two people and was the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history. Similarly, neighbouring Sweden recorded the most attacks and deaths in its history in 2015. Opposition to the immigration policies in Sweden motivated a sword attack in Trollhättan that killed four.

Other countries that had dramatic increases in the number of deaths from terrorism in 2015 also had large scale attacks. This includes Kuwait, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, France and Turkey. All the attacks were either inspired by ISIL or directly related to ISIL or its affiliates. Chad, Cameroon and Niger, which have been targeted by Boko Haram, also recorded their highest levels of terrorism in 2015.

**FIGURE 2.2** NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH AN ATTACK BY YEAR, 2000-2015

Since 2010, there has been a steady rise in the number of countries that have experienced a terrorist attack. However, the trend appears to have plateaued in 2015.

**FIGURE 2.3** NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2000-2015

The overall severity of terrorism has been increasing since 2004, but appears to have peaked in 2014.

"Many of the countries previously suffering from moderate levels of terrorist activity experienced an increase in deaths in 2015."
FIGURE 2.4 YEAR IN WHICH THE MOST DEATHS FROM TERRORISM OCCURRED BY COUNTRY SINCE 2000

23 countries recorded their highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2015. This is six more than the previous high of 17 countries in 2014.

Source: START GTD, IEP calculations
In 2000 there were nearly 2,000 deaths of private citizens from terrorist attacks. This increased to over 12,500 in 2015, representing an increase of 550 per cent. However, in 2015 there was a reduction of 20 per cent in the number of civilians killed from 2014. The reason for the decline in 2015 was due to reduced attacks by Boko Haram, a group that predominantly targets civilians. In 2015:

- Private citizens were targeted in one out of every three terrorist attacks.
- Over two fifths of all deaths from terrorism were from attacks targeting civilians.

Armed assaults are more deadly than other forms of attacks. There are on average 5.5 deaths per armed assault targeting private citizens compared to 2.6 deaths per attack for bombings or explosions. Just over half of all attacks on civilians use bombings and explosions, followed by armed assaults which are used in around 20 per cent of attacks. When the target is civilians, armed assaults tend to be much more deadly than bombings. This is because 36 per cent of bombings and explosions result in no casualties.

Bombings can often be used as a signalling tactic designed to improve negotiating positions rather than to cause mass casualties. This is particularly true for nationalist groups such as the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) that conducted 116 bombings from 2000 to 2012 which killed only one person. In 2015 there were 66 different nationalist or separatist groups that conducted bombings which resulted in no deaths. Many private citizens are also killed in attacks for which they are not the primary targets, sometimes resulting in high numbers of casualties. They are not included under civilians, but are counted under the target category of the attack, such as military or police.

**FIGURE 2.5 DEATHS FROMAttACKS TARGETING PRIVATE CITIZENS, 2000-2015**

There has been a 550 per cent increase in the number of deaths of private citizens from terrorism since 2000.

"36 per cent of bombings and explosions result in no casualties."
2015 was the worst year for terrorism in OECD countries for the 16 years covered by this report, recording the highest number of attacks. The number of attacks in OECD countries rose for the sixth year running, reaching 731 attacks in 2015. This was a 23 per cent increase from the previous high of 592 in 2004. Twenty-one of the 34 countries in the OECD suffered from an attack in 2015.

2015 was also the worst year for deaths from terrorism for OECD countries aside from the September 11 attacks in 2001. The prior peak was in 2004, when 272 people were killed.

The number of deaths from terrorism in OECD countries had not exceeded 130 people in a single year for the last decade. Since 2004, deaths had remained relatively low, but jumped from 77 in 2014 to 577 in 2015. Turkey recorded 337 of these deaths, which can be attributed either to the PKK or to ISIL related or inspired attacks.

The spread of terrorism has also been increasing within the OECD. In 2015, of the 34 countries in the OECD:

- Eleven had at least one death from terrorism, up from nine the previous year.
- Twenty-one experienced a terrorist attack, the same number as the previous year.
- Nine had the highest levels of terrorism since at least 2000.
- Five had the most deaths in a single year since at least 2000.

Since 2000 there have been two periods of high-fatality terrorist activity in OECD countries.

The first period was from 2001 to 2005, which began with the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States by al-Qa’ida, which killed 2,996 people. In 2002 and 2003 the majority of deaths from terrorism in the OECD were in Israel from attacks by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This increase in terrorist attacks corresponded with the Second Intifada, which was a period of armed conflict that caused thousands of deaths, mostly of Palestinians.

The majority of deaths in 2004 and 2005 resulted from two al-Qa’ida inspired attacks. In 2004 the Madrid attacks caused 191 deaths, which accounted for 70 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the OECD that year. The bombings in London in July of the following year constituted 43 per cent of all terrorism related deaths in the OECD in 2005, killing 56 people. The majority of the remaining deaths in 2005 were caused by a series of attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel.

2015 was the first year in a decade that there were more than 150 deaths.

The second period of increased terrorist activity began in 2015. This was the first year since 2004 that there were more than 150 deaths. The number of attacks per year in the OECD has been steadily climbing since 2010. But deaths from terrorism had remained consistently low until 2015.

BOX 2.1 ABOUT THE OECD

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a forum where the governments of 34 democracies with market economies work with each other to promote economic growth, prosperity, and sustainable development. The member states of the OECD include 25 European countries and North America, as well as Australia, Chile, Israel, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.
Like the first phase, this phase has been characterised by large scale attacks planned or inspired by an international jihadi group. In this second phase it is ISIL, also known as ISIS, Daesh or the Islamic State, rather than al-Qa’ida, that is the dominant international terrorist organisation.

In 2015 half of all deaths from terrorism in OECD countries resulted from attacks inspired or directed by ISIL. This includes the Paris attacks in November that killed 136, the Ankara bombing in October that killed 105 and the suicide bombing in Suruç that killed 34. This phase has continued into 2016, with large ISIL-inspired attacks in Brussels, Istanbul, Nice and Orlando. Together, these four attacks killed 211 people, representing 44 per cent of the 482 deaths from terrorism between 1 January and 31 July 2016.

Given the substantial number of deaths occurring in 2016, data from this year, up until the end of July, has been included in the analysis. All of the statistics relating to OECD member countries have been calculated to the end of July 2016.

Except for the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, Turkey is the country that has had the highest number of deaths from terrorism in the OECD since 2000.

Of the 1,071 deaths in Turkey since 2000, 57 per cent occurred between January 2015 and July 2016. Over the last two years the number of deaths in Turkey has increased substantially, from 20 deaths in 2014 to 337 in 2015, to 269 in the first half of 2016 due to major attacks by ISIL and the PKK. Nearly half of the deaths in 2016 were from just three attacks.

Following Turkey, France is the country that had the second highest number of deaths in the OECD in 2015 and the first half of 2016. France did not have a recent history of high levels of terrorism. For the 14 years to the beginning of 2015, France had averaged one death per annum. However, in 2015 deaths increased sharply to 161. This increase was due to the November Paris attacks by ISIL, the Île-de-France attacks which included the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine offices and lone actor attacks. In the first half of 2016, an attack by a lone actor who drove a cargo truck into a crowd celebrating Bastille Day in Nice killed 85 people. Other attacks in France in the first seven months of 2016 include an attack on a Paris police station, the stabbing of two police officers and the killing of a priest at a Normandy church.
The United States had the third highest number of deaths from terrorism in the OECD in 2015 and in the first half of 2016. Since 2006, 98 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the United States have been by lone actors. There were several high fatality lone actor attacks in 2015 and 2016. This includes the San Bernardino attack where 14 were killed, the attack on attendees of the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in South Carolina that killed nine, the attacks on the Navy Operational Support Center in Tennessee that killed six and the Orlando nightclub shooting that killed 50 and is suspected to be inspired by ISIL.

Belgium had the fourth highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2015 and the first half of 2016. This was due to the Brussels attacks on 22 March 2016 where the nail bombings of the Brussels airport and Maelbeek metro station killed 35 and injured 340. Prior to this, the deadliest attack in Belgium was in May 2014 when four people were killed by a shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels by a former ISIL member. The only other fatal terrorist attack in Belgium since 2000 was in 2012 when the Imam of a Shiite mosque was killed by a firebomb.

Like Belgium, Germany has not had a history of high levels of terrorism in the last two decades. 2015 was the first year since 2007 that Germany experienced a death from terrorism. There were three fatal terrorist attacks in 2015 which killed six people. Two of these attacks targeted refugee shelters or buildings with fire, killing five people. In the first half of 2016 there were three attacks that resulted in deaths. Two of these attacks involved stabbings, which injured eight people and killed one civilian. The other attack was a suicide bomber who, having pledged allegiance to ISIL, exploded themselves at a wine bar injuring 15 people.

Israel is the only OECD member country that has had a death from terrorism in every year since 2000. In 2015 there were 17 deaths from terrorism while in the first half of 2016 there were 18. There was at least one fatal attack in Israel in 2016, which appears to have been inspired by ISIL. This attack killed three people.

Ten of the twenty most lethal terrorist attacks since 2000 in the OECD occurred in 2015 and 2016. Four took place in 2015 and six in 2016. These ten attacks resulted in 579 deaths and nearly 2,000 injuries. The attackers in eight of these ten events had some affiliation with ISIL, either as individuals claiming to be inspired by ISIL or attacks by the group itself, such as in the 2015 Paris Attacks.

Except for the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, Turkey is the country that has had the highest number of deaths from terrorism in the OECD since 2000.
TABLE 2.1  TEN WORST ATTACKS IN OECD COUNTRIES SINCE 2015

<table>
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<th>COUNTRY</th>
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<th>ATTACK</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
<th>INJURIES</th>
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<td>France</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Paris attacks</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ankara bombings</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>ISIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Suruç bombing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>Lone actor (ISIL inspired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Île-de-France attacks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Local group (al-Qa’ida/ISIL inspired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Nice truck attack</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Lone actor (ISIL inspired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Atatürk Airport attack</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>230</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Orlando nightclub shooting</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Lone actor (ISIL inspired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Brussels attacks</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>330</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>March Ankara bombing</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>February Ankara bombing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEP

ISIL ATTACKS IN OECD COUNTRIES IN 2015 & FIRST HALF OF 2016

- More than half of deaths from terrorism in the OECD since 2014 were in attacks with a connection with ISIL.
- There were at least 131 ISIL affiliated attacks or plots between January 2014 and July 2016.
- Twenty-nine per cent of all attacks that were inspired by ISIL occurred in the United States, followed by 19 per cent in France.
- Thirty-eight per cent of deaths from ISIL linked attacks were in France. The Paris attacks killed 137 and the Bastille Day attack in Nice killed 85.
- Half of all plots with an ISIL connection have been conducted by people who have had no direct contact with ISIL.
- ISIL directed or inspired attacks took place in 17 of the 34 members of the OECD; these attacks resulted in deaths in 11 countries.

There were 18 deaths from 17 ISIL-affiliated attacks in the OECD in 2014; direct contact between the perpetrator and ISIL occurred in at least seven of these attacks. This increased significantly in 2015, with 313 deaths from 64 attacks. Nineteen of the attacks were directed by ISIL. The two largest attacks occurred in France and Turkey. The French attack occurred in November in Paris where 137 people were killed by a series of coordinated attacks by ISIL operatives and in Turkey in Ankara in October 2015 where 105 were killed in bombings. This increase in attacks by ISIL in the OECD continued into the first half of 2016 with 44 attacks that killed 255.
Whilst there was a significant increase in the number of deaths from attacks related to ISIL there has also been an increase in deaths not related to ISIL. There were 59 deaths from attacks without an ISIL connection in 2014, which increased by 350 per cent to 264 deaths in 2015. The majority of these deaths were from attacks in Turkey by the PKK. In the first half of 2016 there have been 227 deaths in the OECD without an ISIL connection. Attacks by the PKK killed 117 people while two attacks by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) in Ankara in February and March killed a combined 64 people.

The level of support that ISIL provides in terrorist attacks varies greatly. Half of all ISIL related plots were by lone actors who showed sympathy to ISIL, but without having any direct contact with the group. As of the time of writing, none of the attacks in the US had direct ISIL involvement.

Attacks attributed to ISIL have increased significantly since the call by ISIL on 22 September 2014 to directly target many OECD countries. In 2014 there were 13 lone actor attacks inspired by ISIL, this increased to 33 in 2015. Up until the end of July there had been 22 attacks in 2016.

It is possible that after investigations some of the attacks currently coded as lone actor attacks with sympathy and no contact to ISIL may actually be determined to have a greater connection to ISIL. For example, the Thalys train attempted shooting in August 2015 in France where a gunman was overpowered by passengers was initially described as a lone actor. However, after investigation it was determined that the gunman had been in communication with the leader of the Paris attacks, who was one of the highest-ranking external ISIL members. Alternatively, the motivation behind some lone actor attacks may never be fully known, as attempts to circumvent law enforcement result in limited information being left behind.

Attacks by small groups of people that have received training and directives by senior ISIL members have increased. In 2014 there were two such attacks, which resulted in no deaths. In 2015 this increased to 19 attacks that resulted in 281 deaths. In the first half of 2016 there were 12 ISIL directed attacks resulting in 105 deaths.

The deadliest attacks since 2014 have had direct ISIL involvement, as seen in figure 2.10. Four of the ten deadliest attacks in the OECD since 2015 were carried out by ISIL. These attacks are the Paris Attacks, the 2015 Ankara bombings, Atatürk Airport attack and the Brussels attacks, which together killed 327 people and injured over 1,300 people.
LONE ACTORS

Lone actor terrorism is defined as terrorist acts committed by individuals who act alone and without the support of a terrorist organisation. Lone actor terrorist attacks are not a new phenomenon, but have tended to come in waves, with these types of attacks resurfacing in recent years. This could be due to a contagion effect whereby a general terrorist strategy is adopted without direct contact with others.\(^1\)

In one study that examined all lone actor attacks between 1969 and 2012, three distinct waves of attacks were identified: in the early 1980s, early to mid-1990s, and early 2000s.\(^2\) Since ISIL’s call for individuals to carry out independent attacks in 2014 there has been the start of another wave of lone actor attacks.\(^3\) Lone actors have the potential to cause high casualties, as seen in the attacks in Nice and Orlando in 2016. In 2015, lone actors were responsible for 22 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries.

Given that lone actor terrorism has been around since at least the late 1880’s beginning with the anti-monarch anarchists in Russia,\(^4\) and the differing ideological drivers of lone actor attacks, it is perhaps not surprising that there is not one profile that aptly characterises them, other than perceived injustices.

Traits of lone actor terrorists:

\[\text{There are no generalisable traits for age, education or social isolation that act as predictors to carry out lone actor terrorist attacks.}\]

\[\text{The only trait that is common amongst lone actor attacks is that perpetrators are mostly, but not exclusively, male.}\]

\[\text{Some research has found that lone attackers tend to be slightly older than terrorist members of an organisation — an average age of 33 for lone attackers as compared to 20 for Colombian militants and 26 for al-Qa’ida related groups. However other research has not found any consistent trends in age.}\]

\[\text{There have been similarly mixed findings on the levels of education and affluence for lone attackers, with both under-educated and socially deprived attackers as well as highly educated affluent individuals carrying out attacks.}\]

\[\text{A study focused on lone attacks in the EU between 2000 and 2014 did find slightly higher rates of mental health issues in lone actor attackers than in the general population (35 per cent compared to 27 per cent).}\]

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2016 | Trends
DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS

Domestic terror groups are most often motivated by anti-government sentiment, nationalism, separatism, racism, bigotry or anarchy. The most prominent domestic terrorist groups in the OECD have been motivated by nationalistic ideologies or independence movements. This includes the IRA in Northern Ireland, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) of Spain and the PKK of Turkey. The other main form of domestic terrorism is home-grown such as the perpetrators of the London bombings of 2005. This attack, which was the deadliest on British soil since WWII, was executed by a group of people born in Britain and motivated by jihadist beliefs and opposition to the foreign policy of Britain.

Due to the array of different motivations behind domestic terrorist groups and the varying circumstances under which they come into existence, it is difficult to establish a profile of a ‘generic domestic terrorist.’ However, substantial research exists on why individuals join ethnic rebellions and independence movements. When group grievances against the state are high, and the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion is low, groups are most likely to form.

The deadliest home-grown group in the OECD in the last few years is the PKK. Between 2000 and mid 2016 the PKK carried out 569 terrorist attacks which resulted in 529 deaths. These trends are shown in figure 2.11.

Despite the recent increase in deaths from terrorism by the PKK, the peak of recruitment happened from 1990 to 1994, when there were on average over 700 recruits per year. In contrast, from 2000 to 2012 there were on average 65 recruits per year.

A unique database of 8,011 PKK recruits shows nearly 80 per cent of recruits to the PKK were born in Turkey, with other recruits born in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Only 78 of the 8,011 recruits were forcibly recruited into the PKK, highlighting that the organization is an organically ‘home-grown’ group. Thirteen per cent of these PKK recruits had been political activists prior to being recruited into the PKK, but only four per cent claimed that their families had been victimised by the state. The average age of recruitment does not vary substantially over time, ranging from 20 in 1975 to 21 in 2012. The majority of recruits had either a high school or university level education, as shown in figure 2.12.

Family socio-economic status data is available for 1,079 recruits and is distributed as shown in figure 2.13. Fifty-eight per cent of the recruits for which data is available come from low socio-economic backgrounds, while 12 per cent come from high income families. Middle income families account for 30 per cent of recruits.

FIGURE 2.11  TIME-LINE OF PKK CAUSED DEATHS, 2000 TO MID 2016
Deaths from PKK have increased in 2015 and in the first seven months of 2016.

Source: START GTD, IEP calculations
Most recruitment for domestic terrorist groups active in Turkey is done through friends and family. This appears to be regardless of the ideology of the group and includes groups inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) as well as Turkish Hezbollah which is motivated by religious ideology.14

“Most recruitment for domestic terrorist groups active in Turkey is done through friends and family. This appears to be regardless of the ideology of the group and includes groups inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) as well as Turkish Hezbollah which is motivated by religious ideology.”

When group grievances against the state are high, and the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion is low, groups are most likely to form.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

2015 and the first six months of 2016 have seen ISIL become the most prominent international terrorist organisation in the OECD both by numbers of attacks and by deaths.

There have been at least 31,000 people who have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL and other extremist groups. Similarly to al-Qaeda, foreign recruitment appears to be based on personal rather than political motivations. A key impetus for foreign fighters joining ISIL has been a strong sense of isolation and perceived difficulty in assimilating into ‘western’ culture.

Leaked ISIL documents from early 2016 revealed the personal details of 4,600 militants who had joined ISIL in 2013 and 2014. Of the 3,244 records where the nationality is known, 12 per cent, or 387 come from 17 OECD countries. Through analysing these documents, the United States Counter Terrorism Center found the average ISIL fighter is male, 26, has a relatively high level of education and a relatively low level of knowledge of Islam. The average age is in line with other estimates of foreign fighter age, including an average age of 24-25 for al-Qaeda. However, there is a large distribution of ages ranging from the oldest recruit, born in 1945, to the youngest recruits, 41 of whom were under 15 years old when they were recruited.

The differing knowledge of Islam appears to have an influence on the types of roles within ISIL that people choose. Twelve per cent of recruits opted for a suicide role over a more conventional fighting role, with those who had advanced knowledge of Islam and Sharia being far less likely to choose the suicide role than those with more limited knowledge.

Unlike home-grown groups, education and employment opportunities seem to influence membership of international terrorist groups. Recruits to ISIL generally have higher levels of education and lower income status, as seen in figure 2.14. Although 25.5 per cent of recruits reported having a high level of education, only six per cent of recruits have a high level occupational status. Western recruits tended to have slightly higher education levels than non-Western recruits. High level of education was classified as post high school degree or advanced degree, whereas high occupational status meant white-collar work or teaching. There is speculation that this disconnect between education and opportunity may have been a motivating factor for recruits joining ISIL out of a sense of frustration.

FIGURE 2.14  EDUCATION LEVEL VERSUS OCCUPATION STATUS OF ISIL RECRUITS

There is a large mismatch between levels of education and occupational status for ISIL recruits with high and medium levels of education.

Unlike home-grown groups, education and employment opportunities seems to influence membership of international terrorist groups.
In 2015 four groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all deaths from terrorism: ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida.

ISIL surpassed Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 2015 and was responsible for 6,141 deaths in the year.

Boko Haram had an 18 per cent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 5,478 deaths during the year.

Al-Qa’ida had a 17 per cent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 1,620 deaths in the year.

The Taliban in Afghanistan had a 29 per cent increase in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 4,502 deaths from terrorism during the year.
Four terrorist groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all deaths from terrorism by known groups in 2015. Although this represents a two per cent decline in the number of people killed by these groups, their percentage share of all deaths has increased from 66 per cent in 2013. In 2015 these four groups were responsible for the death of 17,741 people.

**ISIL** was the deadliest terrorist group in 2015 with a one per cent increase in deaths from the previous year, responsible for the deaths of 6,141 people. Despite a reduction in attacks in Iraq, there was a 50% increase in attacks in Syria. In 2015 ISIL also expanded the number of countries in which they conduct an attack to 11, up from six in the previous year. If ISIL affiliated groups were to be included, the number of countries where attacks occurred would jump to 28.

**BOKO HARAM** had an 18 per cent reduction in deaths in 2015 compared to 2014, with 5,478 people killed. Boko Haram has been the focus of a coalition of government forces in West Africa. The group is also responsible for a high number of deaths from violent conflict. There were 4,476 battle-related deaths stemming from conflict between Boko Haram and government forces in 2014 and 3,005 in 2015. Boko Haram had an eight per cent decline in the number of attacks in Nigeria. This was offset by its expansion into other countries with attacks in six countries, two more than in 2014.

Despite this reduction of activity in Nigeria, Boko Haram has remained extremely deadly. The Baga massacre, a series of killings and razing of 16 villages by Boko Haram in the first week of January 2015, led to an estimated 2,000 deaths and is one of the deadliest attacks in Nigeria’s history. However, like many instances of attacks around the Lake Chad region, uncertainty remains over the exact death toll and the massacre has not been classified as a terrorist attack.

The **TALIBAN** in Afghanistan had its deadliest year for terrorism in 2015, with 4,502 deaths, a 29 per cent increase on the previous peak in 2014. 2015 also was the deadliest year for conflict deaths in Afghanistan with a 34 per cent increase from the previous year.

**AL-QA’IDA** had a decline in deaths of 17 per cent in 2015 to 1,620 deaths. This count includes deaths from groups which are strongly affiliated with Al-Qa’ida. These include al-Shabaab, the al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent. The increasing deadliness of the al-Nusra Front was offset by declines in the number of people killed by al-Shabaab and AQAP.
The deadliest terrorist groups are also engaged in war and armed conflict, therefore the total casualty counts are much higher than just their deaths through terrorism. ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida are also engaged in conflicts with either government or other non-state groups.

Over 27,000 people were killed as a result of violent conflict with ISIL. Deaths resulting from violent conflict between governments and ISIL increased by 78 per cent in 2015, up from 15,000 the previous year. This includes conflicts with the government of Iraq, Yemen and the Assad regime. ISIL was also engaged in conflict with other non-state groups that would not be considered terrorism, including attacks on groups in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Yemen.

Violent conflict in Afghanistan has risen since the drawdown of the international troops in 2013. Taliban is in assurgency, carrying out more terrorist attacks which have resulted in a 29 per cent increase in deaths in 2015. Battle-related deaths from conflict with the Taliban also rose 34 per cent from 2014 to 2015. The Taliban was able to briefly capture the city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan in 2015, the first city to fall into the Taliban since their regime was removed from power in 2001. At the time of writing the Afghan government has taken back control of the city but clashes between Taliban and Afghan government forces in and around the province were ongoing.

Boko Haram has been engaged in armed conflict with the Multinational Joint Task Force, a coalition of West African militaries made up of fighters from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. There were over 3,000 battle-related deaths from this conflict in 2015. This is a decline of 33 per cent from the previous year, highlighting the falling fortunes of the group due to the Nigerian Army’s gains. Population displacement and erratic rainfall in areas affected by the violence have led to severe food insecurity. There have now been three consecutive years of crop failures. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that more than 4.4 million people in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria are facing a food emergency and 65,000 of those are in famine.1

In 2015 al-Qa’ida undertook attacks in Syria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The al-Nusra Front has been involved in armed conflict with Hezbollah, the Hazzm Movement and ISIL, as well as with forces loyal to the Assad regime. AQAP has been in conflict with the Government of Yemen as well as other actors in the Yemeni civil war, and AQIM have been in conflict with the Government of Mali and the United Nations mission since 2013.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) classifies terrorism as actions outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. This means that only acts conducted by non-state actors and which are contrary to international humanitarian law, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians, are classified as terrorism. The actions of governments do not get counted in the GTD and are therefore not included in the GTI. The GTD and START do not count state terrorism and only record incidents by sub-national actors.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines battle-related deaths as fatalities that are related to combat in a violent conflict. Typically, this is through conventional warfare tactics involving the armed forces of the warring parties, which includes traditional battlefield fighting and bombardments. Whilst the targets are usually the military and its installations, there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of indiscriminate bombings and civilians killed in crossfire. All deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths.2
ISIL, also known as ISIS, Islamic State or Daesh, is a terrorist group based in Syria and Iraq. It emerged from al-Qa’ida in Iraq, moving into Syria during the Syrian civil war. In February 2014 al-Qa’ida formally broke ties with ISIL, with the leader of al-Qa’ida stating ISIL disobeyed directions from al-Qa’ida to kill fewer civilians. Like other fundamentalist jihadi groups, ISIL seeks to create an area of Islamic rule. The group controls a significant amount of territory in both Iraq and Syria. ISIL aspires to control the Levant region which includes Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It is opposed to the Alawite Assad regime and the Shia Iraqi Government of Haider al-Abadi. ISIL has also claimed to be fighting a holy war against Shia Muslims, Christians and Yezidis, an ethno-religious group in Iraq and Syria.

The entire organisation is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who is known as the Caliph or political successor. ISIL has a strong military presence in the region with many former members of the Iraqi army under the Saddam Hussein regime joining it.

In 2015, ISIL slightly increased the deadliness of attacks from previous years. This resulted in ISIL killing 6,141 people in terrorist attacks, a one per cent increase from 2014. However, this increase in deaths coincided with an 11 per cent reduction in attacks. As such, ISIL became more deadly, with more high-fatality attacks. There were on average 6.4 deaths per attack in 2015 up from 5.7 deaths per attack in 2014.

As well as increased lethality, there was also an increase in the number of countries targeted by ISIL. ISIL conducted attacks in 11 countries in 2015, up from six countries the previous year. The group undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 2015.

2015 also saw an increase in the number of groups that claimed affiliation with ISIL. There were ISIL affiliates active in 13 countries in 2014. By 2015 that had grown to at least 28 countries which had groups that had pledged allegiance to ISIL. There have also been attacks by individuals who have been inspired or directed by ISIL. For example, there were ISIL-inspired plots in at least 11 OECD countries in 2015.

Despite the increased geographic spread of ISIL connected attacks, the majority of attacks occurred in Iraq and Syria. 81 per cent of attacks by ISIL were in Iraq and 15 per cent were in Syria. Four cities in Iraq, Baghdad, Ramadi, Mosul and Baiji, together accounted for a quarter of all attacks.

The majority of attacks targeted civilians, who account for 43 per cent of deaths. Over half of attacks on civilians were bombings or explosions, with the number of assassinations decreasing from the previous year.

There were 609 bombings by ISIL in 2015, and they were more deadly on average than previous years. This is a trend that has been seen with other groups too. As groups gain greater experience with explosives they tend to have more casualties with fewer attacks. In 2014, 40 per cent of attacks did not lead to any deaths, whereas it was 23 per cent in 2015. The biggest change in 2015 was the increased lethality of suicide bombings. Suicide bombings remained more deadly than other types of bombings with on average 11 deaths per attack compared to three for other types of bombings. This was an increase of 20 per cent from the previous year.
ISIL generated an estimated US$2 billion in revenue in 2015. This was largely due to smuggling of oil which at one stage generated on average US$1.3 million a day.1 According to the US treasury department this business left ISIL net profits of just over US$500 million in 2015.2 As a result of the targeting of ISIL-operated refineries and convoys by coalition forces, production declined from 75,000 to 50,000 barrels per day.3 Another major revenue stream for ISIL is taxation, both for individuals and businesses in the territory they control. This is estimated to be US$350 million per year.4 This includes income and business tax of ten per cent, as well as taxes on pharmaceutical drugs and cash withdrawals.

Other significant sources of financing include the sale of archaeological pieces to black markets, which was estimated to be up to US$100 million per year.5 ISIL has also generated revenue from kidnapping for ransom, estimated to be up to US$45 million in 2014. Kidnapping has often targeted the international community, but declined in 2015 and 2016 as there were fewer staff from multinationals active in regions controlled by ISIL.6 There have also been reports that there is a connection between ISIL and drug smuggling.7

Boko Haram, the deadliest terrorist group in 2014, had a reduction in attacks and deaths in 2015. There were 18 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism by Boko Haram in 2015 than the previous year. As well as being engaged in armed conflict with the Nigerian government, Boko Haram is also engaged with the Multinational Joint Task Force, a coalition of West African militaries made up of fighters from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. As a result of this military intervention Boko Haram has fled areas it previously controlled.

The group is also known as Jamāʿat Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Daʿwah waʿl-Jihād and more recently Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). The name Boko Haram can be translated as ‘Western education is forbidden.’ Following a dispute with the Nigerian government and the murder of their leader Mohamad Yusuf in 2009, the group began engaging in a campaign of violence. The new leader, Abubakar Shekau, declared jihad against the Nigerian Government and the United States in 2010.

Boko Haram seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, a country which is divided between the Christian south and the Muslim north. Sharia law is fully implemented in nine states and partially implemented in three of the 36 states of Nigeria, all of which are in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has interacted heavily with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and more recently with ISIL, receiving military support.
training, funding channels and social media training. In March 2015, the group formally pledged allegiance (bayat) to ISIL and recognised the leader of ISIL, al Baghdadi, as the Caliph of Muslims. Boko Haram has allegedly been training with the al-Qa’ida linked group al-Shabaab in Somalia, suggesting a softer allegiance to ISIL than originally thought.

In 2015, 75 per cent of deaths by Boko Haram were in Nigeria, compared to 92 per cent the previous year. Because of the greater military effort in north-eastern Nigeria and its defeats, Boko Haram has expanded into neighbouring countries. Boko Haram has engaged in terrorist attacks in five countries in 2015 apart from Nigeria, resulting in deaths from terrorism increasing in all these countries. In Nigeria there was a 33 per cent reduction in deaths from terrorism as well as battle-related deaths. Niger, a country which had no attacks from Boko Haram in 2014, suffered 12 per cent of the deaths in 2015, with a total of 649 people being killed. Boko Haram continued incursions into Cameroon and Chad resulted in large increases in terrorism deaths in 2015, with 527 and 206 people killed respectively.

“Private citizens remained the major target of Boko Haram’s attacks.

Burkina Faso similarly had no attacks by Boko Haram in 2014 with one attack in 2015. The remaining attacks in Burkina Faso, including the 2016 Ouagadougou attack where 30 were killed in an attack on a hotel, were conducted by AQIM.

Private citizens remained the major target of Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks, being the target in 70 per cent of attacks and accounting for 73 per cent of deaths. Other groups that were targeted include religious institutions and the military, which accounted for only six per cent of attacks each. There were around 20 attacks targeting mosques and four attacks on churches.

Boko Haram has continued to increase the use of bombings after developing greater training and expertise from other terrorist groups.10 There were 194 bombings in 2015, up from 107 bombings the previous year and 35 in 2013. In 2015, three quarters of bombings carried out by Boko Haram were suicide bombings — a significant tactical change compared to previous years. This is a reflection of the adaption of the group to the increased securitisation in the areas it operates in, as suicide bombers are generally more difficult to thwart. There has also been an increasing use of women and children as bombers. Many bombings target markets or public places, such as in January 2015 when a bomb attached to a ten-year-old girl exploded and killed at least 20 people at the Monday Markets in Maiduguri. On average suicide bombings killed ten people per attack.

FINANCING OF BOKO HARAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANNUAL REVENUE</th>
<th>US$25 MILLION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRINCIPAL FUNDING SOURCE</td>
<td>KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND EXTORTION (KRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER FINANCING ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>BANK ROBBERIES, ILLEGAL MINING, EXTERNAL DONATIONS, DRUGS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike ISIL, Boko Haram does not have a sophisticated financing structure. The primary revenue source for Boko Haram is kidnapping, ransom and extortion.11

This includes mass hostage-takings such as the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls.12 According to the United Nations Security Council, Boko Haram has also used human trafficking to raise money.13 Other revenue sources include criminal activities such as bank robberies, illegal mining and support for drug cartels to ensure transit through Nigeria.14

TALIBAN

<table>
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<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>TALIBAN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENTS</td>
<td>1,094</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEATHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>INJURIES</td>
<td>4,685</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOCATION OF ATTACKS</td>
<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Founded in 1994 by Mohamad Omar, the group was originally constituted by a mixture of Mujahedeen, who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and a group of Pashtun tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 and ruled until 2001, when they were overthrown by the American-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan. Since the drawdown of NATO forces in 2013 there has been a corresponding increase in terrorist attacks by the Taliban.
2015 was the deadliest year for the Taliban, which killed 4,502 people in 1,094 terrorist attacks. This is an increase of 29 per cent in deaths and 23 per cent in attacks from 2014, previously the deadliest year. Afghanistan also experienced the worst year in its civil war, with nearly 18,000 deaths from conflict in 2015.

The Taliban are seeking to destabilise the government through undermining its institutions. As a result, the police were the major target of the Taliban in 2015, accounting for half of all incidents and deaths with 543 attacks, resulting in 2,259 deaths. Most attacks on police are armed assaults targeting police at checkpoints, outposts or at patrols. Around 20 per cent of attacks on police were bombings, which tended to target police headquarters. There were also 30 suicide bombings targeting police that killed 193 people. Suicide bombings are on average more deadly than other forms of attacks. In 2015 suicide attacks on police killed on average 6.4 people per attack compared to two people per attack for non-suicide bombings.

Private citizens were the second largest group targeted by the Taliban, accounting for about 20 per cent of incidents. A third of attacks on civilians used bombs, however only about six per cent were suicide attacks. The third largest targeted group was the military, which accounted for five per cent of attacks and 13 per cent of deaths. The Taliban killed 577 people in 55 attacks on military targets in 2015.

Attacks by the Taliban have continued to be centralised along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. However, there has been an increase in attacks in the northern provinces. There appears to be an expansion of the Taliban further north within Afghanistan and particularly along the border with Tajikistan.

**FINANCING OF THE TALIBAN**

<table>
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<th>ANNUAL REVENUE</th>
<th>US$400 MILLION(^{15})</th>
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<td>PRINCIPAL FUNDING SOURCE</td>
<td>OPIUM AND HEROIN SMUGGLING</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER FINANCING ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>TAXATION (USHR &amp; ZAKAT), EXTORTION, EXTERNAL DONATIONS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The sale and trafficking of opium is the largest source of revenue for the Taliban, estimated to generate up to US$200 million a year or more.\(^{16}\)

**FIGURE 3.4** CULTIVATION OF OPIUM POPPY IN AFGHANISTAN, 2005-2015

There was a 19 per cent increase in opium cultivation from 2012 to 2015. It is estimated that the Taliban earned in excess of US$200 million per annum from the opium trade in recent years.

Source: UNODC
Drug traffickers pay the Taliban to protect markets, escort traffickers and assist in the transportation of opium. Afghanistan remains the largest opium producer in the world.17

Taxation is the second source of financing of the Taliban, which entails the ushr, a ten per cent tax on harvest, and the zakat, a 2.5 per cent tax on wealth. The Taliban also imposes taxes on services it does not control, such as water or electricity services.18 Large construction, trucking, telecom and mining companies face extortion attempts by the Taliban.

The Taliban are seeking to destabilise the government through undermining its institutions. As a result, the police were the major target of the Taliban in 2015.

In 2012 the UN Security Council reported that the Taliban raised $400 million through a combination of taxes, donations, extortion and involvement in the illegal narcotics industry.19 Considering that opium cultivation increased by 19 per cent from 2012 to 2015, it is likely that in recent years the Taliban earned in excess of $US 200 million from the opium trade.20 There have also been reports of Gulf Cooperation Council nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, funding the Taliban through Islamic charities and other institutions.21

**AL-QA’IDA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>AL-QA’IDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFFILIATES</td>
<td>AL-SHABAAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL-NUSRAH FRONT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABDULLAH AZZAM BRIGADES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL-QAIDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| INCIDENTS | 368 |
| DEATHS    | 1,620 |
| INJURIES  | 969 |

**LOCATION OF ATTACKS**

ALGERIA  
BANGLADESH  
FRANCE  
KENYA  
LEBANON  
MALI  
PAKISTAN  
SOMALIA  
SYRIA  
UGANDA  
YEMEN

Al-Qa’ida was formed in 1988 by Usama bin Ladin, a Saudi Arabian who was killed in 2011, and Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Sunni scholar who was killed in 1989. The group, like the Taliban, came to prominence during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It strives for international jihad. The group was responsible for large scale attacks in New York, London and Madrid and was the main target of the NATO-led War on Terror following the September 11, 2001 attacks. As a result, many of al-Qa’ida’s leadership have been killed and al-Qa’ida now adopts a decentralised structure using regional cells and affiliated organisations, known as franchises, instead of a centrally controlled organisation.

Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates undertook attacks in 12 countries in 2015, down from 14 the previous year and the peak of 16 countries in 2011. In total, there were 1,620 deaths from the six most prominent al-Qa’ida affiliates in 2015. This is a 17
per cent decline from the previous year and reflects the lessening impact of the deadliest of its affiliates, al-Shabaab.

In 2015 al-Shabaab killed 836 people, an 18 per cent decline from 2014. Nevertheless, 2015 saw the group’s deadliest attack which targeted civilians; Kenya’s Garissa University College attack that killed at least 147 people.

Al-Shabaab, also known as Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, is an al-Qa’ida affiliate based in Somalia that is seeking to create an Islamic state in Somalia. Whilst ISIL have appealed for al-Shabaab to pledge allegiance, al-Shabaab remain an al-Qa’ida affiliate. Kenyan military forces have been placing further pressure on al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2015 and 2016, which has diminished their ability to conduct more attacks.

The second deadliest of al-Qa’ida affiliates is the al-Nusra Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qa’ida in Syria, and has been active in the Syrian civil war since 2012. Unlike other al-Qa’ida affiliates, the group had an increase in deaths from terrorism from 488 in 2014 to 611 in 2015. In 2013, ISIL attempted to annex the al-Nusra Front, which remained affiliated with al-Qa’ida until July 2016 when it announced a split. Most analysts believe this was an attempt to avoid being targets of air strikes and to potentially participate in future negotiations rather than an ideological or tactical shift for the group. As well as deaths from terrorism, in 2015 the al-Nusra Front also engaged in 270 battle-related deaths from conflict with Harakat Hazm, Hezbollah and ISIL as well as with the forces loyal to the Assad regime.

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) killed 155 from terrorism in 2015, a 62 per cent decline from 2014. AQAP is active in Yemen and saw declining influence due to the influx of ISIL-affiliated groups. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and Mali, active since 2007, killed 15 people across 11 attacks in 2015, including attacks on members of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In early 2016 they also undertook attacks in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire targeting tourists.

The Abdullah Azzam Brigades is the al-Qa’ida branch in Lebanon, with attacks being undertaken under the group name since 2004. They did not claim responsibility for any deaths from terrorism in 2015 and have been less deadly since the capture of their former leader in late 2013. The newest al-Qa’ida affiliate, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent, began activities in September 2014 and claimed responsibility for the deaths of secular bloggers and publishers in Bangladesh.

FINANCING OF AL-QA’IDA

| ANNUAL REVENUE | US$150 MILLION |
| PRINCIPAL FUNDING | ORGANISED CRIME |
| SOURCE | FRANCHISES |
| OTHER FINANCING | EXTERNAL DONATIONS, KIDNAPPING |

Al-Qa’ida has evolved from a group that depended exclusively upon Usama bin Ladin’s personal wealth and donations by individuals from Gulf states to a global organisation with a diversified portfolio of criminal business.

The franchise structure enables centralised control but decentralised activity. As such, local groups can be opportunistic in seeking revenue sources which are based on their region.

Al-Shabaab generates revenue through income taxation and extortion, as well as through trading coal. The al-Nusra Front, like ISIL, generates revenue through the sale of oil, kidnapping foreigners in Syria and through private donations from individuals in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Other al-Qa’ida affiliates like AQAP engage in more traditional criminal behaviour, such as robbing the Al Mukalla central bank and extorting oil and telco companies.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2016 | Terrorist Groups
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GROUPS

ISIL & AL-QA’IDA

The two largest terrorist networks are al-Qa’ida and ISIL. Al-Qa’ida began in 1988 and initially fought against the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan. Over time al-Qa’ida focused on the “far enemy” of the United States as opposed to the “near enemy”, being governments in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia whom Usama bin Ladin opposed for their alliance with the United States.28

Whilst initially highly centralised, al-Qa’ida evolved into a franchising model. Some branches are run by al-Qa’ida fighters, such as AQAP, while others use the al-Qa’ida brand without major operational input, such as the al-Nusra Front. This branching out with new groups based on national grounds was a result of diminished capabilities and actually undermines al-Qa’ida’s core goal of creating a transnational group based on religious affiliation.29

A Jordanian militant, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, established the extremist group Tawhid wa al-Jihad, allegedly with support from al-Qa’ida. After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 the group moved into Iraq and introduced suicide bombings. Following their impact in the insurgency, Zarqawi formally joined al-Qa’ida in 2004 with the group renamed al-Qa’ida in Iraq. However, due to differences of opinions on tactics and targets there was continual tension between the groups, with Zarqawi continuing to target civilians and Shiites with levels of violence deemed unacceptable by al-Qa’ida.

After Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike by the United States in 2006, an Egyptian named Abu Ayub al-Masri took over the organisation and united other groups under a new group called Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In order to foster greater support from local Iraqi leaders, a local Iraqi was declared leader of ISI. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi with a doctorate in Islamic studies, took over the group in 2010.30 The group conducted a series of deadly attacks, including 25 suicide bombings in 2012 that killed 142 people. It expanded after the drawdown in coalition forces and amidst increasing sectarian conflict within Iraq. The group also gained expertise in armed conflict due to its involvement in the Syrian civil war where it was one of the most professional of rebel factions.31 Baghdadi declared in a statement in April 2013 the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and in the process attempted to annex the al-Qa’ida affiliated al-Nusra Front which was active in Syria. Al-Qa’ida rejected ISIL making an official statement in February 2014. ISIL declared itself the Islamic State, claiming a caliphate and Baghdadi as the Caliph.

ISIL have since continued the feud with al-Qa’ida. From 2014 to 2015, ISIL has been involved in armed conflicts with non-state groups that have resulted in 11,076 deaths. This includes with al-Qa’ida affiliates, including 770 deaths from armed conflicts with the al-Nusra Front. ISIL have also had clashes in Afghanistan with long-term allies of al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, through the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State.

As well as being engaged in direct armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, ISIL has also rejected al-Qa’ida’s preferred strategy for expansion. The propaganda of ISIL focuses less on the theological justification for jihad, with greater emphasis on military images and life under ISIL governance than al-Qa’ida. As opposed to al-Qa’ida, which still maintains control of messaging and requires ideological consistency with its different branches, ISIL has less restrictive requirements. As a result, there have been many more affiliates of ISIL than al-Qa’ida.

Al-Qa’ida, its branches and supporters conducted attacks in 12 countries in 2015, down from the peak of 16 countries in 2011. These attacks were in Afghanistan with the Taliban, Syria with the al-Nusra Front, Somalia and Kenya with al-Shabaab, Pakistan with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Yemen with AQAP and in Mali and Algeria with AQIM. There were also attacks in Bangladesh and France. In Bangladesh these attacks were from the newest branch of al-Qa’ida, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent.

In contrast, there were 28 countries that had an ISIL affiliated attack in 2015. Reflecting the rapid growth of ISIL, there were ISIL attacks in nine countries in 2013 rising to 13 countries in
2014. Many of these attacks were by groups which existed prior to 2013 and have aligned with ISIL. As a result, it is unlikely that these ISIL affiliated groups will disappear even with the military defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria.

Some groups rescinded their association with al-Qa’ida to affiliate with ISIL. This includes Boko Haram, the second deadliest terrorist group in 2015, which originally had associations with al-Qa’ida. However, given the strength of al-Qa’ida affiliates active in West Africa it is possible that Boko Haram will return to the al-Qa’ida brand.32 Reflecting this shift towards ISIL away from al-Qa’ida, there has been a decline in the number of countries with al-Qa’ida affiliated attacks.

As a result of shifting allegiances, ISIL has been responsible for a rapid increase in deaths from terrorism around the world. The Taliban is close to al-Qa’ida and, although al-Qa’ida has no formal control over the Taliban, they have retained some financial and military ties developed during the Soviet invasion. Both groups also have the shared goal of fighting the US-led coalition in Afghanistan to have an Islamic government in Afghanistan.
ISIL affiliated groups were responsible for an increase of 438 per cent in terrorism deaths from 2013. This has largely been driven by increased deaths from ISIL in Iraq in 2014 and Syria in 2015. However, many new chapters of ISIL emerged in 2015. There were 13 new chapters of ISIL that conducted attacks in 2015 that killed 457 people. These new chapters conducted attacks in Bangladesh, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

In addition to attacks by ISIL affiliated groups, ISIL has encouraged lone actor attacks. Examples of major lone actor attacks which may have been inspired by ISIL include the Nice truck attack in France in 2016 which killed 85, the Orlando nightclub shooting in the United States in 2016 which killed 50 and the Suruç bombing in 2015 in Turkey which killed 33.

ISIL, Boko Haram and al-Qa’ida dominate the terrorist threat in the ten countries where terrorism has the greatest impact. Of the ten countries with the greatest impact of terrorism as ranked by the GTI, seven have an ISIL affiliated group as one of the deadliest active groups. Five of these ten countries have an al-Qa’ida group active as one of the deadliest groups.

**FIGURE 3.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUPS FOR THE TEN COUNTRIES WITH HIGHEST IMPACT OF TERRORISM**

Groups are colour coded by their affiliation. Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism, only India didn’t have an attack by an ISIL or al-Qa’ida affiliated group in 2015.
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

KEY FINDINGS

- The global economic impact of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion in 2015, decreasing by 15 per cent from its 2014 level.

- Iraq is the country suffering the highest economic impact from terrorism, reaching 17 per cent of its GDP in 2015.

- Tourism’s contribution to GDP is twice as large in countries with no terrorist attacks compared to countries with attacks.

- The economic resources devoted to peacekeeping and peacebuilding represent two per cent of the economic impact of armed conflict and terrorism.
The global economic impact of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion in 2015, decreasing by 15 per cent from its 2014 level, and reflecting the overall decline in the number of people killed by terrorism. However, the 2015 economic impact of terrorism was still at its second highest level since 2000. The economic and opportunity costs arising from terrorism have increased approximately eleven-fold during the last 15 years.

There have been three peaks in the economic impact of terrorism since the year 2000 and they are linked to the three major waves of terrorism. The first large increase in the economic impact of terrorism happened in 2001, when the attacks of September 11 in New York and Washington D.C. took place. The second peak was in 2007 at the height of the Iraq war. The 2007 increase is mainly attributed to al-Qa’ida affiliated terrorist groups and coincided with the coalition troop surge in Iraq. The third wave started in 2012 and is still continuing, with the economic impact of terrorism peaking at US$105.6 billion in 2014. The increase in the last four years was mainly driven by increases in terrorism in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

In 2015 and 2016, transnational terrorism has increasingly impacted highly peaceful countries, including member countries of the OECD. Figure 4.1 shows the trend in the economic impact of terrorism since 2000. For more on the trend in terrorist activity in the OECD, refer to Section 2 of this report.

The economic impact of terrorism is relatively small compared to other forms of violence, accounting for approximately one per cent of the cost of violence at the global level in 2015. The total economic impact of violence reached $13.6 trillion in 2015 (PPP) or 13.3 per cent of global GDP.
The ten most affected countries relative to the size of their economy are all conflict-affected states in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions. Iraq is the country with the greatest economic impact of terrorism, amounting to 17 per cent of its national GDP. Iraq has ranked as the most impacted country on the Global Terrorism Index since 2004. Similarly, the economic impact of terrorism in Afghanistan is equivalent to 16.8 per cent of its GDP. The country has suffered from increasing levels of violence since the drawdown of the international coalition forces. Table 4.1 shows the economic impact of terrorism as percentage of GDP for the ten worst affected countries.

The economic impact of terrorism is calculated using IEP’s cost of violence methodology. The model for terrorism includes the direct and indirect cost of deaths and injuries as well as the property destruction from incidents of terrorism. The direct costs include costs borne by the victims of the terrorist acts and associated government expenditure, such as medical spending. The indirect costs include lost productivity and earning as well as the psychological trauma to the victims, their families and friends.

Unit costs for deaths and injuries are sourced from McCollister et al (2010). To account for the income differences for each country, the unit costs are scaled based on country GDP per capita relative to the source of the unit costs.

The analysis uses data on incidents of terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The data provides the number of deaths and injuries for each incident as well as the extent of property destruction.

In addition, the data provides estimated dollar values of property destruction for a sample of incidents. The property destruction estimates from the GTD are then used to generate costs of property destroyed by various types of terrorist attacks. Each of the different property costs is further calibrated by country income type: OECD, high income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income and lower income country groups.

Where countries suffer more than 1,000 deaths from terrorism, IEP’s model includes losses of national output, equivalent to two per cent of GDP. Terrorism has implications for the larger economy depending on the duration, level and intensity of the terrorist activities. At the macroeconomic level, terrorism leads to reduced business activity, production and investment. In addition, it also diverts public resources to counterterrorism-related security services.

The total economic impact of violence reached $13.6 trillion in 2015, or 13.3 per cent of global GDP.
Figure 4.2 provides the breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism for each of the four categories included in the model. Deaths from terrorism account for 74 per cent of the economic impact, at US$65.7 billion. The second largest category are GDP losses due to terrorism, at US$20.9 billion or 23 per cent of the total. Injuries and property destruction made up three per cent of the economic impact in 2015.

The ten countries suffering the biggest economic impacts of terrorism are all conflict-affected states in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions. Iraq is the country most affected by the economic impact of terrorism, amounting to 17 per cent of its national GDP.
All ten of the countries with the highest economic impact from terrorism are countries where an armed conflict is ongoing. Similarly, nine of the ten countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism face an active armed conflict. ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, which were the four deadliest terrorist groups in 2015, are all engaged in armed conflict against various governments, including international military coalitions.

Figure 4.3 highlights the rising economic impact of both violent conflict and terrorism from 2007 to 2015. The economic impact of terrorism peaked in 2014 at US$106 billion. In 2013 and 2014, the economic impact of violent conflict and terrorism rose by 23 and 35 per cent respectively. In 2015, the economic impact of terrorism was equivalent to 14.2 per cent of the economic impact of conflict, but as conflicts around the world have escalated, terrorism has worsened and the economic impact of both has increased.

Figure 4.4 compares the global economic impact of violent conflict and terrorism to the global spending on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping operations are measures aimed at responding to a violent conflict while peacebuilding expenditures are aimed at developing and maintaining the capacities to build resilience to prevent future violence. Peacebuilding seeks to enable a country to sustain and develop peace over the long term and prevent armed conflict and terrorism. This is done through building the core functions of government, ensuring basic levels of safety and security and increasing the internal capacity for dispute resolution by supporting inclusive political processes, as well as other measures. Therefore, peacebuilding is more targeted than peacekeeping toward creating the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peace in conflict-affected countries.

Peacebuilding expenditure aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict by strengthening national capacities and institutions for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. These activities are distinct from peacekeeping activities, which are broadly aimed at responding to a conflict and establishing security.
Studies of both developed and developing countries show the negative relationship between economic growth and terrorism. For example:

- After the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque country in Spain in the late 1960s, economic growth declined by ten per cent.2

- A study of the economic impact of terrorism in Israel found that per capita income would have been ten per cent higher if the country had avoided terrorism in the three years up to 2004.3

- Results from research focused on Turkey show that terrorism has severe adverse effects on the economy when the economy is in an expansionary phase.4

Terrorism adversely affects economic growth, capital movement and trade flows. Terrorism reduces economic activity due to increases in actual and perceived risks. Investors come to expect reduced returns on capital. This results in decreased foreign direct investment and, in extreme cases, flight of domestic capital. For instance, a study of 78 developing countries found that even a small increase in terrorism leads to significant decreases in FDI.5

Further, the effects of terrorism vary based on the characteristics of the terrorist attack and the economy it affects. The economic burden of terrorism is higher when terrorist activities happen over considerable periods of time. As a result, domestic terrorism typically has more severe economic effects than transnational terrorism. Research has shown that domestic terrorism is associated with a greater drop in FDI and its impact is far more persistent.

Advanced and diversified economies are economically more resilient and have shorter recovery periods from incidents of terrorism. Smaller and less diversified economies suffer more severe disruptions and longer-lasting effects. The effects are mainly explained by the ability of the diversified economies to reallocate resources such as labour and capital from the terrorism-affected sector. In addition, advanced economies also have more resources and better institutions to counter future terrorism.
Tourism and tourism-related services such as aviation and transport, is one of the sectors of the economy that suffers the most from terrorism. Travel and tourism contributed US$7.2 trillion to global GDP in 2015, or 9.8 per cent of the global total.\footnote{The adverse economic effects of terrorism on the tourism sector are felt by all countries that suffer terrorist attacks, regardless of whether or not these incidents are targeted at tourists. Since 2000, Yemen, India, Algeria, Colombia and Pakistan have seen the largest numbers of terrorist attacks directed against tourists. Terrorism targeted at tourists occurs in a diverse set of countries, but especially in the MENA and South America regions. Terrorism may be directed at tourists because they are a vulnerable and visible group, they may be seen to represent foreign intrusion, or because the attacks are aimed at destabilising the economy.\footnote{The direct costs of terrorism on the tourism sector include decreased tourist numbers, leading to decreased spending and lower GDP. Indirect costs include decreased employment in the tourism sector and reduced flow-on effects to other industries, such as food service and cleaning and maintenance businesses. Between 2008 and 2014, tourism and travel's average contribution to GDP growth was 3.6 per cent in countries that had no terrorist attacks targeting tourists. In countries where attacks deliberately targeted tourists, it amounted to 1.9 per cent.}

The impact of terrorism on France's tourism industry can be measured. France experienced a number of major terrorist attacks in 2015. From 2014 to 2015, the GDP contribution from tourism in the country fell by US$1.7 billion. By comparison during the same period Italy, a neighbouring country which recorded no deaths from terrorism, grew its tourism sector by US$4.9 billion.

FIGURE 4.5
CHANGE IN TOURISM REVENUE IN 2015
France and Tunisia, which witnessed deaths from tourism, experienced large losses in tourism revenue. Conversely, Italy and Morocco, which had no deaths from terrorism, increased their revenues from tourism.

Source: WTTC, IEP calculations

Similarly, Tunisia, which experienced a serious attack on the Sousse beach in 2015, has lost US$1.2 billion in tourism revenue. In 2015, one million fewer tourists visited Tunisia compared to the prior year.\footnote{On the other hand, Morocco, a country where no deaths from terrorism occurred, increased tourism and travel by US$400 million from 2014 to 2015.}
Governments affected by terrorism have often increased expenditure on counterterrorism activities as an initial policy response. This includes increases in the budget of security agencies that are tasked with containing terrorism and it also includes the spending on the military.

As such, counterterrorism can be considered another category in the cost of terrorism analysis. However, the cost of counterterrorism activities has not been included in the model contained in this report.

It is estimated that spending on national security and intelligence agencies in the G20 countries reached at least US$117 billion in 2014. The United States alone has spent over US$650 billion on intelligence in the last ten years. This can only provide an indication of counterterrorism expenditures, as national intelligence activities involve many other functions beside counterterrorism intelligence. Additionally, many countries do not disclose their expenditures. The expenditures on counterterrorism spending have been more precisely measured in Europe. An EU study found that counterterrorism spending has significantly increased, from €5.7 billion in 2002 to €93.5 billion in 2009 or a 16-fold increase.

Figures from the US Department of Defense (DOD) show that the air campaign against ISIL has cost US$8.7 billion in total. The average daily cost of the air campaign has increased from US$9 million per day to US$12 million, as the military have stepped up their operations. Figure 4.6 shows the average daily cost of the air campaign against ISIL in Iraq and Syria for the United States.

The US$8.7 billion spent by the US does not include categories such as military aid and efforts against terrorism elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan and Libya. If data on spending on the war against ISIL were available for the remaining 26 members of the coalition, the costs would be much higher.

**FIGURE 4.6 AVERAGE DAILY COST OF THE US AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISIL IN IRAQ AND SYRIA**

On average, the cost of the air campaign against ISIL has increased by 24 per cent from June 2015 to July 2016.
CORRELATES & DRIVERS OF TERRORISM

KEY FINDINGS

- Ninety-three per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state sponsored terror — extra-judicial deaths, torture and imprisonment without trial.

- Over 90 per cent of all terrorism deaths occurred in countries engaged in violent conflicts.

- Only 0.5 per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that did not suffer from conflict or political terror.

- Terrorism is more likely to occur in OECD member countries with poorer performance on socio-economic factors such as opportunities for youth, belief in the electoral system, levels of criminality and access to weapons.

- In both OECD and non-OECD countries terrorism is statistically related to the acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with neighbours, likelihood of violent demonstrations and political terror.

- Individual terrorist acts are unpredictable but follow common statistical patterns. This aids in understanding similarities between terrorist organisations, their tactics and the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations.
IEP has conducted a wide range of statistical tests using over 5,000 datasets, indexes and attitudinal surveys to identify the most statistically significant factors associated with terrorist activity. The results of this analysis show that terrorism is highly related to the levels of political terror and ongoing conflict. Around 50 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries that at the time were experiencing violent internal conflict. A further 41 per cent occurred in countries that were militarily involved in a civil internal conflict involving foreign powers. This suggests that in a majority of cases, tackling terrorism is intrinsically linked to tackling broader safety and security issues of the states involved.

In OECD member countries, socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, lack of confidence in the press, low faith in democracy, drug crime and negative attitudes towards immigration correlate significantly with the GTI. In non-OECD countries, factors such as a history of violence, ongoing conflict, corruption and a weak business environment feature more prominently in the correlation results.

There are commonalities between OECD and non-OECD countries. Globally, higher levels of political terror, lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU all correlate with higher levels of terrorism.

Net migration as a percentage of total of population does not correlate with the GTI at either the OECD or global levels. These results are visualised in Figure 5.1 whereas correlation coefficients are shown in Table 5.1.

### Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>Variable</th>
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<td>Youth not in education and not in employment by sex (thousands)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Acceptance of the Rights of Others</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Free Flow of Information</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Good Relations with Neighbours</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Low Levels of Corruption</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO/ GBD</td>
<td>Suicide rate - average of both sexes</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO/ GBD</td>
<td>Suicide rate - males</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YDI</td>
<td>Employment and Opportunity</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEP
Factors associated with terrorism are distinctly different for OECD and non-OECD countries. For OECD countries, opportunities for youth, free flow of information, criminality and access to weapons are associated with greater impact from terrorism. For non-OECD countries the continuation of ongoing conflict, corruption and political instability correlates with the GTI. Acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with neighbours, likelihood of violent demonstrations and political terror correlate for all countries.

Globally, higher levels of political terror, lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU all correlate with higher levels of terrorism.
Political terror refers to the levels of state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment.¹

To analyse the link between levels of political terror and terrorism carried out by non-state actors, the GTI was compared to the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS is measured using a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 representing ‘no political imprisonment’ and 5 representing ‘unrestrained political terror waged against the whole of population’.²

To explore the link between political terror and terrorism IEP has analysed the location of all terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in which at least one person was killed between 1989 and 2014. The locations of these 44,553 attacks were then compared to the Political Terror Scale. Figure 5.2 shows that between 1989 and 2015, 93 per cent of all terrorism attacks occurred in countries with violent political terror. Less than one per cent occurred in countries where there was no political terror as measured by political imprisonment.

Figure 5.2 shows that between 1989 and 2015, 93 per cent of all terrorism attacks occurred in countries with violent political terror. Less than one per cent occurred in countries where there was no political terror.

Source: START GTD, Political Terror Scale, IEP calculations

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“93 per cent of all terrorism attacks occurred in countries with violent political terror. Less than one per cent occurred in countries where there was no political terror.”
Terrorist activity has distinct drivers, predominantly occurring within nations that are also experiencing broader internal conflict. IEP has compared the location of each of these attacks to all battle related deaths involving at least one state actor.³

Figure 5.3 highlights that around 50 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries in the midst of an internal conflict.⁴ A further 41 per cent occurred in countries whose governments were militarily involved in an internationalised conflict. Interstate conflicts had the lowest amount of terrorist activity, accounting for only one per cent of all terrorist attacks. Only nine per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries with no official involvement in an ongoing conflict.

50 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries in the midst of an internal conflict. A further 41 per cent occurred in countries whose governments were militarily involved in an internationalised conflict.

Source: START GTD, UCDP, IEP calculations
STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

By analysing the distribution and intensity of terrorist activity it can be observed that the majority of deaths from terrorism occur from a relatively small percentage of attacks. Over half of all attacks result in no deaths. Extremely high-casualty terrorist attacks continue to be rare as shown in Figure 5.4. Since 2000 there have been less than 75 attacks which resulted in over 100 deaths. Around 20 per cent of attacks result in one death, with 24 per cent having between two and ten deaths. Only 4.3 per cent of all attacks resulted in more than ten deaths.

By analysing the cumulative distribution of deaths, figure 5.5 shows that 80 per cent of all deaths were caused by only 20 per cent of all attacks since 2000. In fact, approximately half of the attacks in the world since 2000 did not result in any deaths. Such statistical properties lead to the observation that deaths from terrorism follow a power-law probability distribution. Power-law distributions are common in many phenomena, such as the intensity of natural disasters and the use of violence in armed conflict.

In relation to terrorism, an organisation pursues its goals through violent means while counter-terrorism forces attempt to prevent and combat the attacks. In such cases, each side co-evolves to meet the changing threat of the other. In this environment, larger more complex attacks take longer to plan and in turn are more susceptible to being intercepted, making them more and more difficult, but not impossible, to execute to completion.

As deaths from terrorism follow a power-law distribution, it is expected to see a logarithmic relationship between deaths in a given incident and the number of incidents with at least that many deaths. This is indeed what is observed, as shown in figure 5.6. Large scale terrorist attacks like the September 11 attacks, the 7/7 London attack, the Madrid train bombing or the Beslan hostage crisis are rare but not completely unexpected.

Figure 5.6 shows the global power-law distribution of deaths by terrorist attacks since 2000. This figure shows the probability that any given attack kills at least a certain number of people. For example, it shows that the probability of an attack killing ten or
more people is ten per cent, while the probability of an attack that kills 100 or more people is around one per cent.

The power-law distribution has a number of practical applications:

- Indicates the likely lethality of future terrorist attacks based on past history and trends.
- Suggests possible trajectories of emergent terrorist organisations.
- Changes in the power-law distribution can signal changes in success or failure of counter-terrorism operations.

Interestingly the power-law nature of terrorism is independent of many factors. Plotting the statistical distribution of deaths from large scale terrorist organisations show striking similarities to not only the global distribution of deaths, but also to each other. Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of fatal attacks of seven of the largest terrorist organisations tracked in the GTD.

While the average number of deaths per attack and the total number of deaths differ, the overall power-law trends are similar. Such distributions can also be used to gain insights into the way violence is used in each of the terrorist organisations’ goals. The IRA for example, which used attacks as a signalling tactic rather than as a means to cause large scale civilian casualties, has a much lower probability of a large scale attack. However, the remaining six organisations show, all use violence much more prominently in their campaigns. In a general sense, the Taliban, al-Shabaab and FARC have an almost identical distribution of deaths while Boko Haram and ISIL are more similar to the Tamil Tiger campaign in Sri Lanka in the 2000s. Of all groups, ISIL has the highest probability of increased large scale attacks. While based on far fewer incidents and therefore harder to generalise, attacks from lone actors also follow the same statistical patterns.

The probability of an attack that kills ten or more people is ten per cent, while the probability of an attack that kills 100 or more people is around one per cent.
FIGURE 5.7 DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE IN FATAL ATTACKS OF LARGE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

Deaths by terrorist organisations all follow similar power-laws. The Taliban, Al Shabaab and FARC have almost identical distribution of deaths while ISIL and Boko Haram are more similar to the LTTE campaign. Comparatively, the IRA had a low distribution of deaths in its campaign. This shows ISIL has the highest probability of large scale attacks.

80 per cent of all deaths were caused by only 20 per cent of all attacks since 2000. Such statistical properties lead to the observation that deaths from terrorism follow a power-law probability distribution.
In September 2014, an attack by a lone actor on two police officers in the Melbourne suburb of Endeavour Hills signalled a dramatic change in the Victorian security environment. This incident occurred during a meeting between the officers and the attacker, who had been refused a passport over concerns he was intending to travel to Syria and join the fighting. Today, Victoria Police is managing a range of complex and multifaceted national security threats which are characteristic of trends and developments within the global security environment. First among these threats are home grown terrorist plots and lone actors inspired by the ideology of the global jihadi movement. Additionally, local political groups are responding to issues associated with the global jihadi movement, resulting in sometimes violent confrontations between left-wing and right-wing extremists in Victoria. Looking forward, there is rising volatility in South East Asia, driven in part by foreign fighters returning from the Syrian conflict. Victorians who have fought with militant groups overseas will pose many challenges should they return home. Approximately 110 Australians are thought to be fighting in the Syrian conflict, many of whom are Victorian. At least eight Victorians are known to have died fighting for militant groups in Syria and Iraq, however, it is likely that more have been killed. Currently, approximately 300 individuals are being monitored by Victoria Police’s Counter Terrorism Command. The majority of these individuals are linked to, or inspired by, the global jihadi movement. Within the Victorian context, the global jihadi narrative finds its main appeal amongst a small cohort of young Muslims. This being the case, Muslim communities can be considered the first victims of terrorism when their young people become indoctrinated into this violent ideology. The number of Muslims in Victoria as a percentage of population is 2.9%, slightly higher than the national average of 2.2%. Muslims in Victoria represent a variety of sects and ethnic groups with their own traditions and cultural practices. These groups come from a number of different countries and often are affected by events overseas more directly than the broader Victorian community due to familial connections in conflict zones. Islam is a diverse and expansive religion with many practices and beliefs amongst its 1.6 billion followers worldwide. Within Islam, there are many schools of thought; some continue traditions developed over centuries, while others seek reform to the practice of the religion in some way. Some of these reform movements are liberal or modernist, and others seek a return to Islamic first principles. One of the ‘first principles’ movements is known as Salafism, which is more of an approach to reading scripture than a distinct sect. Salafism itself has a wide variety of practice, with the majority of Muslims following this approach eschewing violence. However, the groups that make up the global jihadi movement have drawn selectively on the Salafi school of thought to justify their extreme intolerance and violence. To differentiate this divisive and fragmentary ideology from peaceful Salafis, and from all other Muslims, we refer to it as Salafi-Jihadism. Radicalisation to violence is driven by a variety of factors including identity and relevance seeking behaviour, association with individuals who espouse a radical ideology and perceptions of persecution or injustice, amongst other personal factors. However, the ideology of the global jihadi movement is an important contributor to the process of radicalisation, as it provides an overarching framework that justifies and encourages the use of violence in furtherance of its objectives. The ideology of Salafi-Jihadism underpins the global jihadi movement, defining its identity, objectives, and modus operandi. Salafi-Jihadism also provides a sense of inclusion to vulnerable members of Victoria’s Muslim communities, encouraging them to reject traditional Muslim norms along with values associated with Western liberalism.
COMMUNITY POLICING AND COUNTER TERRORISM

Victoria Police operates from a community policing model which seeks solutions to crime and crime related issues in partnership with the Victorian community. The makeup of the Victorian population has become increasingly diverse and as such, Victoria Police has responded to this by pursuing a policy of enhanced engagement with new and emerging communities. Victoria Police has been engaged with Muslims over a number of decades, following an increase in immigration to Victoria from Muslim majority countries beginning in the late 1970s. This relationship has developed over time, building a foundation on which Victoria Police and the Muslim Community have worked to address a range of public safety concerns. Seen in context of this history, Police/Muslim engagement on issues around terrorism is simply the most recent manifestation of this long term relationship. As a result, Victoria Police’s relationship with Muslim communities has not been defined or dominated by counter terrorism.

In the context of counter terrorism, Victoria Police’s newly established Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) seeks to proactively impact terrorism through direct engagement with the communities most affected. Such engagement can also assist in addressing concerns held by the Muslim community about victimisation following terrorist incidents. This engagement may be initiated by police or undertaken at the request of community groups who are seeking advice on how to mitigate the local threat of terrorism. Victoria Police can enhance the capability of Muslim communities to take the lead, whilst simultaneously preserving the religious independence and integrity of the participating Imams. This has integrity of the participating Imams. This has

CTC also has responsibilities in the investigation and critical response to terrorist threats. While these capabilities are necessary, they are not designed to affect the broader ideological and social drivers of the threat. Whilst CTC holds an important piece of the counter terrorism puzzle, it cannot be at the front end of many efforts if they are to be successful. For instance, efforts to counter the ideology of Salafi-Jihadism are most likely to be effective where Muslim communities, particularly religious leaders, are empowered to take the lead, whilst simultaneously retaining their independence.

An example of a community driven initiative that is encouraged and supported by Victoria Police is the National Imams Consultative Forum (NICF). The NICF is delivered by Melbourne University’s National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies (NCEIS), with the support of the Australian National Imams Council (ANIC) and the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The NICF’s main aim is to empower collaborative work between Imams, academics and government to understand issues relating to community safety, radicalisation and violent extremism.

Since the inception of the NICF in 2012, Victoria Police has supported this initiative through its unique ability to facilitate access to information and individuals that participating Imams would otherwise be unlikely to access. Forums and workshops organised and facilitated by NCEIS have been utilised to connect Islamic religious leaders with subject matter experts in mental health, social media, law and international relations amongst a variety of other subjects. The following speakers of note have participated in previous forums:

- The General Director of Ideological Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior for Saudi Arabia and head of the Saudi government’s rehabilitation program for former extremists.
- Two Directors-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).
- A former senior member of Indonesian terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
- The Deputy National Coordinator of Prevent, the United Kingdom’s primary counter-radicalisation program.
- The Imams, many of whom are overseas born, have indicated that these forums have enhanced their understanding of issues affecting Muslim congregations in an Australian context. They have also expressed a strong desire to be part of the solution to the threat posed by Salafi-Jihadi terrorism to the broader Australian population. The NICF also gives these religious leaders additional tools and perspectives to identify and manage the influence of Salafi-Jihadi ideology on their congregations, in particular younger Muslims. These tools include a focus on the process and indicators of radicalisation and Islamic militant doctrine.

The NICF also has taken on the role of preparing material intended to directly challenge the core ideological views propagated by the global jihadi movement. A key publication produced by the NICF in 2015, and endorsed by more than 20 Imams from across Australia, is a series of statements addressing Australian Muslim perspectives on 12 misunderstood and frequently misinterpreted topics central to individuals’ recruitment into Salafi-Jihadism. Some of these include citizenship, Australian law and sharia, fatwas, treatment of non-Muslims, the Caliphate, jihad, suicide and fighting in overseas conflicts. This document is designed to represent a united voice from Muslim religious leaders. It is also the first of its type in Australia and was the result of an extensive dialogue between its signatories.

Other important resources available on the NICF website include translated fatwas from across the Muslim world that repudiates the Salafi-Jihadi ideology and its justifications of violence, as well as pivotal statements such as the Amman message.11 Also available are powerful statements from former terrorists recanting their belief in violence and terrorism. Some of these documents were written in languages other than English and as such were not usually afforded the level of attention they warrant in Western media. Many of these have now been translated into English by NCEIS to enhance their accessibility to Western audiences.

CONCLUSION

An integrated approach to countering violent extremism is necessary in the current security environment, particularly when a key driver of the global jihadi movement emanates from a contest over the nature of Islam. By facilitating access to resources and through its own extensive network of relationships, Victoria Police can enhance the capability of Muslim leaders to meet some of the challenges presented by extremism. This assistance is delivered in a manner that respects and preserves the religious independence and integrity of the participating Imams. This has always been, and will continue to be, a priority for Victoria Police.

An unreasonable expectation exists that Muslims condemn every terrorist act undertaken by another Muslim. However, there is also the risk of ceding ground to right-wing hate groups if the question of linkages between religion and terrorism are not discussed in open forums. Initiatives such as the NICF and their publications are best positioned to not only instigate messaging that separates the majority of Muslims from the violence and rhetoric of extremists, but also to directly challenge the narrative and ideology of terrorist groups.
WHY PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IS THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S BUSINESS

Amy E. Cunningham, Advisor; and Dr Khalid Koser, Executive Director, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)

Since the publication of the 2015 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda has gained attention and become more clearly defined. Of course, reservations remain, for example concerning definitions, data, and drivers; the genesis and ultimate purpose of PVE; and the risks associated with the implementation of the agenda. Nevertheless, momentum is developing. The UN Secretary-General has published his Action Plan on PVE, a growing number of countries are developing national strategies and policies on PVE, and an increasing number of NGOs and institutions are developing a capacity for PVE.

While the PVE agenda was initially developed and promoted by a cohort of national governments, and latterly the UN, attention is now turning to harnessing a more comprehensive approach, with a particular focus on engaging the private sector. This emphasis on engaging the private sector in PVE is a welcome one, and there are obvious reasons to do so. In many countries affected by violent extremism, businesses – from financial firms, to food and beverage retailers, to mobile phone operators – have access to, and trust within, local communities. It is at this, the grassroots level, where the solutions to PVE can be found and where efforts must begin. On the whole, the private sector is regarded as faster, more flexible, and more focused than the public sector. Certain industries have specific added-value in preventing violent extremism, including communications and social media companies which can readily produce online content to counter violent extremist narratives. More generally, the private sector excels at vocational training and is strong at creating jobs; (essentially, constructive opportunities or alternatives that may prevent inadvertently stoke violent extremist reactions or contribute to recruitment. For example, the risk of generating or exacerbating conflict over the extraction of natural resources is well-documented, especially where extractive industries lack transparency, are not adequately held to account, ignore local communities, fail to share benefits appropriately, mismanage funds, or excessively impact local economies, society, and environments.

As a public-private partnership, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) has been at the forefront of engaging the private sector in its efforts to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas (in Bangladesh, Kenya, Kosovo, Mali, Myanmar and Nigeria). There is a seat for the private sector on GCERF’s multi-stakeholder, constituency-based, Governing Board; country-level committees include private sector representatives; and the private sector has provided both in-kind and direct contributions to the Fund and the initiatives it supports.

The challenges of engaging the private sector should not be underestimated. On the one hand, there is a compelling business case for the private sector to engage in PVE; assets, supply chains, markets and future labor pools are all directly affected by the rise in violent extremism. On the other hand, for many companies, violent extremism and terrorism are too politically-sensitive to allow for their overt cooperation, while others still view the issue as the responsibility of government. Patience is also required; even on generally less divisive issues – like poverty, education, or health– where it has taken many years for the private sector to genuinely engage. As this year’s Global Terrorism Index reminds us, however, the challenge is urgent. To complicate matters, there is increasing competition for private sector resources, ranging from the new Sustainable Development Goals, to the demands resulting from the current migration and refugee crisis.

Our research and experience points to the need for a transparent, principled approach to engaging the private sector in PVE, one that takes into account their strengths as well as their weaknesses. Here we outline five key principles for engagement, including immediate and long-term challenges:

BE RISK-PRONE, NOT RISK-averse

First, encourage the private sector to be risk-prone, not risk-averse. Companies, small and large, do not achieve success without failure along the way. Failing quickly, learning from those mistakes, and recovering, are lessons (in resilience, flexibility and innovation) that the private sector could impart to PVE initiatives and implementers. For the private sector to be willing to attempt innovative initiatives, even risky ones that might fail, they need to be supported by all stakeholders, most importantly government. The private sector needs a safe space for dialogue with national governments; they may also need technical expertise in PVE. Alternatively, it is possible they will seek assurances of distance and autonomy from government. The PVE field is an inherently sensitive space to operate in; convincing companies that they will not be penalized for taking a risk is imperative.

PVE AS CORE BUSINESS

Second, the private sector should be encouraged to think about preventing violent extremism as a core business objective – not just as part of philanthropic or corporate social responsibility (CSR) priorities. This will not be possible across all sectors; some are much more directly affected by PVE than others. There exist opportunities even among small and medium-sized enterprises and nationally-owned businesses that may not have dedicated CSR budgets but – because they are most attuned to social issues, are large contributors to GDP, and can influence stability through job training and employment – may be willing to incorporate PVE objectives into their core business strategies. To facilitate this shift will require directly linking, for example, the disruption of commodity prices, to violent extremism.
REALIZE THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S FULL POTENTIAL

Third, the full potential of the private sector needs to be realized. Businesses can offer more than just financial resources – for example, they have marketing and branding acumen that can help position and promote PVE objectives. Similarly, by virtue of working on the ground with communities, businesses often have intimate understandings of local contexts, cultures, and networks that governments and aid agencies may not.

Development organizations, NGOs and even government should refrain from asking the private sector simply to finance their ideas. Instead, emphasis should be placed on mutually beneficial collaborations that will result in long-term partnerships – ideally ones that capitalize on the expertise and offerings of that individual company – not just the corporate cheque book.

BUSINESS AND FRAGILITY

Fourth, contrary to popular belief, there is space for business to enter, operate and flourish in fragile contexts. Fragile states often become fragile because of government inability to fulfill its mandate. In some instances, this presents an entry point for the private sector to bolster reconstruction and offer basic services. While it is important to be realistic about the role and responsibility of businesses to address the underlying causes of violent extremism, equally it is clear that not only can companies invest, but also they can strengthen institutions and promote genuine state reform.

In 2013 the World Economic Forum led an initiative of 300 Israeli and Palestinian business leaders, who – sharing a frustration over the lack of political progress, and supported by Western diplomats – argued that business collaboration on economic recovery could boost employment and create a more friendly investment climate, (thereby making the Palestinian Authority less reliant on foreign aid)16. One of the supporters of this initiative was Coca-Cola CEO, Muhtar Kent. Kent’s Coca-Cola is no stranger to investing in fragile contexts, and understands that sustainable governance is imperative to building business-friendly environments.17

If we can encourage the private sector to be risk-prone rather than risk-averse, we can create a space where the private sector can use its clout to create political space for investment and change. Engaging the private sector may help to attract politicians who otherwise may be disengaged. What is more, when investing in fragile contexts, we need to be careful not only to appeal to large multi-nationals; we must involve local business, because in the most fragile of contexts, local businesses create the majority of jobs and often step in to provide basic services when government cannot.

DO NO HARM

Fifth, and perhaps most important, the private sector must make every effort to Do No Harm. Companies, as well as those institutions and structures engaging them (civil society and governments) must be held accountable and must engage responsibly. This means not only engaging with reputable businesses and business sectors to abstain from corrupt practices, but also focusing on the outcomes of that engagement. For example, if the focus of the engagement with a community is job creation, then the jobs offered should be sustainable and commensurate with the skills of the community.

One large multinational software company we spoke with in Nigeria reported failures in their community outreach training in IT. Having initially overlooked the fact that IT/tech was a foreign concept to the local community, they immediately became aware that creating expectations and not meeting them would surely exacerbate frustrations (thereby playing into the narratives towed by violent organizations – criminal and otherwise). Realising this misstep, the company recalibrated and introduced a shoe-making class, which according to one company leader (who spoke off-the-record) “may not have been shiny and sparkly, but it was realistic and had impact.”

CHALLENGES

There is a host of immediate and long-term challenges to engaging the private sector. A few of the most prominent ones that we have discovered include the following:

Profits: CEOs might be on-board to support PVE initiatives, but their shareholders are not. No matter how young, passionate, or socially conscious entrepreneurs and CEOs may be, ultimately they are responsible to their shareholders, whose priority is profit. It is very difficult to make the case that investing in PVE is a risk worth taking, especially when the benefits are only likely to be realized in the long term.

Vetting: If, as argued above, investing in long-term partnerships with small and medium enterprises and nationally-owned companies is the best way to shift PVE from CSR portfolios and into core business practices, we had better be sure of who we are working with. Equally as important as knowing who our partners are, is knowing who their partners are. We are operating at a time when globally, trust in government is low. Often nationally-owned companies have direct relationships with local and national government – the very same governments blamed for structural failures that give rise to conditions conducive for violent extremism. There is a real concern that if the wrong company or an unethical company is engaged, the risk is to do more harm to a community than good.

Language: Aside from a lack of consensus on definitions, the language of PVE is often seen as ‘toxic’. Many development agencies and NGOs do not want their initiatives to be associated with PVE, for fear the branding will disenfranchise communities, or worse yet, erode their operational safety. When it comes to the private sector, speaking about terrorism can very quickly turn a conversation from development objectives to security concerns. This is a challenge because we know that companies care about transparency; but communicating in a transparent manner while not scaring companies, is a fine line. In all reality, many of the companies approached will say “no thank you, not for us” – but some will stay. And it is in those partnerships where the PVE community can collaborate with, and learn from the private sector to build lasting partnerships.

Lift and Shift: The drivers of violent extremism are individual and specific, meaning that any preventive approach or intervention has to be localized. Donors and implementers, in an effort to fast-track solutions, try to “lift and shift” – meaning they overlook local specificities and try to apply a solution that may have worked elsewhere. Just because the indicators present themselves as similar, does not mean that the underlying causes are the same – nor the solution.

CONCLUSION

While there are good reasons to be wary about the efficacy of partnering with the private sector on PVE, if we can get this right, the rewards will outweigh the risks. What is required is more research, metrics and models to capture results, and immediate
examples of success. Sustained, long-term engagement will require coordinated and holistic approaches that appeal not only to the private sector’s business case, but also to its expertise and passions. This will require bold and brave corporate leaders, patience and dedicated nurturing of relationships.

At first, success will most likely be found through engaging the private sector with vested interest in the stability and prosperity of local communities – for example companies working in agriculture, extractives and telecommunications. The goal being, that eventually companies small and large, national and multi-national, will take risks and begin to incorporate PVE in their core business operations. To achieve this, the private sector must feel as though it is respected as a genuine partner. It is possible, but it will take time – and the clock is ticking.

JIHADIST HOTBEDS AND LOCAL RADICALISATION PROCESSES

Dr Paolo Maggiolini, Research Fellow; and Dr Arturo Varvelli, Head of Terrorism Research Program, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI)

Poverty, unemployment, lack of job opportunities, trafficking and smuggling, socio-political, economic and physical marginalisation, the role of Salafist ideology as well as the influence of brotherhood networks: all these elements have been frequently highlighted as elements, factors or drivers that could help explain the dynamics of radicalisation leading to active violent militancy under the ideals of jihadism. In particular, in recent years there has been an increasing effort to understand how their intertwining and overlapping on single individuals or communities within specific spaces and territories (such as prisons, suburbs or marginal regions), and lay the ground for hotbeds of jihadism. To this aim, it is key to discern and distinguish between root/structural factors and circumstances, thus highlighting differences and similarities between different cases of radicalisation. This analytical framework may contribute to understand the intersection and intertwining between individual pathways, societal contexts and territorial conditions, thus contextualising the thresholds of radicalisation dynamics. At the same time, it could make it possible to identify if and how paths of radicalisation have changed in the course of time, and gauge the interplay between the local, regional and international dimensions.

Needless to say, this approach presents multiple challenges. On the one hand, each area or territory has unique contextual factors and histories that need to be carefully analysed in order to concretely understand how and why they can catalyse radicalisation processes and under which conditions.

However, such a study must avoid criminalising entire communities, as it may lead to further marginalisation and isolation, and nurture a culture of suspicion. On the other hand, such analysis cannot avoid confronting the ongoing and broader debate on how the radicalisation process works and on the role of religion or the manipulation of its message, namely the radical militant interpretation of Islam. But in doing so, the study of the hotbeds should proceed free from preconceptions, preconceived theses and culturalism. In other words, a more focused and comprehensive understanding of the relation between radicalisation and socio-economic and political conditions within a specific territory appears to be the best way to contribute to the ongoing debate on the origin and nature of jihadist movements. Moreover, it can supersede today’s divisions between academics and specialists.

Over the years, several studies on jihadism and radicalisation have been carried out. They use psychological, sociological as well as political and institutional approaches. Different definitions have been proposed with the aim of defining the boundaries of such fluid phenomena. In fact, although today the use of the words radicalisation and jihadism is strongly entrenched in political and bureaucratic discourse as well as in daily vocabulary, these concepts are still widely debated and clear-cut definitions have yet to be found.21 In particular, jihadism has been frequently described by pointing out the centrality of the call to armed combat under the ideal of jihad against both external non-Muslim enemies and official rulers in the MENA region, who are considered “apostates.”22 At the same time, jihadism has been depicted through its radical idea of religion that requires a perpetual war against the West and its allies.20 Other approaches have instead sought to describe its logics through chronologies, pointing out its developments and changes, identifying discontinuities and similarities between different groups and messages.23 Finally, recent analysis has emphasised that it seems to be a “bricolage” resulting from appropriation and manipulation of specific concepts, images, symbols of the Muslim tradition and its combination with the main Western political ideologies of the last century.22

Accordingly, jihadism is different from other militant radical ideologies for its ambition to give the “believer-militant” a new beginning, a “purer” and more “authentic” identity as well as a clear mission in the present world and in the afterlife. Moreover, in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the French public domain has seen a new round of debate on the causes and origins of today’s radicalism and terrorism. Although it may sometimes seem self-referential – due to its main focus on the French context – it provides relevant insights to the present analysis.

In his article published in Le Monde on 24 November 2015,23 Olivier Roy resumes and enriches some of his traditional thesis.24 To understand the phenomenon of radicalisation Roy explains that it is key to distance it from...
such youths and within our societies, Today's jihadism is the clear expression of a rather than a "radicalisation of Islam." dynamic of "Islamisation of radicalism" foreign fighters reveal the development of a Europe and the considerable number of identity. Accordingly, the terrorist attacks in principle symbolise. This occurs without and the "original" culture that they in European and especially in Europe.

Indeed, neither culturalism nor post-colonialism lie fit into the definition of today's jihadism. According to the author, today's jihadism is neither "a revolt of Islam", nor a "revolt of the Muslims." It is a phenomenon that affects two specific youth categories: the second/third generations of immigrants and the converts to Islam. These two groups share the same experiences of breaking with their parents and the "original" culture that they in principle symbolise. This occurs without successfully embracing an inclusive new identity. Accordingly, the terrorist attacks in Europe and the considerable number of foreign fighters reveal the development of a dynamic of "Islamisation of radicalism" rather than a "radicalisation of Islam." Today's jihadism is the clear expression of a revolt that already exists in the minds of such youths and within our societies, nurtured more by nihilism than idealism.

In an interview published in Atlantic25 Giles Kepel refused the notion of radicalisation developed by Roy and more generally the capacity of such a concept to identify the essence of current events. In fact, Kepel insists on underlining the relationship between today's jihadism and Salafism. Without full awareness of the impact of such interaction, Islamic radicalisation tends to appear a loose concept. Accordingly, similarities between different experiences, such as the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, or the Abaaoud group, should not be overstated. Kepel underlines that today's terrorism represents the third wave of jihadism. A dynamic that particularly involves second/third-generation Western Muslim youths. To better understand the today's jihadist wave, it is first necessary to analyse the intertwining between three distinct key events. First, the 2005 riots within France's banlieues brought third-generation postcolonial immigrants to the fore as one of the central political players in French public space. Secondly, in 2004, one of the most famous jihadist strategists, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, published "The call to global Islamic resistance", theorising the need to bring the jihadist ideology and struggle to Europe, taking advantage of youths' socio-political malaise in the suburbs. Finally, the development of YouTube and Web 2.0 provided strategic means of communication and recruitment. The convergence of these three key events suddenly showed its impact in March 2012, with the terrorist attack perpetrated by Mohamed Merah. Now, this aggression can be considered the prelude to today's jihadist wave.

Indeed, the two approaches seem to describe widely different phenomena. On the one hand, rethinking jihadism according to the idea of "Islamisation of radicalism" sheds light on a dynamic of generational revolt that sees isolated and nihilistic individuals embracing the jihadist fight, going through a sort of re-conversion experience. On the other, focusing on Salafism reveals the importance of the brotherhood dimension, as well as of living environments and conditions, especially those pervaded by radical Islamist ideology and culture.

Nevertheless, if combined and concretely tested on the ground, these theories and approaches can effectively provide a more nuanced analytical framework defining a sort of continuum where different experiences and organisations can coherently be positioned and understood. Moreover, the integration of both psychological and sociological approaches can effectively help expand the analysis, focusing on the intersection between individual pathways and social conditions.

In this framework, the issue of the "quest for an alternative identity" could provide a further useful analytical tool to improve today's knowledge of jihadism. On the one hand, according to several scholars26, these ideologies can answer the question of "Who am I?" Under precise conditions, the response could appear enormously appealing in its simplicity. It offers full and apparently meaningful membership in a global umma defined by adherence to a universal (and violent) radical Islamic doctrine that rejects local customs and traditions. Muslim identity thus becomes a matter of inner belief to be militantly expressed on the ground rather than a spiritual expression.

Currently ISIL seems to offer this form of identity, in particular to young generations both in Europe and the Middle East. On the other hand, the quest for identity can also help explain the fascination exerted by a number of organised groups involved in separatist or resistance struggles as well as ISIL' proto-state claims, whose activities are interpreted not only in terms of military confrontation but also as efforts to imagine alternative existences and socio-political futures.

Given the complexity of today's jihadist galaxy, with its huge variety of individuals, movements, territories and spaces, such multifaceted understanding is much needed. Bearing this in mind, the concept of hotbeds can provide a useful analytical field in which to validate and further develop these insights. In fact, a more holistic approach towards the study of the different actors and exponents that made up the so-called present jihadist galaxy can clearly show that different elements and factors traditionally considered as drivers of radicalisation can variably intertwine, developing multiple paths of radicalisation. This is clearly explained by the fact that all the known/possible so-called hotbeds have unique characteristics that eventually drove the radicalisation of their populations. Without such comprehensive understanding, these phenomena tend to remain elusive.

For instance, in the Western and Middle East contexts, there are some constants or major factors that all the known cases share. Accordingly, radicalisation clearly appears to be a "local" dynamic which, however, loses perspective and projection if analysed independently from the regional and international dimensions.

More specifically, all the cases regarding the Western domain seem to share the common issue of identity and belonging at both the community and individual levels. This implies not only poor and weak concepts at the citizenship level, but more widely in the perception of the right to live and exist within the public space and sometimes in the state itself. Accordingly, radicalisation in Great Britain seems to be the product of a long political history that repeatedly challenged British Muslim identity. For those who
radicalised, the path developed through a complex array of influences. ISIL propaganda is just the most recent message that has found resonance among those who sought an alternative identity and inclusion. In this context, the Belgian case proves the double impact of socio-economic deprivation and feelings of rejection. In particular, the perception of being constantly subjected to judgment because non-indigenous citizens has emerged as one of the major drivers of local radicalisation. The case of Minneapolis takes the analysis to the other side of the Atlantic. Here, in addition to community-oriented motivations, militant al-Shabaab’s use of an early system of bridging figures – in which fighters on the ground communicated and kept in touch with potential recruits in their own community at home – created a constant flow of information and inspiration able to orient and sustain a durable radicalisation process. This experience has been particularly strategic to ISIL, which relied on al-Shabaab recruitment classes – like Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan and Mohamed Osman – to attract and radicalise Minnesotans from Somalia. This case shows that the combination of a strong community network and radical religious ideology with the presence of an open battlefield can be highly effective in sustaining a wider and resilient network of militant jihadists. Partially similar to this last case, in the Balkans, family and ethnic ties proved to be of primary importance, easily coalescing into the larger separatist or irredentist movements of the post-Cold War period. In fact, this has given jihadist groups not only a common cause to fight but also effective support and recruitment networks. For example, the vacuum in security cooperation between Kosovo and Macedonia has been used by the supporters of Salafi and Takfiri movements in order to spread their ideology, recruiting people that today have joined foreign conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Family and ethnic links are also important in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Sandzak in Serbia. More generally, jihadism in the Balkans seems to be triggered by multiple drivers that can be partially considered “traditional”, such as the marginalisation of minorities, development of radical ideology, lack of prospects. Today these are reinforced by geopolitical and international dynamics. When placing the spotlight on the Middle Eastern context, the wider regional socio-political instability, the crisis of the state and of its social contract seem to dominate. In this framework, securitisation has a tragic impact, as does the targeting and repression of specific local communities. This widens the effects of political and economic marginalisation and deprivation. Moreover, this region offers the ideal battleground to feed the jihadist concept of the perfect struggle and to control and manage strategic economic resources. The case of Sinai shows that Egyptian authorities need to calibrate their policies to safeguard state interests, especially in terms of inclusive policies of local communities, economic growth, poverty alleviation and protection of the basic civil and political rights. The Cairo government should reduce its securitisation approach while favouring a détente and stabilisation of the Peninsula and promoting a culture of legality and its political legitimacy. When it comes to ISIL hotbeds in Libya, they appear to be the product of two different drivers. On the one hand, the process of personal radicalisation, deeply rooted in former ways of expressing discontent with the domestic situation in the Qaddafi period. On the other, radicalisation seems to stem from the political marginalisation of a part of Libya’s population in the post-revolutionary period. Derna is a good example of the first type of radicalisation, Sirte of the second. Broadly speaking, political rather than ideological reasons seem to prevail. In Tunisia, ISIL recruitment has been successful thanks to the exclusion and marginalisation that many individuals experience in local society. Radicalisation in Tunisia can thus be described as the result of multiple layers of exclusion and marginalisation that gradually ended up in a search for inclusion in the global container of utopian jihadist ideology. Finally, it is interesting to focus on Dagestan and the Pankisi Valley cases. They are the most problematic areas in the North Caucasus. Both contexts are the product of a complex set of issues: religious, ethnic, clan relations, criminality, and the presence of the radical Islamist underground. Furthermore, the second Russian military campaign in Chechnya made things worse in the North Caucasus and triggered a new wave of radicalisation.

In conclusion, an anything but trivial fact is that each hotbed has its own distinctiveness as well as its relative pathways to radicalisation. Being locally rooted, any response needs to be tailored to context. Nevertheless, governments, particularly the EU, should take into consideration three general prescriptions.

**AVOID FOMENTING POLITICAL MARGINALISATION.** The most important challenge is related to the fact that the security/military dimension of counterterrorism should not be at the expense of the political dimension. The establishment of hotbeds of extremism in the Mediterranean and Middle East not only raise issues related to security, but their progress also highlights the need to develop a comprehensive political response able to assess all the factors of current regional instability.

**FOCUS ON PREVENTION AND INCLUSION.** Given the importance of territorial and brotherhood networks, prevention and inclusion should be developed both at the individual/community and urban levels. Education to diversity and urban regeneration and renewal could help create a new sense of belonging both within targeted community/spaces and between them and the rest of the society, thus avoiding further isolation and criminalisation.

**DEFINE A EUROPEAN “COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM” (CVE) AGENDA.** The attacks in Paris and Brussels and the many counterterrorism police operations have underlined the danger posed by radicalised individuals, often coming from European hotbeds. An EU program can foster a common and shared understanding of radicalisation processes on a large scale and implementing effective collaboration between intelligence services.
Terrorism is proving to be an enduring global security threat, not least due to the fact that modern terrorist groups have become more lethal, networked and technologically savvy. Today, groups such as ISIL and al-Qa’ida have the ability to control and hold entire cities hostage. This power mainly stems from their ability to generate revenue from numerous criminal activities with almost complete impunity.

During the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, al-Qa’ida numbered around 300 mujahedeen in Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban. Fifteen years later, two global terrorist groups have emerged transforming the global threat landscape – al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). At the end of 2015 ISIL controlled 6-8 million territories in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and ISIL currently is growing faster than it ever has before.23

Currently al-Qa’ida and ISIL are escalating their attacks in an intense rivalry for global prowess and international reach while competing for affiliates worldwide. With its determination to govern and control territories in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, ISIL is currently a greater threat than al-Qa’ida. It represents a three dimensional threat: a core situated in Iraq and Syria, ISIL regional affiliates and ISIL online. This constellation has spawned ISIL-inspired radicalised cells, ISIL affiliates and ISIL online. This has been shown, ISIL criminal networks and operations are supported by all three dimensions. Since ISIL declared its caliphate in June 2014, ISIL core, regional affiliates and inspired groups have carried out more than 4,000 attacks in 28 countries. ISIL’s geographic presence has grown exponentially since it hit the world stage in 2014. ISIL has a total of 30 self-proclaimed wilayats or provinces, ten of which are outside of ISIL’s core base in Syria and Iraq. These include regional affiliates in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as well as allied affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIL in Afghanistan consists of former members of the Afghan Taliban, the Haqani Network, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and it is supported by Jamaat Ul Dawa al Quran (JDQ). These groups have generated millions annually from narcotics trafficking and illegal extraction of precious stones and timber. As former members continue to splinter off, ISIL is thus not only generating an income from its own wilayats, but also through criminal markets of other groups. ISIL is actively making links to Southeast Asian terror groups as well. Home to 62 per cent of the world’s Muslims, the Asia Pacific region offers ISIL not only a new base to establish power, but also new avenues of revenue to exploit.

Al-Qa’ida similarly operates on a franchise model, with off-shoots in Africa and Asia and it is developing new relationships with groups in the Caucasus, India and Tunisia. Al-Qa’ida is also working towards territorial control. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to have a strong presence in Yemen and remains the group’s greatest direct threat to the United States.

CRIME AND TERROR: THE HIDDEN LINKS

Transnational criminal networks exist in almost all countries in the world. According to a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimate, total criminal earnings across the globe were US$ 870 billion in 2011. While transnational crime is ubiquitous, it remains heavily concentrated in failed or failing states beset by conflict, sectarian divides, poverty and low social cohesion, which can lead to a climate of corruption, injustice, impunity and inequality. It is in these areas that crime-terror links thrive.

The Sahara-Sahel is a region plagued by these conditions. Historically an area known for smuggling and trafficking, recent civil conflicts and unrest in the Sahel and Maghreb have created the perfect storm for criminal operations to flourish. Drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom (KFR), arms trafficking and, most recently, the trafficking and smuggling of refugees and economic migrants, helped terrorist groups in the region to thrive. These enriched and strengthened terrorist and armed rebel groups not only aim to make money, but also to consolidate power by taking urban centres and setting up their own mini-states. Criminals have been drawn to West Africa’s porous borders and fragile states for over a decade. In 2005, Colombian drug traffickers reportedly financed Guinea-Bissau’s re-election campaign of President Vieira, effectively taking control of parts of the country and giving birth to the world’s first narco state.22 Together with neighbouring Guinea, Guinea-Bissau has become a transit hub for the cocaine trade from Latin America to West Africa, then up to the Maghreb and into Europe. The lure of drug trafficking made deep inroads into many West African states, perverting economies and corrupting the highest levels of government and broad sectors of the population. Several of the smugglers including criminals and jihadists established headquarters in Gao, Mali, which soon became a transit hub for illegal trade to Europe. The trade negatively impacted Mali, causing political turmoil which was a factor in the 2012 coup d’état, which in turn contributed to uprisings in the north, led by militias and terrorist groups. Today, with local infrastructure crumbling, increased insecurity, and tourism destroyed, many poor Africans have the choice to either join jihadist movements or become refugees. Youngsters are paid less than US$600 to join terrorists’ military cadres.

KFR became the second lucrative criminal trade that helped terrorism flourish. In 2003, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) kidnapped 32 Europeans in the Sahel. The Algerian mujahedeen Mokhtar Belmokhtar is believed to have used the GBP 5.5 million ransom paid to fund al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan's campaign of terrorism in the Sahel. Belmokhtar is known for smuggling and trafficking, recent civil conflicts and unrest in the Sahel and...
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). From 2003 to 2012 AQIM have allegedly collected nearly US$ 90 million from kidnapping.35 Arms trafficking also helped feed terrorism in the region. It is estimated that when the Qaddafi regime fell in 2011, 250,000-700,000 arms from the Libyan arsenal fell into the hands of traffickers and, subsequently, terrorist groups. The value of the arms trade in Libya is estimated at US$4-15 million. The increased availability of weapons has also strengthened terrorist groups operating in Mali, Nigeria and Libya, including al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Eddine and Ansar al-Sharia.

Most recently, the trafficking of migrants and refugees started feeding the terror mill as well. The wider instability in the region and its environs, including the wars in Iraq and Syria, and growing insecurity in the Horn of Africa, has made migrant smuggling a big business for militia groups and terrorists in Libya and other transit countries. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that during the first three months of 2016, at least 170,000 migrants and refugees entered Europe along sea-borne routes, which is more than eight times the number recorded through the first three months of 2015. In total, over one million migrants and refugees crossed the Mediterranean in 2015.

According to the EU, nine out of ten irregular migrants from North Africa or Turkey use criminal facilitators. A recent Europol report claimed that migrant smugglers facilitating travel from Algiers, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Jordan and Turkey were making between three and six billion dollars for their efforts in 2015.36 There is evidence that smugglers have to share their profits with terrorist groups. If smugglers paid terrorists a third of the profits, a conservative estimate, terrorist groups could have earned as much as 100 million in 2015 alone from smuggling in Libya according to a study of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.37 In Libya, ISIL controls a stretch of the approximately 260 kilometres of Mediterranean coast around Sirte enabling it to tax the operators involved in people smuggling.38

The economic importance of smuggling routes through Libya has led to fears that the country may become a new staging ground for ISIL.37 There are estimates that ISIL fighters in Libya constitute a force strength of between 4,500 and 6,000 fighters; to boost its ranks, ISIL is abducting economic migrants from Sudan, Eritrea and West Africa en route to Europe. There are also reports that ISIL is expressly orchestrating attacks on civilians in refugee camps in western Syria and elsewhere to increase the flow of migrants and subsequently profit from taxation revenues.

**CRIME-TE TERROR RELATIONSHIPS**

There are three main types of relationships that characterise terrorist groups’ links with criminal enterprises and organised crime: direct involvement, strategic alliances and exploitative authority over vulnerable groups and businesses.

A number of terrorist groups engage directly with criminal groups who carry out kidnappings in exchange for a share of profits. In Yemen, locals work for AQAP by searching for foreigners to abduct in Sana’a. Not only is KFR a key source of funding for AQIM, AQAP, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Boko Haram, but al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri also called for supporters worldwide to kidnap Westerners as they could be exchanged for jailed jihadists. While KFR helped al-Qa’ida and its affiliates to obtain at least US$ 125 million since 2008, in 2014 alone, ISIL earned US$ 45 million through KFR, and it has a special department dedicated to this activity. Some groups engage in express kidnapping, stealing local officials and their families for small but quick profit. In addition to terrorizing communities and serving as a source of income, kidnapping also constitutes a resource for obtaining new recruits, and a way of securing women for fighters.39 Criminals and terrorists are also active in the illicit trade of counterfeit goods, which is the largest black market, larger than the global narcotics trade.39 Contraband tobacco is a US$ 1 billion trade in North Africa, run directly by terrorists who find it highly profitable and low risk. The Taliban’s cigarette smuggling, for example, is second only to their heroin trade.

A second type of relationship occurs in the form of strategic alliances with criminal groups, allowing them to profit from criminal activities by buying and selling goods through crime groups or by taxing the transport of goods across areas under their control. An example of such an alliance is an elaborate art-for-arms trade conducted by Italy’s organised crime groups who supply arms to the Islamic State in Libya in an elaborate art-for-arms exchange. Illicit art worth millions extracted from Libyan tombs is shipped from Sirte to the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, infamously run by Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta criminal gangs. The ‘Ndrangheta exchange the art for arms supplied by the Neapolitan Camorra criminal gangs who have a long-standing arms trafficking businesses with the Russian mafia who secure arms from Moldova and Ukraine. The weapons are then shipped back to Sirte and ISIL, feeding the conflict in Libya.40 Another example of such an alliance is illegal logging. According to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the annual spoils of the illegal logging and trade amount to US$ 30-100 billion. In Somalia, charcoal exports are a significant source of revenue for al-Shabaab. In 2012 this was recognised by UN Security Council Resolution 2036, which banned the import and export of charcoal from Somalia. Despite the ban, UNEP estimates that al-Shabaab earns US$ 38-68 million a year from charcoal sales and the taxes it collects on the transport of the illegal commodity.41 Terrorists and criminal groups are thriving on the exploitation of natural resources that is increasing global fragility and preventing global development. Environmental crime has become the world’s fourth largest crime sector, with an estimated US$ 91 -258 billion being stolen annually.42

A third way in which terrorists are profiting from organised crime is by taxing and extorting individuals who are under their control or by joining forces with corrupt government officials. ISIL has become the richest and most violent terrorist group in modern history, with an estimated wealth in 2015 of over US$ 2 billion from oil sales, smuggling, sale of stolen goods, extortion, and looted banks and antiquities.43 However, it is important to note that the group currently earns over half of its income from taxation, imposing levies on everyone and everything that crosses its territories and from expropriating real estate and property from those who have fled.

**GAPS IN STATE POWER**

The opportunistic ability for criminal-terrorist groups to take over geographic areas is due to collapsing state power and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. The instability brought on after the wake of the Arab
Spring, which led to hundreds of thousands of people trying to escape to Europe, further undermined state control challenging the authoritarian order in six Arab states. Four states – Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen – are failing or partially failing, leading to chronic conflict, lawlessness, and extreme poverty in the region. This has created an opportunity for radical religious extremists, terrorists, and criminal groups to prosper. Several states in the region can now no longer fully control and contain criminality and violent terror within their borders.

States worldwide are being challenged by criminal-terrorist networks; especially in prisons, urban areas, and cyberspace. Prisons have become the place where terrorists and criminals meet, plan, plot, and recruit. The most prominent example is Abu-Bakhr al-Baghdadi, the leader and self-declared caliph of ISIL, who spent formative time at Camp Bucca, a US-controlled prison in Iraq, where he met Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlfawi, a former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein’s air defence forces, who was the architect of the ISIL strategy for the takeover of towns, focusing heavily on surveillance and espionage. The Iraqi government estimates that 17 of the 25 most important ISIL leaders spent time in US prisons in Iraq, planning the creation of ISIL and its ideology.

In the West, prisons have also become a networking and learning environment where terrorists and criminals can share ideology and build networks. A large percentage of terrorist recruits – some estimates are as high as 80 per cent – have criminal records varying from petty to serious crimes. The recruitment of criminals provides terrorists with the skill sets needed to succeed: a propensity to carry out violent acts, ability and criminal-terrorist networks; especially in prisons, urban areas, and cyberspace. Prisons have become the place where terrorists and criminals meet, plan, plot, and recruit. The most prominent example is Abu-Bakhr al-Baghdadi, the leader and self-declared caliph of ISIL, who spent formative time at Camp Bucca, a US-controlled prison in Iraq, where he met Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlfawi, a former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein’s air defence forces, who was the architect of the ISIL strategy for the takeover of towns, focusing heavily on surveillance and espionage. The Iraqi government estimates that 17 of the 25 most important ISIL leaders spent time in US prisons in Iraq, planning the creation of ISIL and its ideology.

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For Islamist extremist groups, prison has become an important recruitment location. They especially target young petty criminals with Middle Eastern backgrounds. The Charlie Hebdo attackers Amedy Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi, for example, met in prison. There, they also met al-Qa’ida’s top operative in France, Djamel Beghal, who served time for attempting to bomb the US Embassy in Paris in 2001. Abdelhamid Abbaoud, the minder of the Paris plot, as well as his co-conspirator Salah Abdeslam, also followed a trajectory from petty crime to armed robbery, both ending up in prison, where they met and were radicalised by Fouad Belkacem, the former leader of the Brussels terrorist recruiting organisation Sharia4Belgium.

State power is also progressively being weakened in large cities and ports. Urban centres harbour lawless enclaves that are exploited by criminals, terrorists, militants, and bandits. In so-called feral cities such as Mogadishu, Caracas, Ciudad Juárez, and Raqqa, governments have lost their ability to govern or maintain the rule of law. In order to build up more resilience in cities, the UN launched the Strong Cities Network (SCN) in September 2015.

**GAPS IN CYBER POWER**

While terrorists have created insecurity in the real world for decades, there has been a major paradigm shift for the last 15 years: terrorists are now engaged in the world’s greatest open space, the internet. ISIL’s growing global influence marks the first time in history that a terrorist group has held sway in both the real and virtual worlds.

Cyberspace has become a new domain for violence. It is used to project force with videos of torture and assassinations as well as to recruit.

In cyberspace, extremist groups’ greatest success is their ability to use propaganda in a strategic way to entice fighters and followers. ISIL uses the digital world to create an idealised version of itself, a reality show that is designed to find resonance and meaning among its diverse supporters. For the adventure seeker, it broadcasts its military power and bloodthirsty violence; for those looking for a home, job, refuge, religious fulfilment, or meaning in life, it uses this medium to present an idyllic world by depicting the caliphate as a peaceful, benevolent state committed to helping the poor. ISIL maintains a successful media wing, al-Furqan, which includes over 36 separate media offices. Together, they produce hundreds of videos, as well as Roumiay (formerly Dabiq), ISIL’s online propaganda magazine. A study by RAND found that ISIL supporters sent over six million tweets from July 2014-May 2015. More than 40,000 foreign fighters from over 120 countries have flooded into Syria since the start of the country’s civil war, including 6,900 from the West, the vast majority of whom joined ISIL. The group is dependent on recruits from Europe for significant funding. It advises aspiring fighters to raise funds before leaving to join ISIL. European recruits’ moneymaking schemes include petty theft, as well as defrauding public institutions and service providers. British foreign fighters committed large-scale fraud by pretending to be police officers and targeting UK pensioners for their bank details, earning more than US$1.8 million before being apprehended.

ISIL has also been successful at using cybercrime to fund itself. It advises fighters on how to transfer funds through money service businesses, pre-paid debit cards, AppleWallet, informal money transfer systems (hawala), and Dark Wallet, a dark web app that claims to anonymise bitcoin transactions. ISIL also instructs its followers to use the internet to acquire weapons. Cells planning attacks in Europe and ‘one wolves’ are increasingly turning to the dark web to obtain weapons: 57 people were arrested in France in 2015 for buying firearms over the internet.

ISIL and al-Qa’ida are interested in using the internet to mount attacks against governments. ISIL recently united five distinct hacking groups into a “United Cyber Caliphate.” Its purpose is to build a cyber army and create forums to enable followers to wage cyber-terror campaigns. ISIL’s Cyber Caliphate recently called supporters to conduct “Electronic Jihad” by hacking energy networks. In order to avoid detection, ISIL also coaches its followers on using anonymous browsers and provides instructive security manuals. ISIL recently coached followers to use ZeroNet Network technology which makes ISIL websites difficult to remove due to multiple website hosting.

Terrorists are gaining in technical expertise. At the same time cyber crime is more accessible than ever before. If criminal or terrorist groups lack in-house hacking talents, they can buy these skills on the dark web or acquire them in the anonymous underground economy where Crime-as-a-Service (CaaS) model is readily available. Everything is for sale, from zombie computers that can swamp a network with traffic to sophisticated cyber malware.
Moreover, such cyber weapons are cheap and accessible, not only for states, but for non-state actors as well. Today, ISIL can use a fraction of its wealth to buy cyber weapons. Stuxnet, believed to have been designed to attack Iranian nuclear facilities cost US$100 million to develop: a recent malware programme, attributed to China, IceFog, was designed to attack government agencies in Japan and South Korea, cost a mere US$10,000 to develop. In order to stop this terrorist-criminal hacker threat, governments are investing heavily in their cyber defences. The UK, for example, spends more than GBP 3.2 billion for cyber defence. Governments need to adopt multiple legal and technical measures to regulate the abuse of the Internet. They must adopt partnerships with technology companies and civil society in order to build epistemic communities to protect vulnerable communities from falling prey to violent extremist propaganda and criminal financing.

THE WAY FORWARD

We are currently witnessing a convergence of terrorism and crime, resulting in terrorist groups with unprecedented resources and abilities to project power. Terrorists that adopt criminal agendas may reach out for political power in order to maintain control of markets, thus posing serious long-term threats to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and stabilization efforts. Groups who engage in criminal markets, such as Hezbollah, the Taliban, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army, have proven to be resilient and long lasting. Despite France’s ability to negotiate an agreement to strike terrorist groups in five Sahel countries with Operation Barkhan, it has been unable to stop Al-Marabitou, AQIM, and MUIAO from engaging in KFR and drug smuggling. To strip terrorists of their power and global momentum and accelerate their defeat, the international community, governments, the private sector, and civil society must work together to combat international criminal networks and implement and enforce global mechanisms for preventing terrorist financing.

Countering terrorist financing is not a linear problem: it can only be understood by developing a comprehensive intelligence picture with international cooperation. Currently, ISIL is still able to move payments and ISIL continue to operate in ISIL-held territory and ISIL continues to use banks outside the territories it controls. Forty countries are still able to finance ISIL, including G20 members. At the global financial level, it is important to enforce global governance regimes that do not allow criminal states or kleptocracies to function with impunity. Finance ministers should focus on preventing ISIL from accessing the international financial system. States near ISIL-controlled areas should help prevent money transfers from the Persian Gulf countries through Turkey and Lebanon, and should work harder to prevent ISIL operatives from accessing their banks. However, preventing backdoor banking is difficult when bank branches remain connected to jurisdictions that are weak or non-existent and do not yet criminalise financing an individual for the purpose of committing a terrorist act. Reclaiming “black holes”, as counter-terrorism officials hope to do, is difficult when financing remains mostly siloed and highly restricted by domestic data-protection and privacy laws. A US government official stated that we “must do more than simply buttress government in order to legitimise a state. [We] must buttress multiple failing state structures to legitimise the interstate system.”

In 2015, the Global Coalition initiated Operation Tidal Wave II, an air campaign to strike ISIL’s oil and gas sectors, as well as infrastructure. The global coalition is actively launching air strikes against ISIL’s oil infrastructure and cash storage sites. The US Treasury maintains that IS oil revenues are down by 30 per cent. However, the global coalition’s response of using military power against ISIL by targeting “cash collection and distribution points”, as well as oil trucks, should not be seen as a long-term solution. ISIL will simply find new ways of earning money by taxing the six to eight million people in the areas that it controls or by selling cement, wheat, phosphates, cotton, and oil to its neighbours. States and international organisations must do more to prevent terrorist groups from receiving charitable donations and from extracting, producing, and selling oil, gas and minerals. As long as the UN Security Council cannot agree on an embargo that punishes those who conduct business with ISIL, and other terrorist groups they will continue to acquire funds.

The criminal-terrorist nexus plays an existentially important role in the expansion and challenge of modern terror groups. It can only be eliminated by restricting terrorist groups from gaining power over land, cities, ports and transnational criminal markets and from further expanding their affiliations and franchises. More must be done to counter the flow of foreign fighters to join terrorist groups worldwide. This can only be done in a concerted global effort involving political, economic, military and societal means. States must create stable and effective leadership by seeking and cooperating with local actors to prevent violent crime and terror. International actors, states and companies must also find effective strategies in preventing terrorists and criminals from exploiting, illegal extraction of natural resources, smuggling, human trafficking, cyber crime and KFR.

There is a growing consensus that international legal frameworks, militarized and police responses to violent extremism and crime are currently not sufficient in transforming the threat. Rather, there is a growing consensus that there needs to be more comprehensive localized approaches to address the underlying conditions that lead to extremism and crime. More needs to be done to address weak and corrupt governments, failed judiciaries, collapsing economies and growing human rights abuses in order to stem the tide of youth being exploited by extremist and criminal groups worldwide. A sense of intense dissatisfaction and hopelessness is on the rise, especially among those either experiencing conflict or trying to escape it.

The recent increase in global terrorism can be explained by several factors that have converged: war, religious and ethnic conflict, corrosive governments, weak militaries, failing states, and the growth of information technology. However, one of the most important developments is the increasing collaboration of criminal and terrorist networks. While criminals used to focus only on revenue generation and terrorists were driven by political motives, we are currently witnessing a convergence of terrorism and crime. These new hybrid groups are driven by both, revenue generation and political motives, resulting in criminal and terrorist groups with historically unprecedented resources and transgressive...
It is now more than fifty years since the UN General Assembly negotiated its first anti-terrorism convention (on offences committed on board aircraft). Some 25 years ago, the Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya for sponsoring acts of terrorism. Some fifteen years ago, the attacks of 9/11 led to a flurry of UN measures to confront the terrorist threat. And ten years ago, the UN General Assembly adopted a Global Counter-terrorism Strategy. Looking back at five decades of counter-terrorist action, this article attempts to provide an assessment of the impact of the UN’s overall counter-terrorism efforts.

The UN’s counter-terrorism work in recent years can be organised under three headings: first, a norm-setting role that includes a) the development and promotion of a Global Counter-terrorism Strategy and efforts to counter violent extremism, b) a set of international conventions, and c) far-reaching Security Council resolutions imposing counter-terrorism obligations on member states; second, capacity-building activities to help countries meet these obligations; and third, Security Council-mandated sanctions, in the 1990s, against state sponsors of terrorism, and since 9/11 against hundreds of individuals and entities affiliated with al-Qa’ida.

Reviewing these efforts, this article concludes that while the UN plays an important and useful role in establishing norms and frameworks for cooperation, its most significant operational contribution may ultimately lie in a field that does not fall narrowly within the UN’s counter-terrorism framework; namely, its work in resolving conflicts in countries where terrorist groups seek to take advantage of the widespread instability.

**INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS**

Starting in 1963, sixteen international conventions have been negotiated under the UN’s auspices criminalising specific acts of terrorism, such as hostage taking, acts against certain means of transport or categories of persons, or use of certain devices for terrorist purposes. The most recent is the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Some of these conventions, such as the 1999 Convention on Terrorist Financing, enjoy near-universal membership. Whether states parties have adopted internal enforcement measures is a different matter. None of the treaties contains a monitoring and follow-up regime.

Nevertheless, together these instruments have helped establish global anti-terrorism norms and provide a framework for international counter-terrorism cooperation. The treaty framework constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition for effective counter-terrorism. The finding of a 1990 study that there had been no statistically significant reduction in the post-treaty number of attacks is likely to remain valid today.

Unfortunately, efforts to adopt an all-encompassing comprehensive counter-terrorism convention have eluded the UN. This is because member states have been unable to agree on a definition of terrorism, in particular on the questions of whether the definition should include so-called “state terrorism” (i.e. acts carried out by the military forces of a state against civilians) and whether people under foreign occupation should retain the right of violent resistance.

While the absence of a comprehensive convention does not represent a serious gap in the law (almost every form of terrorism is prohibited either by the various sectoral conventions or by international criminal law) and has not stood in the way of robust UN counter-terrorism action post-9/11, it does undermine the organisation’s moral authority by inhibiting it from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic. More importantly, though, the fact that there is no agreed definition of terrorism raises serious human rights concerns, as this allows some governments to justify their prosecution of legitimate political dissent as combating terrorism mandated in far-reaching Security Council mandates.

ASSESSING THE UN’S EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM

Sebastian von Einsiedel, Director, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
SANCTIONS AGAINST STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

During the Cold War, the UN Security Council was largely silent on terrorism and much of the UN’s counter-terrorism activity unfolded in the General Assembly. This began to change in the early 1990s against the backdrop of a rise in state-sponsored acts of terrorism. The Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya in 1992 over Tripoli’s noncooperation with the investigation of two airline bombing incidents; against Sudan in 1996 for alleged involvement in an assassination attempt on Egyptian president Mubarak; and against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1999 for harbouring al-Qaeda. However, during the 1990s, the Council refrained from taking action against a number of other states, such as Iran, whose sponsorship of terrorism was established in a Berlin court in April 1997.

Sanctions against Sudan and Libya were phased out in 2001 and 2003, respectively, after both ended their sponsorship of terrorist groups at least partly in response to the sanctions. By contrast, as would become clear on 11 September 2001, sanctions against the Taliban did not lead to any policy change in Kabul, even though sizable financial assets were frozen.

Nevertheless, the cases of Sudan and Libya suggest that sanctions (as well as the threat thereof and the prospect of their removal) can be an effective tool against state support of terrorism, at least in those cases in which the economic damage and loss of prestige outweigh the benefits a regime believes it derives from involvement in terrorist activities. Moreover, forceful Council action arguably served to further de-legitimise state sponsorship of terrorism and might have deterred other countries from using terrorism as a tool of statecraft. The threat of state sponsorship of terrorism is certainly much less prevalent today than it was in the 1980s or 1990s.

SECURITY COUNCIL-LED COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11

As the previous paragraphs attest, the UN was much more active on counter-terrorism in the 1990s than is commonly realised. However, the real game-changer for the organisation in this area was 9/11, which highlighted the increasingly transnational nature of the threat, making the UN Security Council a natural venue to lead the international charge against al-Qaeda. Resolution 1368, adopted on 12 September 2001, established an important precedent by invoking—for the first time—the right of self-defence against terrorist attacks under Article 51 of the UN Charter, providing an international seal of legal approval to the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan. The Council also extended the sanctions on al-Qaeda, which were originally just focused on Afghanistan, to all parts of the globe, vastly expanding the list of individuals and entities against whom the sanctions would be applied (the so-called 1267 sanctions regime).

Less than two weeks later, the Council adopted Resolution 1373, one of the most ground-breaking resolutions in the body’s history. It imposed legally binding obligations on all UN member states to, among other things, enhance legislation, strengthen border controls, and increase international cooperation to combat terrorism. The Council also established, and later expanded and institutionalised, a support structure to monitor member state implementation of Resolution 1373. The new counter-terrorism architecture established by the Council was a remarkable development for an organisation whose membership had been deeply divided on the question of the legitimacy of non-state violence, in light of the fact that many liberation movements had at one point or another been labelled “terrorist” by former colonial powers. However, as Eric Rosand and the present author have written: “While the UN’s pre-9/11 effort was ambivalent, the new focus on al-Qaeda allowed UN members to unite to condemn a specific terrorist group and thus enable the US to move terrorism near the top of the UN’s agenda.”60

In 2004, the Council further broadened its counter-terrorism program, embarking on an ambitious effort to keep weapons of mass destruction out of terrorist hands. That year, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear proliferation network operated by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, the Council unanimously adopted the far-reaching Resolution 1540, which requires all UN member states to take legislative and regulatory steps to prevent terrorists and other non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Resolution 1540 was modelled after, and bore many similarities to, the Council’s counterterrorism effort under Resolution 1373. Like Resolution 1373, it imposed binding obligations on all member states, thereby circumventing the normal treaty-making process. And like Resolution 1373, it led to the creation of a committee and monitoring mechanism intended to help states implement the onerous obligations contained in it.

However, the Council’s expanding counter-terrorism effort soon attracted widespread criticism, undermining member state buy-in. First, the legislative nature of Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which created far-reaching and binding obligations on all member states without their prior agreement, elicited much resentment, which only recently began to recede. Second, the US invasion of Iraq under the banner of the global war on terror delegitimised Washington’s counter-terrorism endeavour in the eyes of many member states. Third, the Council’s neglect of human rights issues relevant to terrorism led to some outrage among the NGO community and beyond. In particular, the disregard of due process in the 1267 sanctions listing procedures, which did not offer any recourse or review mechanism for individuals who argued they were wrongfully sanctioned, came under growing criticism. The 1267 regime was eventually deemed by the European Court of Justice to have violated fundamental human rights, posing a potential threat to the legitimacy of the Council’s larger sanctions enterprise. In 2009, the Council reluctantly established an ombudsperson to review requests for delisting from sanctioned individuals or entities, which helped alleviate the criticism and resulted in the removal of dozens of individuals and entities from the sanctions list. The Council’s cavalier approach to individual human rights in adopting the sweeping terms of resolution 1267 stands as one of the shoddiest moments in its record.

While questions regarding the legitimacy of the Council’s counter-terrorism effort subsided over the years, questions regarding its effectiveness have assumed greater prominence. Financial sanctions contributed to a significant weakening of al-Qaeda from 2005 – 2011. However, they have since lost their bite as the group’s financing no longer relies on wealthy donors but on criminal enterprise and coercive taxation in areas where terrorist groups control territory, as in Syria. The regular reports of the expert
panel monitoring implementation of the sanctions have greatly contributed to our understanding of the evolution of al-Qa’ida and the Taliban and the conflict economy of the countries in which they operate. While there is scant evidence to suggest that the sanctions regime lastingly constrained its targets, it did help reinforce the counter-terrorism norm and foster international cooperation. It also had an important terrorism norm and foster international targets, it did help reinforce the counter-sanctions regime lastingly constrained its 
there is scant evidence to suggest that the countries in which they operate. While
and the Taliban and the conflict economy of the understanding of the evolution of al-Qa’ida sanctions have greatly contributed to our campaign to prevent, criminalise, and prosecute international travel by their citizens to join terrorist groups. Adopted at a summit level meeting of the Security Council, the “foreign fighters” resolution may have had some mobilising effect on member states. At the same time, it is difficult to implement and monitor, and its breadth and vagueness raise serious human rights concerns about the potential for abuse by repressive states against separatist or opposition forces branded as “terrorist.”

**BROADENING THE UN’S COUNTER-TERRORISM AGENDA: THE GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

Meanwhile, a few years after 9/11, the UN Secretary-General and the UN General Assembly, concerned about the Council’s exclusive grip on the UN’s counter-terrorism agenda, attempted to reassert their own role in this area. In 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan tabled a blueprint for a global counter-terrorism strategy that was meant to place greater emphasis on addressing root causes and respect for human rights. At the same time, he established an interagency “Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force” to ensure that the wide array of UN agencies would bring their combined strength to bear on the implementation of the strategy. The year after, the General Assembly followed suit, unanimously endorsing a modified version of the Secretary-General’s strategy. That strategy helped transform a previously acrimonious UN discussion on counter-terrorism into a comparatively constructive one. And in some countries, the strategy provided welcome cover for governments to strengthen counter-terrorism measures without being seen by their sceptical publics to be buying into the controversial US-led war on terror.

All told, however, it is debatable whether either the strategy or the task force produced concrete achievements on the ground, other than generating a cottage industry of meetings and expert workshops in New York and elsewhere. The task force added new structures and layers to an already complicated counter-terrorism architecture, intensifying duplication and competition instead of furthering coherence. Saudi Arabia, in 2014, donated $100 million to a UN Counter-terrorism Center that was created within the Task Force Secretariat, to assist capacity-building efforts. However, there is little evidence so far that the Task Force has the necessary absorption and implementation capacity to use these funds productively.

Meanwhile, rhetorical support by many governments for the UN strategy notwithstanding, its call for more comprehensive counter-terrorism approaches largely fell on deaf ears. Indeed, around the world many governments continued to rely primarily on military and law enforcement tools in their counter-terrorism efforts, often to the detriment of human rights and with insufficient attention paid to underlying drivers of extremism. French President François Hollande’s invocation of a “war on terrorism” and adoption of reflexive security measures following the November 2015 Paris attacks, while understandable given the very serious pressure exerted by these attacks on French society, suggest that the lessons of the US-led “war on terror” have not been internalised.

To be fair, the rise of ISIL and the growing problem of foreign fighters have led, in recent years, to some wider acknowledgement that security-based counter-terrorism measures alone have not been sufficient to prevent the spread of violent extremists. This has given rise to efforts to operationalise the elements of the UN’s global counter-terrorism strategy that deal with root causes and human rights. These efforts are now framed, at the UN and beyond, under the new headline of “Countering Violent Extremism,” (CVE) which promotes a laundry list of measures, from conflict prevention and strengthening
governance, human rights and the rule of law to engaging communities, empowering women and youth, and advancing education and employment - amounting to a vast, and largely unfunded, agenda.63

Effective pursuit of any of these activities may – or may not - contribute to reducing violent extremism. However, there are valid concerns about pursuing a broad range of UN activities under the CVE-label, which risks “securitising” development efforts,64 leading activities the UN does and should pursue in their own right to be seen as counter-terrorism endeavours. Framing CVE in this way also entails the danger of “downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimizing political activities the UN does and should pursue in their own right to be seen as counter-terrorism endeavours. Framing CVE in this way also entails the danger of “downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimizing communities as potential extremists.”65

Moreover, as an intergovernmental organisation catering to the needs and driven by the interests of national governments, the UN is constitutionally ill-equipped to implement CVE measures. Eric Rosand rightly notes that these measures are better carried out by local actors, such as municipal governments, who are “best positioned to prevent the spread of violent extremism within their communities.”66 The UN’s comparative advantage may thus lie in supporting and mobilising funding for networks that would allow for sharing of best practices among such local actors.

THE UN’S CONFLICT RESOLUTION ROLE

A major 2016 report by the International Crisis Group assessing international efforts to confront al-Qa’ida and ISIL noted that growing reach of these groups in recent years “is more a product of instability than its primary driver.” The report concludes that “[p]reventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises.”67

It follows that the UN’s operationally most meaningful contribution in the area of counter-terrorism may lie in its conflict prevention, peacebuilding or peacekeeping efforts in countries in which terrorist groups take advantage of the widespread instability.

The UN has accumulated ample experience and a proven record of success in its efforts to end civil wars over the past two and a half decades. However, serious questions arise regarding the preparedness of the UN’s conflict management tools, in particular its peace operations, to deliver mandates in countries affected by terrorist insurgencies, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Mali.

First, the growing presence of Islamist terrorist groups in many of today’s civil war environments complicates the UN’s peacemaking because many of these groups pursue maximalist demands that are very difficult to meet or to incorporate into political settlements based on human rights and democratic governance. Second, even where such groups may be motivated primarily by local, legitimate, and reversible grievances, key powers tend to discourage negotiations with them, many of them being proscribed through UN, US, or EU terrorism designation lists. Third, jihadi groups have proven difficult to engage around respect for humanitarian norms, which the UN has successfully employed elsewhere with other armed non-state actors. Fourth, the UN has increasingly become a target of such groups, which has led it to ever greater preoccupation with protecting itself rather than local civilians and has hampered its ability to engage with the local population, win hearts and minds, and mediate local disputes. And finally, as a high-level review of UN peace operations concluded in 2015, “UN peacekeeping missions, due to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations.”68

While that conclusion is doubtless accurate, the UN needs to reflect on how it can adapt its peace operations to deliver on their mandate in theatres where terrorist networks are present. Among the key questions the UN will need to confront are: how to identify elements among violent extremist groups that could potentially be engaged in mediation, peace and reconciliations processes, and how to peel them away from die-hard radicals; how to reconcile the implementation of mandates to extend state authority with the need to address grievances of local communities which have mainly experienced state authority as oppressive and exclusionary force; and how to adapt Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programs to the context of violent extremism.69

CONCLUSION

What do all the UN’s efforts in the field of counter-terrorism add up? This review lends some credence to the damning assessment of Richard Barrett, the former head of the UN expert panel monitoring implementation of sanctions against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, who recently concluded that “[t]he U.N. is too political, too uncoordinated, too focused on process rather than outcomes and follow-up, and too far removed from the people who actually deal with the problems of terrorism on the ground to make much of an impact, or even to appear relevant.”70

While it is true that the UN’s operational counter-terrorism activities have faced severe shortfalls and limitations, the UN has proven a useful venue for establishing the broad normative and cooperative frameworks for collective counter-terrorism action. It thus provides conducive background music that can be helpful to those member states who want to embark on comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts in line with human rights and international law. However, the UN’s norm development has proven too weak to offset the negative effects of counterproductive counter-terrorism policies by Member States that ultimately exacerbate the terrorist threat.
## GTI Ranks and Scores, 2016

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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>30/3/2015</td>
<td>Bosso</td>
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APPENDIX C
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX METHODOLOGY

The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years. In this year’s GTI Palestine has been included for the first time. The geographical definition of Palestine for the purposes of the GTI includes the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as well as the Gaza Strip.

The GTI score for a country in a given year is a based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country’s yearly score, are:

- total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year
- total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year
- a measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three and a five year weighted average is applied to try and reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in table one was determined by consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.

The property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are shown in table 2, incidents causing less than US$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between $1 million and $1 billion a 2, and more than $1 billion a 3. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as ‘unknown’, thus scoring nil, with ‘catastrophic’ events being extremely rare.

### TABLE 1
**INDICATOR WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Total number of incidents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of fatalities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of injuries</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of property damages measure</td>
<td>Between 0 and 3 depending on severity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2
**PROPERTY DAMAGE LEVELS AS DEFINED IN THE GTD AND WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CODE/ WEIGHT</th>
<th>DAMAGE LEVEL</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor (likely &lt; $1 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major (likely between $1 million and $1 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Catastrophic (likely &gt; $1 billion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY’S GTI SCORE**

To assign a score to a country, each incident is rated according to the four measures, the measures are multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents, and then all incidents for a given country are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, assume Table 1 depicts a hypothetical country’s records for a given year.
TABLE 3: HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY TERRORIST ATTACKS IN A GIVEN YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS FOR THE GIVEN YEAR</th>
<th>CALCULATED RAW SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of incidents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of fatalities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of injuries</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of property damages measure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total raw score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>195.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given these indicator values, the country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of:

$$(1\times21)+(3\times36)+(0.5\times53)+(2\times20)=195.5.$$  

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country’s score in the current year. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. Table 4 highlights the weights used for each year.

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world; there are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to many countries which experience only very small amounts, if not zero terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in Table 5, mapping the scores in this way yields the total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate r by:
   a. root = 2 X (Highest GTI Banded Score – Lowest GTI Banded Score) = 20 X (10-0) =20
   b. Range = 2 X (Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score – Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score)
   c. \( r = \frac{\text{root}}{\text{range}} \)
4. The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by \( r^n \).

Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the set bands as defined in Table 5.

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>% OF SCORE</th>
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<td>Current year</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Previous year</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two years ago</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three years ago</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four years ago</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>BAND CUT-OFF VALUES</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.69</td>
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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

METHODOLOGY

The economic impact of terrorism is calculated using IEP’s cost of violence methodology. The model includes both the direct and indirect costs, such as the lost life-time earnings, cost of medical treatments and property destruction from incidents of terrorism. The direct costs include those borne by the victim of the terrorist act and associated expenditure, such as medical spending. The indirect costs include lost productivity and earning as well as the psychological trauma to the victims, their families and friends.

IEP also uses an economic multiplier. The economic multiplier is a commonly used concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure flows through to the wider economy. If a terrorism incident didn’t occur then the costs associated with it would not occur and the money would be more productively deployed, such as in business development or education. For instance, medical costs to treat victims of terrorist attacks or expenditure to repair and rebuild destroyed properties could have been channelled to investments with higher return. Similarly, if the lost life-time earnings were included in the economy, then the individual’s expenditure would have a flow effect through the economy resulting in additional production.

The study uses unit costs for homicide and injuries from McCollister et al. (2010). The unit costs are adjusted to individual country using GDP per capita at purchasing parity level relative to the source of the estimates. In addition, to present the cost in constant 2015 terms, average annual consumer price index data from International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used to adjust the unit costs. The adjusted unit costs are then used to estimate the cost of deaths and injuries from incidents of terrorism.

In addition, the data provides estimated dollar values of property destruction for a sample of incidents. The property destruction estimates from the GTD are then used to generate unit costs of property destroyed by various types of terrorist attacks such as bombings and explosions, armed assaults, hostage taking, assassinations and so on. The unit costs are estimated considering the country national income level and the size of the property destruction. For example, a minor property destruction resulting from bombing is calculated using a different unit cost for high income OECD countries compared to lower income country groups.

Large scale terrorism has implications for the broader economy in countries experiencing intense conflict; therefore, IEP’s model include losses of national output, equivalent to two per cent of GDP.

The analysis presents conservative estimates of the economic impact of terrorism and does not include variables for which detailed appropriate data was not available. For instance, the analysis does not include the impact on business, the cost of fear from terrorism or the cost of counterterrorism.
END NOTES

SECTION 1
RESULTS


2. The analysis of deaths per attack by group is limited to groups known to have committed more than 50 attacks.

SECTION 2
TRENDS


6. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


17. The Soufan Group, op. cit.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

SECTION 3
TERRORIST GROUPS


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SECTION 4
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

8 Figures for growth in the tourism sector refer to the contribution of tourism to a country's GDP, which includes the direct economic benefits from tourism as well as the indirect benefits via the flow-on effects to other sectors.
22 Forbes International, op. cit.
23 Clarke, C., op. cit.
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