



# Multilateralism Index 2024

○ Peace and Security

○ Human Rights

○ Climate Action

○ Public Health

○ Trade



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## Abbreviations

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COP	UN Climate Change Conference
COW	Correlates of War
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
FENSA	Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEA	International Energy Agency
IEADB	International Environmental Agreements Database
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IHR	International Health Regulations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPI	International Peace Institute
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMCI	National Material Capabilities Index
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Trade and Development
UNHRC	UN Human Rights Council
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
WEOG	Western Europe and Other Group
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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# Executive Summary

There are growing calls to transform the multilateral system, which is widely seen as being in crisis. Yet solving the crisis of multilateralism requires understanding what that crisis entails. What parts of the multilateral system are in crisis, and what parts are still functioning? Where is commitment to multilateralism flagging, and where does it remain strong? Where is multilateral action failing to translate into concrete results, and where is it delivering? Who is being left out of multilateral engagement, and who is being included? And what are the trends over time?

To help answer these questions, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) developed the Multilateralism Index. This 2024 edition of the Index assesses changes in international cooperation between 2013 and 2023 across five domains: Peace and Security, Human Rights, Climate Action, Public Health, and Trade. Each domain is evaluated across three dimensions: Participation, Performance, and Inclusivity. Looking at each of these dimensions provides several broad takeaways:

- **Participation:** The Index does not find a major drop-off in participation by states in the multilateral system. In fact, participation increased across all domains except trade. This signals that member states remain engaged in the system, even if the nature of this engagement has shifted from cooperation toward contestation. At the same time, due to limitations in the indicators available, these improvements in participation should not necessarily be interpreted as a broad-based increase in commitment to multilateral action.
- **Performance:** Performance is the one dimension where the multilateral system saw a clear decline across most of the domains. The biggest decline was in peace and security. Human rights and climate action also saw significant declines. These declines may indicate that some global crises are outstripping the multilateral system's ability to respond. At the same time, these shortcomings are not solely failures of multilateralism, as performance in many areas also depends on domestic action by individual states. Moreover, despite these shortcomings, the gears of the multilateral system are continuing to turn.
- **Inclusivity:** Broad improvements in the Index's inclusivity dimension point to two trends: the steady growth in the number of NGOs engaging with various parts of the UN system and the increase in women's representation across many UN bodies. Limitations in the indicators available make it more difficult to assess progress in other areas, including geographic inclusivity and more substantive inclusivity of women beyond their formal representation at the UN.

Several takeaways also emerge from each of the five dimensions covered by the Multilateralism Index:

- **Peace and Security:** The Index paints a mixed picture of participation in multilateral peace and security institutions, with participation in peacekeeping slightly decreasing and participation in peacebuilding increasing. Performance deteriorated across almost all indicators, reflecting blockages at the Security Council and an upsurge in violent conflict. Both inclusivity indicators improved, though major barriers to inclusivity remain.
- **Human Rights:** The Index reveals that member states have maintained—and even increased—their participation in many aspects of the multilateral human rights system, reflecting an ongoing desire to engage in and influence that system even among states with poor human rights records. At the same time, performance on human rights has deteriorated. The indicators on the inclusion of civil society and women in the UN human rights system have improved.
- **Climate Action:** The climate indicators point to mixed trends in participation in and performance on multilateral climate action. However, even where trends are in the right direction, as on climate finance and renewable energy, progress has been far slower than what is required to address the climate crisis. The indicators on inclusivity show clearer improvements.
- **Public Health:** The Index registers an increase in participation in the global public health system over the past decade, in part reflecting increased engagement in response to the sharp rise in public health needs following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Performance has been more mixed, largely due to the ongoing impacts of COVID-19 on global public health. Progress on inclusivity has also been mixed, reflecting ongoing challenges related to the inclusion of non-state actors in the global governance of public health.
- **Trade:** Participation in the multilateral framework for trade has been stagnant—or in some cases deteriorated—since the latest round of multilateral trade talks effectively ended in 2015. Performance has been mixed and is difficult to assess due to the trade volatility caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and heightened geopolitical competition. While the inclusivity indicators have improved, it is difficult to assess geographic inclusivity, which is the biggest fault line in multilateral trade cooperation.

# Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that the multilateral system is facing a series of crises it is struggling to respond to. International action in response to the wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, Myanmar, and beyond has been largely confined to humanitarian assistance rather than peacemaking. Global climate action remains far short of what is needed. Negotiations on an agreement to prevent another global pandemic have struggled to achieve consensus. International human rights instruments have failed to prevent a global backsliding on human rights. Multilateral trade negotiations have been moribund for decades.

In the face of this crisis of multilateralism, there are growing calls to transform the multilateral system, which many see as antiquated, ineffective, and inequitable. As Secretary-General António Guterres said in September 2023, “It’s reform or rupture.” At the Summit of the Future in September, UN member states met to chart a path toward reform and identify “multilateral solutions for a better tomorrow.”

Yet solving the crisis of multilateralism requires understanding what that crisis entails. At its core, multilateralism refers to the coordination of “behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.”<sup>1</sup> This definition encompasses a wide range of institutions. It includes intergovernmental bodies run by diplomats in New York, Geneva, and elsewhere as well as agencies staffed by international civil servants working across the globe. These institutions undertake a vast array of tasks on a wide range of issues, from responding to global crises like war, climate change, and pandemics to managing the day-to-day coordination of aviation, shipping, telecommunications, and postal service. The multilateral system also extends well beyond the United Nations, including hundreds of additional international, regional, and subregional organizations as well as more informal multilateral groupings and alliances.

What, then, do we mean when we talk about a crisis of multilateralism? What parts of the multilateral system are in crisis, and what parts are still functioning? Where is commitment to multilateralism flagging, and where does it remain strong? Where is multilateral action failing to translate into concrete results, and where is it delivering? Who is being left out of multilateral engagement, and who is being included? And what are the trends over time?

To help answer these questions, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) launched the Multilateralism Index in September 2022. Two years later, we are launching a refined and updated version of the Index to assess changes in international cooperation over the decade between 2013 and 2023. By providing a quantitative assessment of the multilateral system, the Index provides an analytic tool to inform decision-making and guide political attention.

The Multilateralism Index is based on the analysis of uniform, year-on-year quantitative data related to the functioning of the multilateral system over time. Unlike other indexes that rate individual states, the Multilateralism Index takes the pulse of the multilateral system as a whole, focusing on the formal, global multilateral system centered on the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> It examines five domains of multilateral coordination: Peace and Security, Human Rights, Climate Action, Public Health, and Trade. Each domain is evaluated across three dimensions:

- **Participation** assesses how the multilateral system is supported, accessed, and utilized by states, including the degree to which states have joined and engage in multilateral bodies and agreements and states’ financial contributions to multilateral bodies.
- **Performance** assesses how well the multilateral system has followed through on implementing actions in pursuit of its stated objectives and the degree to which social, economic, and other measures reflect improvements in multilateral bodies’ areas of concern.
- **Inclusivity** assesses how the multilateral system engages and is supported by non-state actors and the degree to which women are represented in multilateral institutions.

All indicators are scored on a scale from zero to 100, with zero representing the lowest level of multilateral engagement or achievement possible (or on record since the year 2000) and 100 representing the highest level of multilateral engagement or achievement possible (or on record since the year 2000). The composite domain and dimension scores represent an unweighted average of all relevant indicators.

Several changes have been made between the 2022 and 2024 editions of the Multilateralism Index. While the earlier index assessed changes between 2010 and 2020, the current iteration assesses changes between 2013 and 2023. The indicators have also been refined and consolidated, with several indicators added and several removed, leading to a reduction from 65 to 45 indicators. In addition, the Environment domain has been renamed as the Climate Action domain due to a shift toward indicators focused on multilateral cooperation to address climate change.


We believe the Multilateralism Index is a useful tool for taking the temperature of global commitment to multilateralism. Nonetheless, all indexes have inherent limitations, and this is no exception. Its five domains do not cover all areas of multilateral cooperation—perhaps most notably, cooperation on development and cooperation on humanitarian affairs, which we plan to add to the next iteration of the Index. Many aspects of multilateral cooperation are also difficult to quantify, and the quantitative indicators available may not tell the whole story. For example, the inclusivity indicators do not cover geographic inclusivity—one of the most important dimensions for assessing inclusion—because we lacked systematic data on regional representation across the domains. These indicators also do not assess the fundamental lack of inclusivity baked into the design of some multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council. We have therefore strived throughout this report to supplement the main indicators with additional data points and qualitative analysis.

1. John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (1992), p. 574.

2. For indexes that rate individual states, see the Index of Countries’ Support to UN-Based Multilateralism, in Jeffrey Sachs, Guillaume Lafortune, and Grayson Fulle, “Sustainable Development Report 2024: The SDGs and the UN Summit of the Future,” Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2024; and the Global Governance Index, in Richard Ponzio, Nudhara Yusuf, Muznah Siddiqui, and Joris Larik, “Global Governance Innovation Report 2023,” Stimson Center, 2023.

FIGURE 1

## Results of the Multilateralism Index 2024



Source: IEP Calculations


The Multilateralism Index reveals several broad trends across the multilateral system. While changes in participation have been inconsistent across the domains, performance has declined across every domain, and inclusivity has increased across every domain between 2013 and 2023 (see Figure 1). The domain-specific indicators used in the Index, together with additional data points that are not specific to the five domains, reveal several overall trends across each of these three dimensions.

### Participation

There has not been a major drop-off in participation by states in the multilateral system, and many of the indicators have held steady or improved (see Figure 2). In fact, participation in the multilateral system increased across all domains except trade. While some argue that the crisis of multilateralism will result in member states exiting the system, what we instead see is high participation, even as performance is deteriorating. This signals that member states remain engaged in the system, even if the nature of this engagement has shifted from cooperation toward contestation. Member states are competing to define the future of

FIGURE 2

## Percentage of indicators that improved and deteriorated, by dimension, 2013–2023




Source: IEP Calculations

3. Change is considered "marginal" if an indicator has increased or decreased by less than 2 percent.

FIGURE 3

**Global commitment to treaties and agreements in Peace and Security, Human Rights, Climate Action, Public Health, and Trade**



Source: IEP Calculations

the multilateral system and disagree about what that future should entail.

However, these improvements should not necessarily be interpreted as a broad-based increase in commitment to multilateral action. Most notably, all the domains include participation indicators related to multilateral agreements and voluntary financial contributions, which together constitute two-thirds of all the participation indicators. However, both of these indicators come with caveats.


In regard to treaties and other multilateral agreements, participation has largely held steady or slightly increased (see Figure 3). However, ratification of these treaties does not necessarily signal adherence to them. Most treaties have weak enforcement mechanisms, and there is little objective, concrete data on the extent to which states comply with their treaty obligations. At the same time, treaties can bolster multilateralism

even when compliance is incomplete or inconsistent, for example by raising the reputational cost of violating international law.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, lack of compliance is not always deliberate; especially in areas like climate action and public health, it can also result from states' lack of capacity to meet their treaty obligations.<sup>5</sup>

Similarly, while the growth in financial contributions across much of the UN system may reflect a growing commitment to finance multilateral action, it comes with several caveats. First, this growth is almost entirely in voluntary contributions rather than assessed contributions (see Figure 4). Assessed contributions are paid by all member states on a sliding scale based primarily on their share of the global economy. The Multilateralism Index does not use assessed contributions to assess changes in participation because they have barely changed over the past decade (though member states have increasingly failed to pay their assessments on time or in full, creating a liquidity crisis for the UN).<sup>6</sup> These assessed contributions are a more multilateral

FIGURE 4

**UN funding, 2011–2022**



Source: UN

4. Beth Ann Simmons, "Treaty Compliance and Violation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13, no. 1 (2010).

5. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993).

6. UN Secretary-General, "Letter on Liquidity Crisis," January 25, 2024, available at <https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/108/2024/01/SG-Letter-on-Liquidity-Crisis.pdf>.



form of finance than voluntary contributions because they are agreed upon by all member states and feed into the core budget of the UN. Voluntary contributions, by contrast, are essentially bilateral contributions to the UN by individual member states. Moreover, member states have increasingly earmarked their voluntary contributions, which allows them to dictate how the UN can spend this money (see Figure 4). This has been referred to as the “bilateralization” of UN funding.<sup>7</sup> Seen from this perspective, the increase in UN funding is not necessarily a positive sign for multilateral participation.


Second, voluntary financial contributions come almost entirely from wealthy countries in the Global North. For example, over the past decade, around two-thirds of multilateral official development assistance has come from just seven wealthy countries. While certain countries from the Global South play a growing role in development finance, they largely provide bilateral aid that bypasses the multilateral system (countries from the Global North have also shifted toward bilateral aid; see Figure 5). By disproportionately sustaining the UN budget, wealthy countries have disproportionate influence over UN priorities, especially when their voluntary contributions are earmarked. For their part, less wealthy countries may have nonfinancial ways of participating in the multilateral system that are harder to quantify. For example, many small island developing states have been at the forefront of advancing multilateral climate action through diplomatic efforts, and the top ten contributors of troops and police to UN peace operations are all African and Asian countries.

Third, even when financial contributions have increased, they have often been outpaced by the rise in needs. This is most clearly visible when it comes to humanitarian funding (which is not covered by the five domains of the Multilateralism Index). The overall increase in UN funding is largely driven by an increase in humanitarian funding. However, humanitarian needs have risen even faster than humanitarian funding. In 2023, for

example, donors delivered the second highest level of humanitarian funding ever, but humanitarian needs reached a record high, leaving the biggest ever gap between funding and needs (see Figure 6). Even in Ukraine and Palestine, which have been at the center of global attention, the humanitarian response was only around one-third funded. In places like Venezuela, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Syria, the response was less than 20 percent funded. Similarly, while climate finance has steadily increased, it still falls far short of what is required. This means that upward trends in financial contributions often mask what is actually a multilateral financial crisis.

FIGURE 6


### Humanitarian appeals funded, 2016–2023



Source: UNOCHA

FIGURE 5

### Official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, 2010–2022



Source: OECD, IEP Calculations

7. Max-Otto Baumann and Sebastian Haug, “Financing the United Nations: Status Quo, Challenges and Reform Options,” Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, April 2024.

## Performance

Performance is the one dimension where the multilateral system saw a clear decline across most of the domains. The biggest decline was in peace and security. Human rights and climate action also saw significant declines. These declines may indicate that some global crises are outstripping the multilateral system’s ability to respond. For example, faced with wars in places like Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, and Sudan, the UN continues to play a critical role in alleviating suffering through humanitarian aid, but it has proven unable to prevent or resolve these conflicts. While participation in multilateral climate negotiations remains robust, both commitments and actions remain well short of what is required. And while all UN member states committed to the Sustainable Development Goals, progress toward those goals is severely offtrack.


These shortcomings are not solely failures of multilateralism, however. Ultimately, performance in areas such as public health depends on both multilateral cooperation (e.g., on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response) and domestic action by individual states (e.g., on public investment in health infrastructure). Similarly, while the multilateral system has an important role to play in protecting human rights, human rights protection is ultimately the responsibility of states.

Looking at intergovernmental bodies, it is clear that the gears of the multilateral system have not completely ground to a halt. The UN General Assembly’s annual high-level week remains a major event on the diplomatic calendar, drawing more than 120 heads of state and government in 2023.<sup>8</sup> The assembly also passed nearly 300 resolutions in 2022 and 2023—a decrease since 2013 but more

than in any other year since 2015. Considering the growing dysfunction of the UN Security Council, the General Assembly may even have gained in importance as a venue for multilateral cooperation, including on peace and security.<sup>9</sup> As discussed below, even the Security Council has continued passing resolutions on many important issues, though there are signs that growing geopolitical tensions are starting to take a bigger toll.

Even as the performance of the multilateral system comes up short, public perceptions of the functioning of the UN have not changed dramatically over the past decade. While confidence in the UN—and in international organizations more generally—has declined slightly since the mid-1990s, it has remained fairly steady over the past decade.<sup>10</sup> Many surveys have shown that majorities of people in most countries still have favorable views of the UN, want their country to be more involved in the UN, and believe the UN has made the world a better place. Majorities also agree that the UN promotes human rights, peace, democracy, action on infectious diseases, and climate action (see Figure 7).<sup>11</sup> At the same time, perceptions of the UN vary widely by region, from strong support in Northern Europe and Southeast Asia to low levels of trust across much of Latin America and the Middle East (see Figure 8).<sup>12</sup>


FIGURE 7  
Views on the United Nations in 15 countries, 2023<sup>13</sup>



Source: FES

8. Mallika Sen, “UN Summit of World Leaders, by the Numbers,” AP, September 27, 2023.  
 9. Richard Gowan, “The U.N. General Assembly Eyes a Bigger Role in International Security,” *World Politics Review*, July 25, 2023.  
 10. Based on data from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey.  
 11. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, “Global Census Poll 2023,” September 15, 2023.  
 12. Albert Trithart and Olivia Case, “Do People Trust the UN? A Look at the Data,” *IPI Global Observatory*, February 22, 2023.  
 13. Based on a YouGov/FES survey of 15,887 participants from 15 countries: Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK, and the US. The question asked was: “When it comes to the United Nations, would you say you [agree or disagree] with each of the following, or are you unsure? The United Nations...”

FIGURE 8

**Net confidence in the UN, 2017–2022**

Source: EVSWWS

**Inclusivity**


Broad improvements in the Multilateralism Index's inclusivity dimension point to progress across the multilateral system in representing women and engaging civil society. One of the main reasons the Multilateralism Index shows such a large increase in inclusivity is the steady growth in the number of NGOs engaging with various parts of the UN system. At the global level, this is visible in the rapid increase in NGOs with consultative status at ECOSOC beginning in the 1990s (see Figure 9).<sup>14</sup> This increase has accelerated in the past few years following a brief pause in 2020 after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Over the past two decades, the increase has almost entirely been among NGOs with "special" consultative status, which tend to be smaller and to have a narrower focus than NGOs with "general" consultative status.<sup>15</sup>

The regional diversity of NGOs with consultative status has also increased over time. For example, since 1996, the share of Asian

NGOs with consultative status has doubled, while the share of African NGOs has tripled. Nonetheless, NGOs from Europe and North America remain significantly overrepresented compared to their share of the global population.<sup>16</sup> It also bears mentioning that some NGOs have faced criticism for using their access to the UN to push back against previously established norms, particularly around gender equality and women's rights.<sup>17</sup>

Another reason for improvements in the Index's inclusivity dimension is the growing diversity of UN staff. The UN has recently launched several initiatives to make the organization more inclusive, including the 2017 Gender Parity Strategy, the 2019 Disability Inclusion Strategy, and the 2024 Secretariat Strategy on Protection from Violence and Discrimination of LGBTIQ+ Persons. The UN has also long focused on improving geographic representation among staff and, more recently, on addressing racism across the UN system.

FIGURE 9

**NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status, 1945–2023**

Source: UN

14. Consultative status is the only way for NGOs to enter a formal relationship with the UN at large.

15. Special consultative status also comes with a slightly narrower set of rights. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, "The ECOSOC Handbook: A Practical Guide to the United Nations Economic and Social Council," 2021.

16. UN, "Consultative Status with ECOSOC," available at <https://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/about.htm>; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Integrated Civil Society Organizations System," available at <https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do>.

17. Rebecca Holmes, "Feminist Responses to 'Norm-Spoiling' at the United Nations," ODI, April 2024.


The Multilateralism Index focuses on gender parity, which is an issue the UN keeps robust data on. Therefore, one of the main reasons for the increase in inclusivity across all domains of the Index is the steady rise in the representation of women across almost every part of the UN system. In some areas, the UN has already achieved gender parity. For example, 54 percent of international staff in the UN Secretariat’s non-field entities are women, though field entities lag significantly behind at 31 percent.<sup>18</sup> Though starting from a much lower baseline, there has also been progress toward gender parity at more senior levels. For example, from 2012 to 2016, only around a quarter of senior appointments within the UN Secretariat were women. From 2017 to 2022, more than half were women (see Figure 10).<sup>19</sup> As a result, nearly half of UN under-secretaries-general are now women.<sup>20</sup> Compared to the Secretariat, however, UN member states have lagged in their progress toward gender parity: less than a quarter of member states’ permanent representatives to the UN in New York are women.<sup>21</sup>

The UN has also made some improvements in increasing the geographic diversity of its staff. This can be seen in senior appointments in the UN Secretariat. In 2003, 59 percent of appointments were of individuals from high-income countries (most of which are in Europe or North America) and only 9 percent from low-income countries (all of which are in Africa or Asia). By 2023, 41 percent of appointments were from high-income countries and 18 percent from low-income countries—still a major imbalance but a marked improvement (see Figure 11).<sup>22</sup> At the same time, nearly a third of countries are unrepresented or underrepresented among Secretariat staff.<sup>23</sup>

While these increases in representation are important, a truly inclusive multilateral system requires more than just representation. True inclusivity also requires deeper changes, including in the UN’s working culture. For example, in a 2020


survey of UN staff, one-third of respondents reported experiencing discrimination in the workplace.<sup>24</sup> And in a 2019 survey of UN staff, one-third of respondents reported experiencing sexual harassment in the last two years.<sup>25</sup> Particularly when it comes to gender equality, the UN has made major strides over the past decade but still lacks the capacity, culture, and policies needed to mainstream gender equality effectively across the system.<sup>26</sup>

FIGURE 11  
UN senior appointments by country income group, 2003–2023



Source: NYU CIC, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 10  
Female senior appointments to the UN, 2000–2023



Source: NYU CIC, IEP Calculations


18. UN, “UN Secretariat Gender Parity Dashboard,” available at <https://www.un.org/gender/content/un-secretariat-gender-parity-dashboard>.  
 19. Senior appointments include appointments of assistant secretaries-general, under-secretaries-general, and deputy secretaries-general. NYU Center on International Cooperation, “UN Senior Appointments Dashboard,” available at <https://cic.nyu.edu/data/un-senior-appointments-dashboard/>.  
 20. UN, “UN Secretariat Gender Parity Dashboard,” available at <https://www.un.org/gender/content/un-secretariat-gender-parity-dashboard>.  
 21. UN Protocol and Liaison Service, “List of Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations in New York,” July 10, 2024, available at [https://www.un.org/dgacm/sites/www.un.org.dgacm/files/Documents\\_Protocol/headsofmissions.pdf](https://www.un.org/dgacm/sites/www.un.org.dgacm/files/Documents_Protocol/headsofmissions.pdf).  
 22. NYU Center on International Cooperation, “UN Senior Appointments Dashboard.”  
 23. UN General Assembly, *Composition of the Secretariat: Staff Demographics*, UN Doc. A/78/569, November 10, 2023.  
 24. UN, “Results from the 2020 United Nations Survey on Racism,” March 2021, available at [https://ficsa.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Documents/results\\_of\\_the\\_un\\_survey\\_on\\_racism\\_townhall\\_31\\_march\\_2021\\_ra.pdf](https://ficsa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/results_of_the_un_survey_on_racism_townhall_31_march_2021_ra.pdf).  
 25. International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Survey Finds One Third of UN Workers Experienced Sexual Harassment in Last Two Years,” January 29, 2019.  
 26. Dalberg, “Independent Review of the UN System’s Capacity to Deliver on Gender Equality,” February 2023.

# Peace and Security

The peace and security domain has seen the largest decrease in performance, which comes as no surprise considering the outbreak of several devastating armed conflicts in the past few years. The indicators for participation paint a more mixed picture. While there have been superficial improvements in inclusivity, these do not necessarily reflect a broader shift toward inclusion across the UN's peace and security pillar (see Figure 12).

FIGURE 12

## Multilateralism Index 2024 scores: Peace and Security



Source: IEP Calculations

## Participation

The indicators on participation in multilateral peace and security institutions paint a mixed picture. Participation in disarmament treaties (listed in Appendix A) has slightly increased over the past decade but dropped since 2020. This is largely due to the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty in 2020, followed by Russia the following year, as well as Russia's withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2023. Following these withdrawals, Russia and China do not participate in six of the multilateral disarmament treaties, and the US does not participate in five of them.<sup>27</sup> In the past few years, the US and Russia have also withdrawn from bilateral or regional disarmament treaties.<sup>28</sup> These withdrawals reflect growing geopolitical tensions and shifts in the global order that may threaten the long-standing success of agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>29</sup> There are also gaps in the existing disarmament treaty regime. The last major treaty to be agreed on was the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, which none of the nuclear-armed states have signed. There has also been little progress toward new disarmament treaties in critical areas, including the use of weapons in outer space and lethal autonomous weapons systems. This lack of progress stems from ongoing deadlock in the

multilateral disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.<sup>30</sup>

One area where participation seems to have remained relatively steady is UN peacekeeping. This may be counterintuitive considering the breakdown in consensus on peacekeeping mandates in the UN Security Council. The council has not mandated a new UN peacekeeping operation since 2014, while several large peacekeeping operations have closed or are in the process of withdrawing, including in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This has led to a decrease in the number of UN peacekeepers deployed around the world. Nonetheless, peacekeeping appears to retain a broad, cross-regional base of support among UN member states. The number of countries pledging political, financial, and material support for UN peacekeeping has remained steady, as has the number of countries contributing troops and police (see Figure 13).<sup>31</sup>

At the same time, there has been a shift from UN peacekeeping toward regionally led peace operations, which have grown in number over the past decade.<sup>32</sup> This could portend a new model for multilateral peacekeeping, particularly following the 2023 Security Council decision paving the way for UN assessed contributions to be used for African Union-led peace support

27. Russia, China, and the US do not participate in the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; Treaty on Open Skies; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; Convention on Cluster Munitions; and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Russia also does not participate in the Arms Trade Treaty, and China does not participate in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

28. Both the US and Russia withdrew from the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, and Russia withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2023.

29. Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Stephen Herzog, "Durable Institution under Fire? The NPT Confronts Emerging Multipolarity," *Contemporary Security Policy* 43, no. 1 (2022).


30. United Nations, "Secretary-General Urges Conference on Disarmament to Move Humanity Closer to Peace," UN Doc. SG/SM/22139, February 26, 2024.

31. Jenna Russo, "What the 2023 Ministerial Can Tell Us about the Future of Peacekeeping," *IPI Global Observatory*, January 25, 2024; Daniel Forti and Mark J. Wood, "Analyzing Member State Pledges from the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial," *IPI Global Observatory*, February 9, 2022.

32. Claudia Pfeifer Cruz and Jair van der Lijn, "Multilateral Peace Operations in 2023: Developments and Trends," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 29, 2024.

FIGURE 13

**Number of countries contributing uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, 2000–2023**



Source: UN

operations on a case-by-case basis.<sup>33</sup> There is also a risk of growing fragmentation, with countries turning toward bilateral security partners rather than UN or regional operations. However, these shifts are more reflective of factors such as changing security environments and some host countries’ frustrations with the performance of UN peacekeeping operations than of a lack of commitment to UN peacekeeping among UN member states.<sup>34</sup>

In contrast to UN peacekeeping, the UN peacebuilding architecture has attracted increased participation over the past decade—though the amount of resources devoted to multilateral peacebuilding is still dwarfed by that devoted to peacekeeping. Annual contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)—a multilateral pooled fund for peacebuilding activities—have nearly quadrupled since 2013 (see Figure 14). At the same time, following a drop-off in contributions since 2020 and increased demand, the PBF reached its lowest liquidity level to date in 2023.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the PBF relies on voluntary contributions from a small number of countries. Currently, more than half of the PBF’s funds come from just three donors, and more than 90 percent comes from the top 12 donors.


Yet these financial challenges do not tell the whole story. One positive development came in 2023 when the UN General Assembly approved an annual allocation of \$50 million of assessed contributions to the PBF beginning in 2025.<sup>36</sup> This decision could be read as a sign of member states’ commitment to increased multilateral action on peacebuilding and sustaining peace—not only financially but also politically and through nonfinancial contributions.<sup>37</sup> As the 2025 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture approaches, there is also growing attention on the potential of strengthening the UN Peacebuilding Commission as a multilateral forum for promoting peace.<sup>38</sup>

**Performance**

Over the past decade, there have been declines across most measures of performance on peace and security. Over the past three years, there have been declines across all indicators.

FIGURE 14

**Contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, 2006–2023**




Source: MPTF

The most obvious place to look for multilateral performance on peace and security is the UN Security Council. Since 2016, the number of resolutions passed by the council has decreased, with fewer resolutions passed in 2023 than in any year since 2013 (see Figure 15). This reflects two competing trends. On the one hand, the council has not returned to the paralysis seen during periods of the Cold War, as some predicted it would following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The council has continued to pass resolutions on many items on its agenda, including the renewal of most peace operations mandates and sanctions regimes.

On the other hand, the council is far from the level of activity it saw in the early 2010s when it authorized multidimensional peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, Mali, and the Central

33. Jenna Russo and Bitania Tadesse, “UN Support to African Union–Led Peace Support Operations: What Next for Resolution 2719?” International Peace Institute, September 2024.  
 34. On frustrations among host-country governments and publics, see: Julie Gregory and Lisa Sharland, “Host-Country Consent in UN Peacekeeping,” Stimson, September 2023; and Albert Trithart, “Local Perceptions of UN Peacekeeping: A Look at the Data,” International Peace Institute, September 2023.  
 35. UN General Assembly, *Peacebuilding Fund—Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. A/78/779, February 29, 2024.  
 36. UN General Assembly Resolution 76/305 (September 12, 2022), UN Doc. A/RES/76/305.  
 37. Youssef Mahmoud, “Financing for Peacebuilding: Beyond the Money,” *IPI Global Observatory*, October 19, 2022.  
 38. Adam Day and Sophie Buddenhorn, “Elevating the UN Peacebuilding Commission: Proposals for the Summit of the Future,” UN University Center for Policy Research, January 2024; Will Worley, “As Conflicts Spiral, Five Ideas to Bolster the UN’s Peace Commission,” *New Humanitarian*, February 21, 2024.


**FIGURE 15**  
**Total UN Security Council resolutions passed, 2000–2023**



Source: UN

African Republic. There are also signs of deteriorating cooperation on the council over the past year. Since 2022, Russia has vetoed resolutions related to its invasion of Ukraine, humanitarian access corridors into Syria, and arms embargoes on North Korea and Mali, while the US has vetoed several resolutions related to Israel-Palestine.<sup>39</sup> This reflects an upward trend in the number of vetoes (see Figure 16). Between 2020 and 2023, there were 17 vetoes (10 by Russia, 4 by China, and 3 by the US) on 13 resolutions. This is on track to surpass the 40 vetoes cast during the 2010s, which was already a major increase over the previous two decades (9 vetoes in the 1990s and 16 in the 2000s). In an effort to hold these permanent members to account for their use of the veto, in 2023, the General Assembly passed a resolution in which it decided to debate all vetoed Security

**FIGURE 17**  
**Number of conflicts in the world, by type, 2000–2023**




Source: UCDP, IEP Calculations

Council resolutions, in effect requiring the state that cast the veto to justify having done so.

A more dramatic deterioration is visible when looking at the performance of the multilateral system in preventing conflict and building peace. Between 2013 and 2022, the number of active armed conflicts in the world rose from 39 to 55 (see Figure 17). While the plurality of these conflicts are intrastate, there has also been an uptick in interstate conflict, most notably with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.<sup>40</sup> The past decade has also seen a sharp rise in the number of internationalized intrastate conflicts where the conflict parties receive support from third-party states, though this has dropped off over the past few years.<sup>41</sup>

**FIGURE 16**  
**Total UN Security Council vetoes, 2000–2023**



Source: UN, IEP Calculations


39. Richard Gowan, “How the World Lost Faith in the UN,” *Foreign Affairs*, November 9, 2023.

40. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program classifies the Israel-Palestine conflict as intrastate.

41. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “UCDP Charts, Graphs and Maps,” available at <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/>.



FIGURE 18  
Deaths associated with conflict, 2013–2022



Source: UCDP, IEP Calculations


Armed conflicts have increased not only in number but also in intensity. While the overall number of fatalities has fluctuated over the past decade, it has consistently been higher than in the decade prior (see Figure 18). There was an especially dramatic spike in 2022, which had nearly twice as many fatalities as the year before, making it the deadliest year since 1994 (the year of the Rwandan genocide), largely due to the wars in Ukraine and Ethiopia.<sup>42</sup> The number of fatalities fell sharply in 2023 following a cease-fire in Ethiopia, but they remained high, particularly following the outbreak of war in Israel-Palestine and Sudan. Looking beyond armed conflict, the past decade has also seen a large increase in fatalities from non-state conflict, including organized crime, which has most recently been driven by rising levels of violence in Latin America.

A parallel trend has been the drastic decrease in the durability of peace agreements over the past decade. While nearly half of peace agreements lasted more than a year between 2003 and 2013, the proportion of lasting peace agreements fell to less than 20 percent between 2013 and 2023 (see Figure 19). There has also been a decline in the number of peace agreements being reached over the past three decades, from a high of more than 90 agreements in 1994 to just over 30 in 2023.<sup>44</sup> These declines are likely attributable to broader trends in armed conflict, such as the increasing regionalization of conflicts, which can reduce the incentives of conflict parties to reach and adhere to peace agreements.

## Inclusivity

Inclusivity is the one dimension where the Multilateralism Index's peace and security domain has clearly improved. However, major barriers to inclusivity remain, particularly within the UN Security Council. The five veto-holding permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—continue to wield disproportionate power, and major institutional reform is unlikely anytime soon, though the Summit of the Future has ensured that the issue remains on the UN

FIGURE 19  
Lasting peace agreements, 2003–2013 vs. 2013–2023



Source: PA-X, IEP Calculations

agenda. Nonetheless, over the past decade, the ten elected members of the council have increasingly coordinated in an effort to make the council's work more inclusive, transparent, and accountable.<sup>45</sup>

One mechanism for making the Security Council more inclusive has been Arria-formula meetings. These meetings were initiated in the 1990s as a way for council members to have more informal discussions and to increase their engagement with civil society. Most Arria-formula meetings now include briefings from civil society representatives.<sup>46</sup> The number of Arria-formula meetings with civil society representation increased sharply in 2019 and has since declined slightly but remains high (see Figure 20). This could reflect in part the increasing accessibility of these meetings when the Security Council shifted to meeting virtually at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this increase in Arria-formula meetings has not been universally welcomed. It has occurred in part due to Russia's sharp increase in its use of this meeting format since 2020: before 2020, Russia had organized a total of four Arria-formula meetings; since then, it has organized 25. As a result, some have pointed to the increased politicization of these meetings, reflecting the growing politicization of all areas of the council's work.<sup>47</sup> Growing numbers of meetings can also be a burden for council members, particularly when member states use these meetings to push their national interests rather than to improve the council's efficacy or inclusion.

42. Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg, "Organized Violence 1989–2022, and the Return of Conflict between States," *Security Dialogue* 60, no. 4 (2023).

43. Lasting peace agreements are understood as those that have been effective one year after implementation (with effectiveness measured as a country experiencing fewer than 100 battle deaths each year in the first five years following the signing of the agreement).

44. Two-third of the agreements in 2023 were in just one country (Colombia). PeaceRep, "Peace Agreements in 2023: Insights from the PA-X Database," July 2024.

45. Arthur Boutellis, "Lessons from E10 Engagement on the Security Council," International Peace Institute, November 2022.

46. Security Council Report, "Arria-Formula Meetings," December 2020.

47. Stéphanie Fillion, "Does the UN Security Council Have an Arria-Formula Problem?" *PassBlue*, July 6, 2021.




The Security Council has also become more inclusive in regard to gender, though major gaps remain. Over the past decade, there have been gradual increases in the share of women serving as permanent representatives and deputy permanent representatives for council members, among speakers invited to brief the council, and among members of panels and groups of experts mandated by the council—though these increases still fall well short of gender parity.<sup>48</sup> Yet at the same time, there has been a decrease in the number of Security Council decisions that mention women or gender—2023 had the fewest such decisions since 2003.<sup>49</sup>

Looking beyond the Security Council, there have also been steady increases in the proportion of women deployed to UN peacekeeping operations. Troop- and police-contributing countries are currently exceeding UN targets for increasing women’s deployment as police officers, though they are falling short for military personnel, who make up the vast majority of uniformed peacekeepers.<sup>50</sup> As a result, the overall proportion of uniformed women peacekeepers is just 10 percent, while none of the current force commanders are women (see Figure 21). On the civilian side, just over a third of peacekeepers are women, both among all staff and at the leadership level.<sup>51</sup> Institutional and cultural barriers continue to impede not only the deployment of more women peacekeepers but also their full, meaningful, and safe participation once deployed.<sup>52</sup>

One challenge is that increased inclusion at the UN does not always translate into increased inclusion on the ground. For example, more than 40 percent of the members of UN mediation support teams are women, and the UN systematically provides gender expertise to peace negotiations it is leading.<sup>53</sup> Yet women’s representation among the delegates to UN-led peace processes


FIGURE 20  
**Arria-formula meetings with civil society representation, 2000–2023**



Source: UN

stood at just 16 percent in 2022—down from 23 percent two years earlier—and women are almost completely absent from non-UN-led peace processes.<sup>54</sup> The past decade has also seen a decline in the proportion of peace agreements that reference women, girls, or gender.<sup>55</sup>

FIGURE 21  
**Proportion of uniformed peacekeeping personnel that are women, 2009–2023**




Source: UN

48. UN Security Council Affairs Division, “Women at the Security Council,” available at <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/women-security-council>. These increases partly reflect the efforts of several elected members of the council to commit to prioritizing women, peace, and security. See: Security Council Report, “Women, Peace and Security: One Year of Shared Commitments,” November 2022.  
 49. UN Security Council Affairs Division, “Women and Peace and Security Dashboard,” available at <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/women-and-peace-and-security-dashboard>.  
 50. These targets were established by the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018–2028.  
 51. UN Security Council, *Women, Peace and Security—Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2023/725, September 23, 2023.  
 52. Marta Ghittoni, Léa Lehoucq, and Callum Watson, “Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations: Baseline Study,” July 2018.  
 53. UN Doc. S/2023/725.  
 54. United Nations, “Stronger Government Action, Financing Key to Better Protect Women during Armed Conflict, Involve Them in Peace Processes, Speakers Tell Security Council,” UN Doc. SC/15463, October 25, 2023.  
 55. PeaceRep, “Peace Agreements in 2023: Insights from the PA-X Database,” July 2024.

# Human Rights

Globally, there has been a broad deterioration in human rights over the past decade.<sup>56</sup> Nonetheless, the Multilateralism Index reveals that member states have maintained—and even increased—their participation in many aspects of the multilateral human rights system, reflecting an ongoing desire to engage in and influence that system even among states with poor human rights records. There have also been improvements in terms of inclusivity (see Figure 22).

FIGURE 22:  
Multilateralism Index 2024 Scores: Human Rights



Source: IEP Calculations

## Participation

Overall, participation in the UN human rights system has increased over the past decade across numerous multilateral mechanisms. The depth of this participation has varied. For example, the number of states that have ratified the core international human rights treaties (listed in Appendix A) has slightly increased over the past decade. However, several large countries, including the US, China, and India, are among the states that have ratified the fewest treaties. Moreover, many of those states that have ratified the treaties have ratified them with reservations or have not followed through on their reporting obligations. In fact, most states are currently behind on their reporting obligations under human rights treaties they have ratified, leading to a total of nearly 500 overdue reports, more than a third of which have been overdue for more than ten years.<sup>57</sup>

Most member states have continued to engage with the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council. Member states in the Human Rights Council have also continued to mandate new special procedures over the past decade. Special procedures mandate holders are independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human rights, including by


visiting countries.<sup>58</sup> Human rights mandate holders have now visited the vast majority of countries, including every country with a population over 10 million except one.<sup>59</sup> Even North Korea has accepted such a visit, and in 2023, the Taliban government of Afghanistan accepted a visit by the Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls. Moreover, the number of countries that have issued a standing invitation for visits by special procedures mandate holders has steadily increased over the past decade (see Figure 23). However, even countries with standing invitations routinely decline or fail to affirm requests to visit, which puts into question the extent to which standing invitations reflect meaningful commitment to the international human rights system.<sup>60</sup> There is also wide regional variation in the countries that have issued standing invitations, ranging from over 90 percent of countries in the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) and Eastern Europe to under 50 percent of countries in Africa and the Asia-Pacific.<sup>61</sup>

All member states have also continued to participate in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a mechanism for countries to review each other’s human rights records. Since 2008, all 193 member states have been reviewed three times, with a fourth cycle beginning in 2022.<sup>62</sup> As part of the process, states can make recommendations to the states under review, and those states

56. See, for example: Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024,” 2024; Amnesty International, “The State of the World’s Human Rights,” April 2024.  
 57. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “UN Treaty Body Database,” available at [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx).  
 58. OHCHR, “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council,” available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures-human-rights-council>.  
 59. OHCHR, “Country Visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998,” available at <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=completed&lang=en>.  
 60. Ibid.  
 61. OHCHR, “Special Procedures Standing Invitations Percentages Table,” available at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/SP/StandingInvitationsPercentagesTable.pdf>.  
 62. UN Human Rights Council, “Universal Periodic Review,” available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/upr-home>.

FIGURE 23

### Percentage of countries with standing invitations for special procedures visits, 2000–2023




Source: OHCHR

can decide whether to formally accept those recommendations. Over the past decade, states have consistently accepted more than three-quarters of all recommendations.<sup>63</sup> However, even when states accept recommendations, the UPR has no mechanisms to follow through on implementation, and there is little evidence that the UPR systematically leads states to change their policies to improve human rights protections.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, there is wide variation in the quality and specificity of the recommendations from one review to another. In some cases, the proportion of accepted recommendations may also be inflated by friendly states on the council submitting soft-ball recommendations.

Participation in multilateral human rights institutions can also be assessed on the basis of voluntary contributions to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which have more than doubled over the past decade (see Figure 24). OHCHR is heavily reliant on voluntary contributions, which make up around two-thirds of its budget compared to just one-third for assessed contributions. Despite the increase in voluntary contributions, total contributions still fall well short of the amount OHCHR has indicated it needs to fulfill its responsibilities, which have steadily grown without a commensurate increase in assessed contributions.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, a growing share of voluntary contributions are earmarked. This means that donor countries to OHCHR, which are overwhelmingly Western, fund the human rights priorities that matter most to them, allowing them to shape the direction of the UN human rights system.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, while increased contributions to OHCHR do indicate an increased commitment by certain member states to the UN human rights system, this funding model could also undermine the multilateral nature of that system by exacerbating the perception that it is dominated by Western countries.

FIGURE 24

### OHCHR state funding, 2008–2023



Source: OHCHR

63. UPR Info, "Database of UPR Recommendations," available at <https://upr-info-database.uwazi.io/en/>.

64. See, for example: Noam Schimmel, "The UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review as a Rhetorical Battlefield of Nations: Useful Tool or Futile Performance?" *World Affairs* 186, no. 1 (2023).

65. OHCHR, "OHCHR's Funding and Budget," available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/funding-and-budget>.

66. Baumann and Haug, "Financing the United Nations: Status Quo, Challenges and Reform Options."


## Performance

Despite ongoing participation in the UN human rights system, states' performance on human rights has not improved over the past decade. According to the V-Dem human rights index, which assesses a wide range of freedoms, human rights protections have been steadily deteriorating for the past decade across nearly every region of the world (see Figure 25).<sup>67</sup> The past decade has also seen a gradual erosion in human rights as measured by the Political Terror Scale, which focuses on violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state (see Figure 26).

What is especially striking is that members of the UN Human Rights Council have consistently had an even worse human rights record than the world as a whole. In fact, the decline in human rights scores over the past decade has been even steeper among these states (see Figure 26). This reflects a combination of two factors: the overall global decline in human rights scores and countries with particularly bad human rights records being voted onto the council. For example, there was a notable drop in the aggregate human rights score of Human Rights Council members in 2020 when several countries with particularly bad human rights records were all voted onto the council.<sup>68</sup> This could indicate that many states are engaging in the Human Rights Council less out of a desire to foster multilateral action on human rights than to shape the direction of the human rights architecture.


As with the Security Council in the peace and security domain, the deterioration in performance on human rights has not translated directly into decreased output at the Human Rights Council. In fact, the Human Rights Council passed more resolutions in 2023 than in any other year in the past decade (see Figure 27). This has been possible in part because, like the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council passes resolutions by majority vote, and no countries have veto power. Nonetheless, many areas of the council's work remain contentious. For

FIGURE 25  
Global average Human Rights Index Score, 2013–2023



Source: V-Dem


FIGURE 26  
Global and UNHRC member average PTS Human Rights Score, 2008–2023



Source: Political Terror Scale, IEP Calculations

example, the past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the number of “hostile amendments” proposed by more socially conservative states looking to dilute the scope of resolutions, particularly in areas such as gender, sexual orientation and gender identity, and sexual and reproductive rights.<sup>69</sup> Before 2013, the council had voted on no more than four amendments per year, while this number has exceeded 50 in every year since 2020.

FIGURE 27  
Number of resolutions passed by UN Human Rights Council, 2006–2023



Source: UN

67. The V-Dem human rights index “captures the extent to which people are free from government torture, political killings, and forced labor; they have property rights; and enjoy the freedoms of movement, religion, expression, and association.” Our World in Data, “Human Rights Index,” available at [https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-index-vdem?tab=chart&country=-OWID\\_WRL](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-index-vdem?tab=chart&country=-OWID_WRL).

68. See, for example: Steven Hoffman et al., “International Treaties Have Mostly Failed to Produce Their Intended Effects,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 119, no. 32 (2022).

69. Universal Rights Group, “The Human Rights Council in 2023,” December 2023.


## Inclusivity

The UN human rights system has made strides in terms of inclusivity over the past decade. The number of NGO observers at the UN Human Rights Council has been on an upward trajectory, despite some fluctuations following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 28). In general, the Human Rights Council is more open to civil society participation than the Security Council or General Assembly. Civil society also can participate through mechanisms like the Universal Periodic Review and special procedures.

Human rights is also one of the domains whose institutions have historically been closest to gender parity. More than half of OHCHR staff have been women for the entire past decade, and women now outnumber men even at the director level (see Figure 29). There has also been progress in other parts of the human rights system. For example, women now outnumber men among members of treaty bodies, and nearly two-thirds of special procedures mandate holders are women.<sup>70</sup> Human rights mechanisms also systematically address gender equality. Women's rights are one of the most common focuses of recommendations made through the UPR, and several of the special procedures mandate holders are focused on gender-related issues.<sup>71</sup>


There is little concrete data on geographic inclusivity within the UN human rights system. Compared to the Security Council, representation on the Human Rights Council is more regionally balanced. Nonetheless, as noted above, active participation in mechanisms like the UPR and special procedures tends to be skewed toward WEOG countries.

FIGURE 29  
Gender parity in OHCHR staff and leadership, 2013, 2018, and 2023



Source: OHCHR

FIGURE 28  
Number of NGO observers in UN Human Rights Council sessions, 2006–2022



Source: OHCHR

70. OHCHR, "Gender Composition of the Treaty Bodies as of January 2023," available at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/treaty-bodies/elections/2023-01-31/Gender-composition-Treaty-Bodies-012023.pdf>; OHCHR, "Current and Former Mandate Holders (Existing Mandates)," May 1, 2024, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures-human-rights-council/current-and-former-mandate-holders-existing-mandates>.


71. Most recently, in 2016, the Human Rights Council mandated an independent expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

# Climate Action

The Multilateralism Index’s climate indicators point to mixed trends in participation in and performance on multilateral climate action. However, even where trends are in the right direction, as on climate finance and renewable energy, progress has been far slower than what is required to address the climate crisis. The Index’s indicators on inclusivity show clearer improvements (see Figure 30).

FIGURE 30

## Multilateralism Index 2024 Scores: Climate Action



Source: IEP Calculations

### Participation

By some measures, participation in multilateral climate action has been robust over the past decade. Participation in climate agreements (listed in Appendix A) is nearly universal and has changed little over the past decade. Nearly every member state has signed on to the Paris Agreement. In addition, nearly every country has submitted a nationally determined contribution (NDC) laying out its commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as required under the agreement.<sup>72</sup>

However, countries’ commitments under these NDCs remain insufficient. Of the world’s seven largest polluters, none are currently implementing policies that align with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5° Celsius over preindustrial levels—a deterioration since 2013 (see Figure 31).<sup>73</sup> Even as member states have submitted revised NDCs, most of these have not substantially raised the level of ambition.<sup>74</sup> The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has found that current NDCs as of 2023 would still increase emissions by 8.8 percent by 2030, a slight improvement from 10.6 percent the year prior but well short of the 43 percent decrease required to meet the 1.5°C target.<sup>75</sup>

Climate finance is another area where participation may seem robust but remains inadequate. Multilateral climate finance has risen significantly over the past decade, as have bilateral and private climate finance (see Figure 32).<sup>76</sup> Moreover, multilateral climate finance has increased as a share of total climate finance compared to bilateral finance, which can help reduce the earmarking of funds and improve the coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness of contributions.<sup>77</sup>

Yet the overall level of climate finance still falls far short of what is required. In 2009, states agreed on the goal of mobilizing \$100 billion of climate finance per year by 2020. They finally reached this goal in 2022, two years behind schedule. But even this \$100 billion goal was an arbitrary number that does not reflect the actual amount required. It has been estimated that over \$1 trillion per year will be required to meet global needs related to mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.<sup>78</sup> Many issues remain to be sorted out as countries work toward agreement on a new climate finance goal at the 2024 UN Climate Change Conference (COP29).<sup>79</sup>

72. Climate Watch, “Explore Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs),” available at <https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ndcs-explore>.

73. These are China, the US, India, the EU, Russia, Japan, and Brazil.

74. Climate Action Tracker, “Climate Target Update Tracker,” available at <https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker-2022/>.

75. UNFCCC, “New Analysis of National Climate Plans: Insufficient Progress Made, COP28 Must Set Stage for Immediate Action,” November 2023.

76. Multilateral climate finance comes from funds such as the Adaptation Fund, Climate Investment Funds, Global Environment Facility, and Green Climate Fund. It will also include the new Loss and Damage Fund, which is being administered by the World Bank.


77. At the same time, the UNFCCC itself has increasingly come to rely on earmarked funds, which could give donor countries disproportionate influence over its work. Baumann and Haug, “Financing the United Nations: Status Quo, Challenges and Reform Options.”

78. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Considerations for a New Collective Quantified Goal: Bringing Accountability, Trust and Developing Country Needs to Climate Finance,” 2023; UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, “First Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties Related to Implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement,” 2021.

79. See: Natalia Alayza, Gaia Larsen, and David Waskow, “What Could the New Climate Finance Goal Look Like? 7 Elements Under Negotiation,” World Resources Institute, May 2024.

FIGURE 31


## Adherence to global climate policy goals among 7 of the world's largest polluters, 2011–2023



Source: Climate Action Tracker, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 32

## Climate finance (and the USD 100 billion goal), 2013–2022



Source: OECD

## Performance


Considering the shortcomings in participation in multilateral climate action, it comes as no surprise that the multilateral climate architecture has not delivered adequate results. While the trends tend to be in the right direction, change is happening too slowly. Carbon emissions have continued to rise following a momentary drop in 2020 due to reduced economic activity at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Emissions reached a new high of more than 37 gigatons of carbon dioxide in 2023, an increase of 1.3 percent over 2022 (see Figure 33). This remains well above the maximum of 27 gigatons required to be compatible with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C target.<sup>80</sup>

This rise in carbon emissions reflects a lack of adequate progress in decarbonizing the global economy. One example is electricity, which is the economic sector that accounts for the most carbon emissions. The share of electricity generated from renewable sources has steadily grown over the past decade, rising to a high of more than 30 percent in 2023 (see Figure 34). But faster change is needed: renewable energy capacity needs to be tripled by 2030 to keep the 1.5°C target within reach.<sup>81</sup>

This pace of change—not just toward renewable energy but toward broader decarbonization—will require policy changes that go beyond what is currently in place. For example, there has been a growing push to tax carbon emissions, which many scientists and economists see as critical to meeting the 1.5°C target. Carbon-pricing instruments have been slowly gaining traction over the past decade, now covering 24 percent of global

FIGURE 34


### Electricity generated from renewable sources, 2000–2023



Source: IEA

FIGURE 33

### Net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, global, 2000–2022




Source: Global Carbon Project

80. Climate Action Tracker, “Emissions Gap,” available at <https://climateactiontracker.org/global/cat-emissions-gaps/>.  
 81. International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2023,” October 2023.



FIGURE 35

### Global average climate-related tax revenue, 2000–2022




Source: OECD

emissions, up from 7 percent a decade ago.<sup>82</sup> Yet once again, this growth falls short of what is required. In fact, global revenue from climate-related taxes has declined as a share of GDP over the past decade, partly due to governments reducing energy taxes on consumers in response to rising prices (see Figure 35).<sup>83</sup> There has also been no multilateral action to price carbon at the global level, whether through a global carbon-pricing framework or global taxes on sectors such as shipping, air travel, and fossil fuel production and subsidies.<sup>84</sup>

Compared to climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation is more difficult to measure. There is no clear numerical target comparable to the 1.5°C target. While negotiators at the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) agreed on a set of targets for assessing progress toward the Global Goal on Adaptation, they have yet to agree on indicators for these targets.<sup>85</sup> By some measures, such as the environmental resilience score used here, there has been little change in progress toward adaptation over the past decade (see Figure 36).<sup>86</sup> A growing

FIGURE 36

### Average global environmental resilience score, adapted ND-Gain Index, 2013–2022



Source: IMF


number of countries has submitted national adaptation plans outlining how they will reduce their vulnerability to climate change, and many have reported on adaptation actions they have taken.<sup>87</sup> As with mitigation, however, there remains a major gap between the level of resources required to adapt to climate change and the level of adaptation finance available. In 2023, the adaptation needs of developing countries were estimated as being 10–18 times greater than the level of international public financing provided.<sup>88</sup>

## Inclusivity

The indicators used in the Multilateralism Index showed more positive progress on inclusivity. There has been a steady increase in the number of NGOs admitted as observers to UN climate change conferences (COPs), with particularly large increases in 2021 and 2023 (see Figure 37). However, 67 percent of admitted NGOs are from WEOG countries, indicating that civil society

FIGURE 37

### NGOs admitted to COP, 2000–2023



Source: UNFCCC

82. World Bank, "State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024," May 2024.

83. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Effective Carbon Rates 2023: Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions through Taxes and Emissions Trading," November 2023.

84. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein and Farrukh Iqbal Khan, "The Case for a Global Carbon-Pricing Framework," *Foreign Affairs*, September 11, 2023; Michael Franczak, "Who Pays for Climate Action?" *Foreign Policy*, June 3, 2024.

85. Olivia Fielding, "Decoding the Global Goal on Adaptation at COP28," International Peace Institute, March 2024. For potential indicators of adaptation, see also: Anna Cabre, Olivia Fielding, and Michael Weisberg, "Refining the Global Goal on Adaptation ahead of COP28," International Peace Institute, November 2023.

86. This score reflects the difference between countries' readiness to adapt to climate change and their vulnerability to climate change.

87. UNFCCC, "National Adaptation Plans 2023: Progress in the Formulation and Implementation of NAPs," 2023.

88. UN Environment Programme, "Adaptation Gap Report 2023," November 2023.

from the Global South is heavily underrepresented in multilateral climate fora.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, inclusion of civil society climate activists has come alongside the inclusion of fossil fuel lobbyists advocating against transformative climate action. By one count, a record high of nearly 2,500 fossil fuel lobbyists were granted access to COP28 in 2023.<sup>90</sup>


The UNFCCC has also seen progress in terms of women’s inclusion in climate negotiations, though it remains far short of gender parity. The percentage of women on UNFCCC boards and bodies has remained relatively stable over the past decade, at around 35 percent, while the percentage of boards and bodies that have women as chairs, co-chairs, and vice chairs has increased substantially (see Figure 38).<sup>91</sup> As in other domains, however, progress toward gender parity has been slower among member states than within the UN itself. Women’s representation among member states’ delegates to COPs has not substantially

increased over the past decade and has never exceeded 38 percent.<sup>92</sup> Beyond the representation of women negotiators, gender has also gained prominence as a topic at the COPs, especially following the adoption of a Gender Action Plan at COP25 in 2019.<sup>93</sup>

The lack of inclusion of youth in multilateral climate negotiations has been a long-standing point of frustration for many climate activists, especially considering the prominent role of young people in the global climate movement. While it is hard to quantitatively measure progress on youth inclusion, there seems to have been some progress recently, particularly at COP28. For example, COP28 included the first youth climate champion and the first International Youth Climate Delegate Program, and some delegations made concerted efforts to include more youth representatives.<sup>94</sup>

FIGURE 38

**Women's membership on UNFCCC boards and bodies, 2013, 2018, and 2023**



Source: WEDO

89. UNFCCC, "Statistics on Admission," available at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/statistics#Statistics-on-admission>.

90. Kick Big Polluters Out, "Record Number of Fossil Fuel Lobbyists at COP28," December 5, 2023.

91. For a list of these boards and bodies, see: UNFCCC, "Constituted Bodies," available at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/constituted-bodies>.

92. Gender Climate Tracker, "Women's Participation on Party Delegations," available at <https://genderclimatetracker.org/womens-participation-party-delegations>.

93. UNFCCC, "The Gender Action Plan," available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/gender/workstreams/the-gender-action-plan>.


94. Sarah Yerkes, "COP28's Inclusion Efforts Were a Positive Step for Climate," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2023.

# Public Health

The Multilateralism Index registers an increase in participation in the global public health system over the past decade, in part reflecting increased engagement in response to the sharp rise in public health needs following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Performance has been more mixed, largely due to the ongoing impacts of COVID-19 on global public health, as has progress on inclusivity (see Figure 39).

FIGURE 39

## Multilateralism Index 2024 Scores: Public Health



Source: IEP Calculations


## Participation

Participation in global public health has generally increased over the past decade, due in part to the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the pandemic underscored the limits of international political will to pursue multilateral action to address international threats to public health.<sup>95</sup> These limits have come into sharp focus during the ongoing negotiations on an international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the need for such an agreement, particularly following the major shortcomings in multilateral cooperation around equitable vaccine distribution. However, negotiations have run into numerous stumbling blocks and were not completed by June 2024 as originally intended.

One area where the negotiations have been successful is in reaching agreement on amendments to the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR).<sup>96</sup> The IHR lay out countries' obligations to monitor and report on public health emergencies with the potential to cross borders. The proportion of countries complying with the IHRs' reporting requirements has increased over the past decade, reaching an all-time high of 99 percent in 2023 (see Figure 40). This indicates that participation in this mechanism remains robust, despite shortfalls in performance.

FIGURE 40

## International Health Regulations (IHR) country reporting, 2010–2023



Source: WHO

95. See, for example: Jennifer M. Welsh, "International Cooperation Failures in the Face of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Learning from Past Efforts to Address Common Threats," *American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 2022.  
96. WHO, "World Health Assembly Agreement Reached on Wide-Ranging, Decisive Package of Amendments to Improve the International Health Regulations," June 1, 2024.


Similarly, despite the shortcomings in the multilateral response to the pandemic and some governments' criticism of the World Health Organization (WHO) at the pandemic's outset, overall commitment to WHO shows signs of increasing. The pandemic agreement—if it comes to fruition—would likely strengthen WHO's role in coordinating pandemic responses. In addition, member states' voluntary contributions to WHO have significantly increased since 2020 (see Figure 41). While this increase in contributions is a sign of member states' commitment to WHO, it also speaks to broader problems with WHO's funding model. WHO is heavily reliant on voluntary contributions, with only 20 percent of its budget coming from assessed contributions, and the vast majority of these voluntary contributions are earmarked. However, in 2022, member states approved a 20 percent increase in assessed contributions to WHO with the aim of having assessed contributions cover 50 percent of WHO's budget by 2030—a positive sign for member states' commitment to strengthening the organization.<sup>97</sup>

### Performance

The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on global performance on public health. After decades of steady, uninterrupted growth, the global average life expectancy fell after the outbreak of COVID-19 and, as of 2022, it had still not recovered to pre-pandemic levels (see Figure 42). This can largely be attributed to the direct and indirect effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on mortality. Similarly, after decades of steady increase, the proportion of births attended by skilled personnel has plateaued around 90 percent since 2019 (see Figure 43). This is partly attributable to the pandemic's disruption of basic healthcare services. It also speaks to the difficulty of achieving further progress in the poorest countries with the weakest public health infrastructure, as most high- and middle-income countries have already achieved near-universal coverage.

Vaccine coverage also dropped significantly following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, though it had already been largely stagnant at around 86 percent for the past decade (see Figure 44). This drop is largely attributable to the impact of lockdowns and health service disruptions, as well as broader weaknesses in overstretched health systems and some families' growing reluctance to get their children vaccinated.<sup>98</sup> Coverage

FIGURE 42  
Global life expectancy, 2000–2022




Source: World Bank

rebounded slightly in 2022 but remained stagnant in 2023. It has still not recovered to pre-pandemic levels.<sup>99</sup>

Not all areas of deteriorating performance are directly attributable to the pandemic. For example, while countries' reporting under the IHR remains robust, their average capacity to implement the IHR began declining in 2016 and has yet to recover (see Figure 45). Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, many states also failed to comply with the IHR, undermining global cooperation on the pandemic response. For example, some states were delayed in notifying WHO of virus outbreaks; implemented policies that violated WHO guidance, such as discriminatory lockdowns, trade restrictions, and travel bans; and took nationalist measures that violated IHR requirements to collaborate.<sup>100</sup> The recently agreed amendments to the IHR aim to address some of these shortcomings, including by better defining a “pandemic emergency,” establishing a mechanism for coordinating financing, and establishing new bodies to monitor implementation.<sup>101</sup>

FIGURE 41  
WHO country revenue, 2012–2023



SOURCE: WHO

97. WHO, “World Health Assembly Agrees Historic Decision to Sustainably Finance WHO,” May 24, 2022.


98. UNICEF, “The State of the World’s Children 2023: For Every Child, Vaccination,” April 2023.

99. WHO and UNICEF, “Global Childhood Immunization Levels Stalled in 2023, Leaving Many without Life-Saving Protection,” July 15, 2024.

100. See, for example: Benjamin Mason Meier, “Implementation of the International Health Regulations: Evolving Reforms to Address Historical Limitations,” in *Oxford Commentary on the International Health Regulations* (forthcoming).


101. Chloe Searchinger, “The New Amendments to the International Health Regulations,” *Think Global Health*, June 4, 2024.

**FIGURE 43**  
**Global average births attended by skilled health personnel, 2000–2022**




Source: WHO

**FIGURE 44**  
**Vaccine coverage, 2000–2022**



Source: World Bank


**FIGURE 45**  
**International Health Regulations (IHR) global capacity, 2010–2023**



SOURCE: WHO

FIGURE 46

**Gender parity in WHO staff and leadership, 2013, 2018, and 2023**



Source: WHO

**Inclusivity**


As with several of the other domains, gender inclusion is one area where WHO has clearly improved. After years of steady progress, WHO reached gender parity among its staff in 2023 (see Figure 46). While women’s representation at the director level lags, it has also seen steady progress. At the same time, this increased representation of women has not always come alongside the mainstreaming of gender across WHO’s work, and the negotiations on a pandemic instrument have been criticized for failing to adequately consider gender.<sup>102</sup>

Progress in WHO’s inclusion of non-state actors has been more complex. WHO has long struggled with the question of how best to engage with non-state actors, particularly in the private sector. In 2016, the World Health Assembly adopted the Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA), largely in response to criticism over corporate influence over WHO’s work. This led to a temporary drop in the number of non-state actors that had official relations with WHO (see Figure 47). Despite this change, FENSA has been critiqued for not going far enough in reducing corporate influence over the organization.<sup>103</sup>

At the same time, NGOs continue to face barriers to engaging with WHO. Member states sometimes fail to approve NGOs applying for official relations status even if they meet all the criteria and have been approved by the WHO Secretariat.<sup>104</sup> Some member states have also increasingly opposed granting official relations status to NGOs working on sexual and reproductive health, reflecting the growing politicization of this topic.<sup>105</sup>

FIGURE 47

**WHO non-state actor official relations, 2000–2023**



Source: WHO

102. Clare Wenham and Sara E. Davies, “WHO Runs the World—(Not) Girls: Gender Neglect during Global Health Emergencies,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 24, no. 3 (2022); Sara E. Davies and Clare Wenham, “Gender Inclusion in the Pandemic Agreement: A Growing Gap?” *International Peace Institute*, March 2024.

103. Kent Buse and Sarah Hawkes, “Sitting on the FENSA: WHO Engagement with Industry,” *Lancet* 388, no. 10043 (2016); Karlin Seitz, “FENSA—A Fence against Undue Corporate Influence?” *Brot für die Welt, MISEREOR*, and *Global Policy Forum*, September 2016.

104. Global Health Council, “Sign-on Letter: Support to Uphold the WHO FENSA Process,” April 4, 2024, available at <https://globalhealth.org/media/sign-on-letter-support-to-uphold-the-who-fensa-process/>.


105. Health Policy Watch, “WHO Executive Board Votes to Recognize Center for Reproductive Rights but Egypt Promises to ‘Escalate’ Issue to WHA,” April 6, 2024, available at <https://healthpolicy-watch.news/who-executive-board-votes-to-recognize-center-for-reproductive-health-egypt-promises-to-escalate-issue-to-wha/>.

# Trade

Despite improvements in some indicators, participation in the multilateral framework for trade has long been stagnant—if not worsening—since the latest round of multilateral trade talks effectively ended in 2015. Performance has also been mixed and is difficult to assess due to the trade volatility caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and heightened geopolitical competition.<sup>106</sup> While inclusivity has improved based on the indicators used in the Multilateralism Index, it is difficult to assess geographic inclusivity, which is the biggest fault line in multilateral trade cooperation (see Figure 48).

FIGURE 48

## Multilateralism Index 2024 Scores: Trade



Source: IEP Calculations


## Participation

The World Trade Organization (WTO) remains the only truly multilateral forum for negotiating on global trade, and most countries are now members, with little change over the past decade. However, multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO have been effectively suspended since 2015. The latest negotiations—the Doha round—which had been taking place off and on since 2001, were intended to forge agreement on a multilateral trading system that would be more favorable to developing countries.<sup>107</sup> This was seen as particularly important considering that the previous round of negotiations—the Uruguay round—which had concluded in 1994, had put in place a set of rules widely seen as favoring developed countries.<sup>108</sup> The ongoing failure to advance multilateral trade negotiations can therefore be seen as a negative sign for multilateralism, even as membership in the WTO remains robust. The paralysis in global trade negotiations has contributed to the growth of regional trade agreements.<sup>109</sup>

Even within the existing WTO framework, adherence to trade rules has fallen off sharply over the past decade. This is starkly visible in declining participation in the WTO dispute-resolution system, primarily due to the paralysis of the Appellate Body. When one state believes another state is not abiding by WTO rules, the first step it can take is to submit a request for consultation. Beginning in 2019, the number of requests for

FIGURE 49

## WTO requests for dispute-related consultations, 2000–2023



Source: WTO


106. UNCTAD, "Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2023," 2024.

107. WTO, "Doha Development Agenda," available at [https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/coher\\_e/mdg\\_e/dda\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/mdg_e/dda_e.htm).108. See, for example: J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogués, "The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations," *The World Economy* 25, no. 3 (2002).109. WTO, "Regional Trade Agreements," available at [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/region\\_e/region\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm).

consultation began to decline (see Figure 49). This coincided with the US blocking the appointment of new members to the WTO’s Appellate Body in protest of its perceived overreach and unfair rulings related to US interests—a policy that remains in force today. As the terms of the body’s members expired without the appointment of new members, the body became nonoperational. As a result, requests for consultation fell to an all-time low in 2020, partly also due to disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. While there was a slight uptick in 2021, as of 2023, the number of requests had still not recovered, with just six requests last year. While most member states have been seeking to resolve this impasse, the US has insisted on broader reforms to the WTO before reviving the dispute-resolution system.<sup>110</sup> With the WTO’s formal dispute-resolution mechanism stalled, some member states, including the US and China, have turned instead to unilateral retaliatory measures that bypass the WTO.

Another place to look to assess participation in multilateral trade institutions is UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD).<sup>111</sup> UNCTAD is an intergovernmental organization focused on helping developing countries benefit from economic globalization. Voluntary financial contributions to UNCTAD could thus be seen as an indicator of commitment to a more equitable multilateral trade system. Voluntary contributions have trended up slightly over the past decade but have fluctuated significantly from year to year (see Figure 50). As with many other UN entities, UNCTAD remains heavily dependent on voluntary contributions, especially for its technical assistance to developing countries.<sup>112</sup> This dependence can give wealthier countries disproportionate influence over UNCTAD’s activities, a potentially problematic arrangement considering UNCTAD’s mandate to promote the interests of developing countries.<sup>113</sup>

FIGURE 50  
UNCTAD state funding, 2000–2022



Source: UNCTAD


## Performance

Despite the lack of progress in multilateral trade negotiations, trade has increased as a percentage of global GDP over the past decade. Trade fell sharply in 2020 following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic but rebounded dramatically in 2021, exceeding pre-pandemic levels (see Figure 51). Low- and middle-income countries also increased their share of global trade over the past decade.

This rise in trade has coincided with a decrease in global poverty, driven in part by a large decrease in poverty in China (see Figure 52).<sup>114</sup> However, this decrease has slowed over the past decade and temporarily reversed in 2019 and 2020 following the outbreak of COVID-19. As of 2022, global poverty had still not returned to pre-pandemic levels. Moreover, the expansion of global trade has not benefited everyone. Many developing countries remain dependent on the export of commodities, which can make them vulnerable to economic shocks.<sup>115</sup> Trade has also increased income inequality within many countries.<sup>116</sup>

Trade is also being impacted by growing geopolitical tensions. Disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to rising food, fuel, and fertilizer prices that particularly hurt developing countries.<sup>117</sup> In addition, competition between the US and China led both countries to impose retaliatory tariffs against each other beginning in 2018.<sup>118</sup> Yet the US and China are exceptions in this regard. Despite some fluctuations, particularly a spike in 2019, tariffs on agriculture, manufacturing, and natural resources have all slightly decreased over the past decade (see Figure 53). Still, tariffs remain high in certain sectors, particularly on agricultural and textile products exported by developing countries.<sup>119</sup>

FIGURE 51  
Trade as a percentage of global GDP, 2000–2022



Source: World Bank

110. WTO, “Members Updated on Progress in Dispute Settlement Reform Talks in Run-up to MC13,” January 26, 2024; Ian Allen, “It’s Time for the United States to End Its Bipartisan Attack on the WTO,” *Just Security*, March 4, 2024.

111. UNCTAD was formerly known as the UN Conference on Trade and Development but rebranded in early 2024.

112. UNCTAD, *Review of the Technical Cooperation Activities of UNCTAD and Their Financing—Report of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD*, UN Doc. TD/B/WP/325/Add.2, September 8, 2023.

113. On UNCTAD’s contentious history of relations with developed countries, see: John Toye, “UNCTAD at 50: A Short History,” UNCTAD, 2014.

114. Barbara D’Andrea et al., “Thirty Years of Trade Growth and Poverty Reduction,” WTO, April 24, 2024.

115. UNCTAD, “The State of Commodity Dependence 2023,” 2023.

116. UNCTAD, *Trade Policies and Their Impact on Inequalities—Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat*, UN Doc. TD/B/66/4, May 6, 2019.

117. UNCTAD, “The Impact on Trade and Development of the War in Ukraine: UNCTAD Rapid Assessment,” March 16, 2022.


118. UNCTAD, “Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy 2023,” 2023.

119. UNCTAD, “Tariff Trends Mostly Downwards, but Non-tariff Measures Increasingly Used,” available at <https://sdgpulse.unctad.org/trade-barriers/>.



FIGURE 52

### Proportion of the population living below national poverty lines, 2000–2022




Source: World Bank

The decrease in tariffs also comes alongside an increase in non-tariff barriers, such as technical regulations for imported goods or anti-dumping rules. These barriers, which now affect 70 percent of world trade, have come to have an even bigger impact than formal tariffs.<sup>120</sup> Overall, the past decade has seen a shift toward such trade-restrictive policies (see Figure 54). The biggest shift

FIGURE 54

### Trade-facilitating policies, 2009–2023




Source: Global Trade Alert

came in 2019 following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led many countries to implement trade-restricting measures such as export controls.<sup>121</sup> While trade-restricting policies can have positive effects—for example, they are increasingly being used as a tool for climate action—they can also have negative effects—such as when they inhibit the ability of developing countries to export their agricultural products.<sup>122</sup>

FIGURE 53

### Global average trade tariff rate between WTO members (most favored nation status), 2000–2021



Source: World Bank

120. UNCTAD, "Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy 2023."

121. UNCTAD, "Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Trade and Development: Lessons Learned," 2022.

122. UNCTAD, "Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy 2023."

## Inclusivity

As in the other domains, the indicators used in the Multilateralism Index point toward increased inclusivity of women and civil society in the trade domain. It is less clear whether gains have been made in terms of geographic inclusivity.


The number of NGOs accredited for observer status by UNCTAD has steadily increased, with a particularly large jump in 2023 (see Figure 55). The WTO also invites participation from NGOs, but data on NGO participation is not publicly available, and the end

of multilateral trade talks reduces the number of opportunities for engagement.

In terms of gender inclusivity, WTO staff have been majority women for more than a decade. While the WTO still falls short of gender parity at the leadership level, the proportion of women leaders increased substantially over the past five years (see Figure 56). The WTO has also increased its focus on gender over the past decade, including with the establishing of an Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender in 2020 and the launch of a Gender Research Hub in 2021.

FIGURE 55


### UN Trade and Development NGO accreditations, 2000–2023



Source: UNCTAD

FIGURE 56

### Gender parity in WTO staff and leadership, 2013, 2018, and 2023



Source: WTO

# Methodology

The Multilateralism Index measures the UN-based multilateral system in relative terms, identifying in what areas it has grown stronger or weaker in comparison to a decade ago. As such, it provides a snapshot of its state in 2023 compared to 2013. Where 2023 data is unavailable, the latest available data has been used.

## Mechanics of the Index

The Multilateralism Index has been constructed in the following way:

- Unit of analysis: Global/multilateral body
- Timeframe: 2013-2023
- Scale: Scores for all indicators are banded and normalized on a scale of 0-100, with 100 representing the best possible score and zero representing the worst possible score.
- Timescale of banding: 2000-2023 (for indicators banded by highest and/or lowest values on record); in cases in which data does not go back to 2000, the oldest value on record is used
- Weights: Equal weighting of indicators
- Imputation: At the tails of time series, values were kept constant based on latest available or earliest available data
- Interpolation: In cases where global averages relied on country data, linear interpolation was used to fill any missing values between data points. This was the case for the Births with Skilled Staff Present and Global Average Trade Tariffs indicators.
- Global averages: In cases where indicators use global average rates or other values, these represent a simple mean of values across all countries.

Normalization and banding of indicators:

- Where datasets had clearly defined maximum and minimum scores, the original bounds were used.
- Where datasets did not have clearly defined maximum and minimum scores or clear cut-offs, the observed minimum and maximum values from each dataset (e.g., lowest and highest values since the year 2000) were used to establish the bandings.

## Framework of the Index: Domains, Dimensions, and Indicators

As with the 2022 edition of the Multilateralism Index, the 2024 edition comprises five domains, each of which is analyzed based on multiple indicators grouped into three dimensions: Participation, Performance, and Inclusivity. In contrast to the 2022 edition, in which the number of indicators in each domain ranged from 10 to 15, all domains in the 2024 edition include exactly nine indicators.

To help make changes comparable across domains, the selection of the indicators for each domain has been guided by the definitions of each of the three dimensions as well as a number of “areas of focus” within them. For all domains, there are three indicators (corresponding to three areas of focus) in the Participation dimension, four indicators (corresponding to two areas of focus) in the Performance dimension, and two indicators (corresponding to two areas of focus) in the Inclusivity dimension.

A full breakdown of this framework—with the definition of each dimension and areas of focus—is provided in Appendices B and C. The sources of the indicators are provided in Appendix D.

## APPENDIX A: Lists of Treaties and Explanation of Power-Weighted Treaties

The Multilateralism Index uses the treaties and agreements listed in the table below to assess the relevant indicator for each domain. In measuring commitment to these treaties over time, it is important to account for the evolution of the multilateral system. Any normalized measure must reflect changes in the number of UN member states (for instance, there were 117 member states in 1965, 159 in 1990, and 193 since 2011) as well as the number of relevant treaties in existence in any given year.

It is also important to recognize that not all countries wield equal influence in the multilateral system. The Multilateralism Index thus weights country commitment to treaties by their scores in the National Material Capabilities Index (NMCI). The NMCI scores countries' relative power based on six factors: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. When treaty commitments are weighted by the NMCI, each treaty's total score is reflective of the percentage of global power behind it rather than the percentage of countries that have ratified it (out of all existing countries in a given year).

Domain	Instrument	Year of Introduction
<b>Peace and Security</b>	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)	1925
	Antarctic Treaty	1959
	Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water	1963
	Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies	1967
	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	1968
	Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof	1971
	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	1972
	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	1977
	Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies	1980
	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	1981
	Treaty on Open Skies	1992
	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	1993
	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	1996
	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction	1997
	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	2005
	Convention on Cluster Munitions	2008
	Arms Trade Treaty	2013
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	2017	
<b>Human Rights</b>	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)	1965
	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	1966
	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	1966
	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)	1980
	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	1985
	Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	1990
	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)	1991
	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)	2007
	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED)	2007

<b>Climate Action</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	1992
	Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol)	1997
	Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris Agreement)	2016
<b>Public Health</b>	Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO)	1948
	International Health Regulations	1969/2005
	Agreement on the establishment of the International Vaccine Institute (IVI)	1996
	WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control	2003
	Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products	2012
<b>Trade</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO Membership	1948/1995

## APPENDIX B: Definitions of Dimensions and Areas of Focus Used in the Index

Dimension	Indicator areas of focus
<p><b>Participation:</b> How the international system is supported, accessed, and utilized by states</p>	<p><b>Membership:</b> The degree to which countries have joined multilateral bodies and agreements and actively engage in the mechanisms and instruments that these bodies and agreements promote, weighted by states' global power</p>
	<p><b>State Financial Contributions:</b> The level of voluntary funding that multilateral bodies receive from states</p>
	<p><b>Engagement:</b> The level of states' non-financial contributions to multilateral initiatives, proactive outreach to multilateral bodies, or follow-through on multilateral agreements</p>
<p><b>Performance:</b> How well the multilateral system addresses key focus areas</p>	<p><b>Activity 1:</b> The level of implementation of actions by multilateral bodies or states in pursuit of established multilateral objectives</p>
	<p><b>Activity 2:</b> The level of implementation of actions by multilateral bodies or states in pursuit of established multilateral objectives</p>
	<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> The degree to which social, economic, and other measures reflect improvements within multilateral bodies' areas of concern</p>
	<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> The degree to which social, economic, and other measures reflect improvements within multilateral bodies' areas of concern</p>
<p><b>Inclusivity:</b> How the multilateral system engages and is supported by non-state actors and the degree to which women are represented in multilateral institutions and processes</p>	<p><b>Non-state Engagement:</b> The degree to which non-state actors are able to establish relations with multilateral bodies and participate in their activities</p>
	<p><b>Gender Parity:</b> The percentage of women represented among the personnel and leadership of multilateral bodies</p>

## APPENDIX C: Structure and Composition of the Index

Domain	Dimension	Indicator	Time period	Score of 0	Score of 100	Source
Peace and Security	Participation	Power-weighted Disarmament Treaties	1925-2023 1816-2016	No UN member states have ratified any treaties	All UN member states have ratified all treaties	UN; COW; IEP
		UN Peacebuilding Fund	2006-2023	No funding	Highest funding on record	MPTF Office
		Number of Countries Contributing Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations	2000-2023	Lowest on record	Highest on record	UN
	Performance	UN Security Council Vetoes	1980-2023	Highest number on record	0 vetoes	UN
		Number of Resolutions Passed at the UN Security Council	1945-2023	No resolutions	Highest number of resolutions on record	UN
		Lasting Peace Agreements	1990-2023	All peace agreements are in countries experiencing at least one year with more than 100 battle deaths in the 5 years following the peace agreement	All peace agreements are in countries experiencing fewer than 100 battle deaths each year in the 5 years following the peace agreement	PA-X; IEP
		Number and Lethality of Conflicts (composite indicator)	1989-2023	Highest number of conflicts, civilian deaths, and battle deaths on record	Lowest number of conflicts, civilian deaths, and battle deaths on record	UCDP
	Inclusivity	Arria-Formula Meetings with Civil Society Representation	2000-2023	No meetings with civil society organizations	Highest number of meetings with civil society organizations on record	UN; Security Council Report
		Proportion of Uniformed Women Deployed to Peacekeeping Operations	2009-2023	Lowest on record	Highest on record	UN
	Domain	Dimension	Indicator	Time period	Score of 0	Score of 100
Human Rights	Participation	Power-weighted Human Rights Treaties	1966-2023 1816-2016	No UN member states have ratified any treaties	All UN member states have ratified all existing treaties	OHCHR
		OHCHR State Funding	2008-2023	No funding	Highest funding on record	OHCHR
		Percentage of Countries with Standing Invitations for Special Procedures Visits	1999-2023	All countries have issued standing invitations	No countries have issued standing invitations	OHCHR
	Performance	Number of Resolutions passed at the UN Human Rights Council	2006-2023	Lowest on record	Highest on record	UN
		Human Rights Index	1789-2023	Score of 0	Score of 1	V-Dem
		Global Average PTS Human Rights Score	1976-2023	All countries score a 5 on PTS	All countries score a 1 on PTS	Political Terror Scale
		Average UN Human Rights Council PTS Human Rights Score	2008-2023	All UNHRC members score a 5 on PTS	All UNHRC members score a 1 on PTS	Political Terror Scale
	Inclusivity	Number of NGO Observers in UN Human Rights Council Sessions	2006-2022	No NGOs	Highest number of NGOs on record	OHCHR
		Gender Parity in OHCHR Staff and Leadership (composite indicator)	2007-2023	No women staff	At least 50% of staff are women, overall and at the director-level	UN

Domain	Dimension	Indicator	Time period	Score of 0	Score of 100	Source
Climate Action	Participation	Power-weighted Climate Change Treaties	1994-2023 1816-2016	No UN member states have ratified any agreements	All UN member state have ratified all existing agreements	IEADB; COW
		Multilateral Climate Finance	2013-2022	No funding to multilateral climate funds	Highest funding on record to multilateral climate funds	OECD
		Adherence to Global Climate Policy Goals	2011-2023	Seven of the world's largest polluters all have critically insufficient policies	Seven of the world's largest polluters all have policies to meet 1.5-degree target	Climate Action Tracker
	Performance	Electricity Generated from Renewable Sources	2000-2023	No electricity generated from renewable sources	All electricity generated from renewable sources	IEA
		Global Average Climate-Related Tax Revenue (as a % of GDP)	1994-2021	No climate-related tax revenue	Highest climate-related tax revenue on record	OECD
		CO2 Emissions	1750-2022	Highest CO2 emissions on record	Lowest CO2 emissions on record	Global Carbon Project
		Environmental Resilience	2015-2021	All countries score 0 in IMF-adapted ND-GAIN index	All countries score 100 in the IMF-adapted ND-GAIN Index	IMF
	Inclusivity	NGOs admitted to COP	1995-2023	No NGOs	Highest number of NGOs on record	UNFCCC
		Women's Membership on UNFCCC Boards and Bodies	2013-2022	No women on 12 boards and bodies	On average, 12 boards/bodies are composed of at least 50% women and at least 50% of boards/bodies have women as leaders	Gender Climate Tracker
	Domain	Dimension	Indicator	Time period	Score of 0	Score of 100
Public Health	Participation	Power-weighted Global Health Agreements	1947-2023 1816-2016	No UN member states have ratified/signed any agreements	All UN member states ratified/signed all existing agreements	UN Treaty Collection, COW
		WHO Country Revenue	2010-2023	No country revenue	Highest amount of revenue on record	WHO
		IHR Country Reporting	2010-2023	No WHO member states have submitted IHR-SPAR monitoring reports	All WHO member states have submitted IHR-SPAR monitoring reports	WHO
	Performance	Global Average Births with Skilled Health Staff Present	2000-2022	No births with skilled staff	All births with skilled staff	World Bank
		Vaccine Coverage	1980-2022	No vaccines	Universal vaccine coverage	World Bank
		Global Life Expectancy	1960-2022	Lowest global life expectancy on record	Highest global life expectancy on record	World Bank
		IHR Global Capacity	2010-2023	All WHO member states score 0 across all IHR-SPAR capacity measures	All WHO member states score 100 across all IHR-SPAR capacity measures	WHO
	Inclusivity	WHO Non-state Actor Official Relations	2000-2023	No non-state actor relations	Highest number of non-state actor relations on record	WHO
		Gender Parity in WHO Staff and Leadership (composite indicator)	2005-2023	No women staff	At least 50% women, overall and at the director-level	WHO



Domain	Dimension	Indicator	Time period	Score of 0	Score of 100	Source
Trade	Participation	Power-weighted WTO-GATT Membership	1948-2023 1816-2016	No UN member states are WTO/GATT members	All UN member states are WTO/GATT members	WTO
		UNCTAD State Funding	1995-2022	No funding	Highest funding on record	UN Trade and Development
		WTO Requests for Consultations	1995-2023	No requests for consultations	Highest number of requests on record	WTO
	Performance	Poverty Headcount Ratio	2000-2023	Highest percentage on record	Lowest percentage on record	World Bank
		Global Average Trade Tariffs (Most Favored Nation Status)	1988-2021	Highest global average tariff rate on record	No trade tariffs	World Bank
		Trade-Facilitating Policies	2008-2023	All domestic trade policies can be classified as protectionist	No domestic trade policies can be classified as protectionist	Global Trade Alert
		Trade as a Percentage of Global GDP	1970-2022	No trade	All GDP based on trade	World Bank
	Inclusivity	UNCTAD NGO Accreditations	1993-2023	No accreditations	Highest number of accreditations on record	WTO
		Gender Parity in WTO Staff and Leadership (composite indicator)	2005-2023	No women	At least 50% women, overall and at the director-level	WTO

## APPENDIX D: Indicator Sources

Domain	Indicator	Source(s)
Peace and Security	Power-weighted Disarmament Treaties	<a href="https://treaties.unoda.org/treaties">https://treaties.unoda.org/treaties</a> <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/">https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/</a>
	UN Peacebuilding Fund	<a href="https://mpf.undp.org/fund/pb000">https://mpf.undp.org/fund/pb000</a>
	Number of Countries Contributing Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations	<a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors</a>
	UN Security Council Vetoes	<a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick">https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick</a>
	Number of Resolutions Passed at the UN Security Council	<a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0">https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0</a>
	Lasting Peace Agreements	<a href="https://pax.peaceagreements.org/downloads/">https://pax.peaceagreements.org/downloads/</a>
	Number and Lethality of Conflicts (composite indicator)	<a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/">https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/</a>
	Arria-Formula Meetings with Civil Society Representation	<a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/research-tools/Arria-formula">https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/research-tools/Arria-formula</a>
	Proportion of Uniformed Women Deployed to Peacekeeping Operations	<a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender">https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender</a>
Human Rights	Power-weighted Human Rights Treaties	<a href="https://indicators.ohchr.org/">https://indicators.ohchr.org/</a> <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/">https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/</a>
	OHCHR State Funding	<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/funding-and-budget/our-donors">https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/funding-and-budget/our-donors</a>
	Percentage of Countries with Standing Invitations for Special Procedures Visits	<a href="https://spinternet.ohchr.org/StandingInvitations.aspx">https://spinternet.ohchr.org/StandingInvitations.aspx</a>
	Number of Resolutions Passed at the UN Human Rights Council	<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/documents">https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/documents</a>
	Human Rights Index	<a href="https://www.v-dem.net/">https://www.v-dem.net/</a>
	Global Average PTS Human Rights Score	<a href="https://www.politicalerrorscale.org/Data/Download.html">https://www.politicalerrorscale.org/Data/Download.html</a>
	Average UN Human Rights Council PTS Human Rights Score	<a href="https://www.politicalerrorscale.org/Data/Download.html">https://www.politicalerrorscale.org/Data/Download.html</a> <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/membership">https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/membership</a>
	Number of NGO Observers in UN Human Rights Council Sessions	<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session55/regular-session">https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session55/regular-session</a>
	Gender Parity in OHCHR Staff and Leadership (composite indicator)	<a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/594279?ln=en&amp;v=pdf">https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/594279?ln=en&amp;v=pdf</a>
Climate Action	Power-weighted Climate Change Treaties	<a href="https://iea.uoregon.edu/base-agreement-list?page=">https://iea.uoregon.edu/base-agreement-list?page=</a> <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/">https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/</a>
	Multilateral Climate Finance	<a href="https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/">https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/</a>
	Adherence to Global Climate Policy Goals	<a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/">https://climateactiontracker.org/</a>
	Electricity Generated from Renewable Sources	<a href="https://www.iea.org/energy-system/renewables">https://www.iea.org/energy-system/renewables</a>
	Global Average Climate-Related Tax Revenue (as a % of GDP)	<a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ERTR">https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ERTR</a>
	CO2 Emissions	<a href="https://globalcarbonatlas.org">https://globalcarbonatlas.org</a> <a href="https://globalcarbonatlas.org/carbonbudget2023">https://globalcarbonatlas.org/carbonbudget2023</a>
	Environmental Resilience	<a href="https://climatedata.imf.org/pages/adaptation">https://climatedata.imf.org/pages/adaptation</a>
	NGOs admitted to COP	<a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/statistics#Statistics-on-admission">https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/statistics#Statistics-on-admission</a>
	Women's Membership on UNFCCC Boards and Bodies	<a href="https://genderclimatetracker.org/statistics-bodies">https://genderclimatetracker.org/statistics-bodies</a>

<b>Public Health</b>	Power-weighted Global Health Agreements	<a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Index.aspx?clang=_en">https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Index.aspx?clang=_en</a> <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/">https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/</a>
	WHO Country Revenue	WHO (Received on request by email)
	IHR Country Reporting	<a href="https://extranet.who.int/sph/spar">https://extranet.who.int/sph/spar</a>
	Global Average Births with Skilled Health Staff Present	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.BRTC.ZS">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.BRTC.ZS</a>
	Vaccine Coverage	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.IMM.IDPT">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.IMM.IDPT</a>
	Global Life Expectancy	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.dyn.le00.in?name_desc=true">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.dyn.le00.in?name_desc=true</a>
	IHR Global Capacity	<a href="https://extranet.who.int/e-spar/#submission-details">https://extranet.who.int/e-spar/#submission-details</a>
	WHO Non-state Actor Official Relations	<a href="https://www.who.int/about/collaboration/non-state-actors">https://www.who.int/about/collaboration/non-state-actors</a>
	Gender Parity in WHO Staff and Leadership (composite indicator)	<a href="https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/How%20We%20Work/UNSystemCoordination/data/un/Trends/WHO.pdf">https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/How%20We%20Work/UNSystemCoordination/data/un/Trends/WHO.pdf</a>
<b>Trade</b>	Power-weighted WTO-GATT Membership	<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm">https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm</a> <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/">https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/</a>
	UNCTAD State Funding	<a href="https://unctad.org/projects/funding-sources">https://unctad.org/projects/funding-sources</a>
	WTO Requests for Consultations	<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm">https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm</a>
	Poverty Headcount Ratio	<a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/themes/poverty-and-inequality.html">https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/themes/poverty-and-inequality.html</a>
	Global Average Trade Tariffs (Most Favored Nation Status)	<a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.FN.ZS">https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.FN.ZS</a>
	Trade-Facilitating Policies	<a href="https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction">https://www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction</a>
	Trade as a Percentage of Global GDP	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS</a>
	UNCTAD NGO Accreditations	<a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdngolistd28_en.pdf">https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdngolistd28_en.pdf</a>
	Gender Parity in WTO Staff and Leadership (composite indicator)	<a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3885020?ln=en&amp;v=pdf">https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3885020?ln=en&amp;v=pdf</a>

The **INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI)** is an independent, non-profit organization working to strengthen inclusive multilateralism for a more peaceful and sustainable planet. Through its research, convening, and strategic advising, IPI provides innovative recommendations for the United Nations System, member states, regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector. With staff from around the world and a broad range of academic fields, IPI's office faces United Nations headquarters in New York.

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